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Indeterminacy and Incommensurability
in Constitutional Law
Steven L. Wintert
Progressive constitutional scholarship has yet fully to confront the
implications of the conservative shift in constitutionallaw. Liberal critics
continue to seek governing constitutional theories with which to constrain
decisionmakingby judges of a notably different mind. Other, more radical scholars employ the indeterminacy and "law is politics" critiques in a
more open attempt at displacement. Neither approach is viable, however.
Each presumes the primacy of the autonomous,self-directingsubject; each
resists recognition of the situated nature of all human endeavor. This
essay adopts the alternativestrategy: exploring the implications of situatedness as they apply to the development, practice, and attempted
reconstruction of modern constitutional law. After evaluating the lessons
of history, the essay suggests a reconceptualizationof "constitutionalpolitics" which better reflects the parameters that both limit and enable
change. It explores the possibilitiesfor reconstruction through revisionist
readings of three familiar cases-West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, Brown v.
Board of Education, and Griswold v. Connecticut These rereadings
reveal not only that the recognition of situatedness and its constitutional
implicationsare alreadyapartof the canon, but also that they are the very
center of modern constitutionalconcern.
Copyright 0 1990 by Steven L. Winter. All rights reserved.
t Professor, University of Miami School of Law; Visiting Professor, Yale Law School. B.A.
1974, Yeshiva College; J.D. 1977, Columbia University. I am grateful to Mark Tushnet and Mike
Seidman for inviting me to the symposium for which an earlier version of this paper was first
prepared. Since this essay is about situatedness, it is particularly appropriate to acknowledge that
many of these ideas were generated in correspondence and conversation with Pierre Schlag, Mark
Tushnet, Mark Johnson, Milner Ball, Fred Schauer, and Bruce Ackerman. I am grateful to them
and to Frank Michelman, Paul Kahn, George Lakoff, Steve Schnably, Mike Fischl, Jeremy Paul,
Jennifer Jaff, Pat Gudridge, and Lynn Winter for their comments and suggestions.
This essay is dedicated to the memory of my friend Malcolm Rucker.
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The blade wears out the sheath, and in the end no one is satisfied, neither
the philosopher nor the powers that be.1
I
LAW "AND" THEORY

Not long ago, I was invited to a symposium with the deceptively
simple title, "Constitutional Law and Theory in a Conservative Era."
The implicit question--"What are we to do?"-seemed straightforward
enough, however obscure the answer might be. Yet the more I pondered
the title, the more difficult I found the whole idea. First, I kept inserting
into the title the word "practice" (as, in fact, I did once again when I sat
down to write this). Perhaps this merely reflects the lingering effects of
eight years of it. But checking the invitation didn't really help. For,
once I wrestled the word "theory" back into place, I began to fixate on
the word "and." This is embarrassing, I thought. Why am I having such
difficulty with this simple title? But then I realized that, depending on
how one reads the seemingly innocent word "and," the questions put by
the title could be quite different. In fact, I asked myself: What is the
subject? Constitutional law, or constitutional theory, or both, or the
relations between the two? Or is it constitutional-law-and-theory as a
unitary subject?2
Imagine my embarrassment over having so complicated such a simple matter. But then I realized that there was something more profound
at work, something peculiarly of our time. I began to focus on the "and"
and the way it both mediates and holds apart the words that flank it. In
doing so, I saw that the disjunctive effect of this "and" overwhelms its
simple conjunctive meaning just as the predicament of constitutional theory in a conservative era overshadows the ordinary assumption that
judges and constitutional law scholars are engaged in more or less the
same enterprise. This disjunctive "and" suggests, therefore, that the
problems of constitutional law and theory in a conservative era are
problems of incommensurability-that is, the quite substantial risk that
the two will not talk to each other.
Even if it were a simple conjunction, this "and" would nevertheless
present the question of the relations between law and theory, generally,
and between constitutional law and constitutional theory in a conservative era, specifically. We might conclude that law is driven and controlled by theory (of the Grand Theory type), and then concentrate on
getting just the right governing theory to combat the reigning conserva1. M. MERLEAu-PoNTY, ADvENrruRs OF THE DIALECTIC 72 (J. Bien trans. 1973)
[hereinafter M. MERLEAu-Po~rY, DIALECTIC].
2. It did occur to me, of course, that the ambiguity was intentional and designed to keep the
subject of the symposium radically indeterminate.
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tism. Or we might conclude that theory actually follows the law, that
theory is an ex post rhetorical product culled from the contingent artifacts of constitutional decisionmaking. In that case, the challenge would
be either to construct the best constitutional rhetoric with which to persuade others in normative dialogue or to deconstruct the constitutional
discourse that currently holds sway on the Court. But, in a conservative
era, this choice would leave us between a constitutional Scylla and
Charybdis: either mired in the hopeless task of synthesizing Warren
Court precedents into coherent theories that could bind or persuade a
Court of a radically different mind;3 or condemned to the reactive task of
de-synthesizing Rehnquist Court precedents in an effort to undermine its
program and to persuade others (presumedly political actors) that it
lacks legitimacy.
If this picture seems bleak, it should seem equally familiar. What I
have sketched above is the outline of the current debate among liberal-toleft legal scholars. On one side, we have governing theories like Ronald
Dworkin's concept of law as integrity;4 Bruce Ackerman's notion of
amendment outside article V as an exercise of an extraconstitutional popular sovereignty; 5 John Hart Ely's notion of representation-reenforcing
review;' the recent republican revival that seeks to ground adjudication
in "civic virtue" and "public values"; 7 and Michael Perry's conception of
constitutional decisionmaking as morally driven.' On the other side, we
have an increasing array of indeterminacy and "law is politics" arguments that attempt to expose the constructed and contingent nature of
law itself and, thus, to challenge the legitimacy of its current manifestations. This critical camp is by no means monolithic, although its members and their positions are readily identifipble. The most moderate
3. This characterization, of course, is Mark Tushnet's description of mainstream
constitutional law scholarship. See M. TusHNET, RED, WmTE AND BLUE: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS
OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at vii (1988); Tushnet, CharacterAsArgument, 14 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY
539, 539 n.1 (1989).
4. R. DwoRKmN, LAW'S EMPIRE 225-28 (1986).
5. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics/Constitutional Law, 99 YALE LJ. 453 (1989)
[hereinafter Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics]); Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures Discovering the
Constitution, 93 YALE L.J. 1013 (1984) [hereinafter Ackerman, Storrs Lectures]. I discuss
Ackerman's work in greater detail at infra text accompanying notes 371-418 and 444-521.
6. J. ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DIStRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEw (1980). For a
particularly thoughtful critique of Ely, see Regan, Community and Justicein ConstitutionalTheory,
1985 Wls. L. REv. 1073.
7. See, eg., Michelman, The Supreme Court, 198S Term-Foreword: Traces of Selfo
Governmen4 100 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1986); Sunstein, Interest Groups in American Public Law, 38
STAN. L. REV. 29 (1985); Fiss, The Supreme Court, 1978 Term-Foreword.The Forms ofJustice, 93
HARv. L. REv. 1 (1979). Aspects of Michelman's work are discussed at infra text accompanying
notes 173-226.
8. M. PERRY, THE CONSTITUTION, THE CoumRS, AND HUMAN RIGHT (1982); see infra text
accompanying note 171.
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position is that of Cass Sunstein in his Lochner's Legacy piece; 9 the most
radical is that of Mark Tushnet in his extensive oeuvre;10 and the most
comprehensive statement is presented in Stone, Seidman, Sunstein, and
Tushnet's ConstitutionalLaw. I
Regardless of whether we take the route of governing theory or of
theory as rhetorical product, our simple conjunctive "and" has already
driven a wedge between constitutional law and theory. Whichever
approach we take, we have already separated law from theory and placed
the latter on the outside trying to get back in. 2 This separation is una-

voidable in the case of governing theory, which must be autonomous and
discrete if it is to be able to constrain constitutional decisionmaking. But

much the same is true of theory-as-rhetorical-product: It is something
that must first be extracted from past decisions and then reintroduced to
the debate in an effort to persuade current actors. Indeed, in its main-

stream form, theory-as-rhetorical-product is expected to work much like
governing theory-that is, it must be external to the contemporaneous
conservative practices of constitutional law if it is to be successful as a
rhetorical force powerful enough to persuade today's conservative judges

to change position.
But what about constitutional theory's more radical manifestations?
Don't they avoid these problems? After all, the whole idea is to decline
to exert a direct influence on the current practices of constitutional decisionmaking and, instead, to undermine or supplant them altogether. But
in that very sense, the wedge between constitutional law and theory is as
deep and real as it can be. The two don't talk to each other at all.
Stanley Fish contends that this wedge is endemic because theory

and practice are entirely distinct activities.1 3 But that is not my point.
9. Sunstein, Lochner's Legacy, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 873 (1987). Aspects of his article are
discussed at infra notes 79, 405, 427-42 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., M. TUSHNET, supra note 3; Tushnet, Following the Rules Laid Down: A Critique
of Interpretivism and Neutral Principles, 96 HARV. L. REv. 781 (1983) [hereinafter Tushnet,
Following the Rules]; Tushnet, Darkness on the Edge of Town: The Contributionsof John HartEly to
Constitutional Theory, 89 YALE L.J. 1037 (1980).
11. G. SToNE, L. SEIDMAN, C. SuNsmN & M. TUSHNET, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1986).
12. "The objection to the concept of [law as politics] ... conceives of constitutional constraints
as, is some sense, coming from the outside. The democratic position, in contrast, believes that the
most effective constraints are those that come from within." Tushnet, Principles, Politics, and
ConstitutionalLaw, 88 MIcH. L. Rav. 49, 81 (1989). I have tried to develop an expanded sense of
what it might mean for constraints to "come from within," in a series of articles on law and cognitive
theory. See Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and the Problem of Self-Governance 40 STAN. L.
REv. 1371 (1988) [hereinafter Winter, The Metaphor of Standing]; Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense MetaphoricReasoning, and the Cognitive Stakesfor Law, 137 U. PA. L. REv. 1105 (1989)
[hereinafter Winter, Transcendental Nonsense]; Winter, The Cognitive Dimension of the Agon
Between Legal Power and NarrativeMeaning, 87 MIcH. L. REv. 2225 (1989) [hereinafter Winter,
The Cognitive Dimension]; Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 639
(1990) [hereinafter Winter, Bull Durham]. I return to this notion later, in Part IV.
13. See, eg., Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773 (1987); Fish,
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Fish's position depends, on one hand, on an entirely reified, objectivist
view of theory and, on the other hand, on an excessively closed view of
practice.14 Nor is it my point that theory and critique have had no
impact on constitutional law. On the contrary, the critiques referred to
above have had a lasting and, in some sense, irreversible impact on the
way we understand constitutional law. Rather, I am claiming that, in a
conservative era, the relations between theory and practice present formidable problems of incommensurability precisely to the extent that we, as
liberal-to-left legal academics, would like theory to work as a check on,
counterbalance to, or replacement for the current practices of conservative constitutional decisionmaking.
So how do we escape this constitutional Scylla and Charybdis?

Although the critical legal studies critique of liberal legalism has made
important contributions, its concomitant adoption of the indeterminacy
and "law is politics" arguments invites endless problems of skepticism

and incommensurability. To find a path through the maze, we need an
alternate strategy, a strategy informed by a better understanding of our
situation. To begin, we need an epistemological understanding that
allows us to recognize the constructed nature of meaning without
renouncing what is valuable in those constructions.
For this task, I turn to two extralegal sources-one familiar, the
other not. The first is Thomas Kuhn, whose influential account of the

history of science reflects an integrated understanding of both the relativism of human knowledge and the reality of scientific progress. 5 The
second is the French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty.' 6 Although
relatively unexplored in legal scholarship, 17 Merleau-Ponty's work is
Fish v. Fiss, 36 STAN. L. REv. 1325 (1984). Both these essays are reprinted with several others in S.
FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE, RHETORIC, AND THE PRACTICE OF THEORY

IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES (1989) [hereinafter DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY].
14. For the demonstration of this point, see Winter, Bull Durham,supra note 12, and Schlag,

Fish v. Zapp: The Case of the Relatively Autonomous Self, 76 GEO. L.J. 37, 55-58 (1987).
15.
16.

T. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF ScIENrIFc REVOLUTIONS 167-73, 205-07 (2d ed. 1970).
Merleau-Ponty was a contemporary and companion of Jean-Paul Sartre. With Sartre, he

was cofounder of the journal Les Temps modernes he served as the political editor of the journal
from 1945 to 1950. After the outbreak of the Korean War, Merleau-Ponty resigned from the
journal, renounced his "wait-and-see" approach to Marxism, and endorsed parliamentary
democracy as "the only known institution that guarantees a minimum of opposition and of truth."
M. MERLEAU-PoNTY, DIALE='rc, supra note 1, at 226; see id at 227-33. For a helpful, nuanced
introduction to Merleau-Ponty's political thought, see K. WHITESIDE, MERLEAU-PoTrY AND THE
FOUNDATION OF AN EXIsTENTIAL POLITICS (1988). For a development of Merleau-Ponty's
philosophical thought (particularly his phenomenology of the body) as well as its connections to his
political thought, see J. O'NEILL, THE COMMUNICATIVE BODY: STUDIES IN COMMUNICATIVE
PHILOSOPHY, POLITICS, AND SOCIOLOGY (1989).

17. Authors in legal periodicals commonly cite Merleau-Ponty as one of the European
phenomenologists. See, eg., Boyle, The Politics ofReason: CriticalLegal Studies and Local Social
Thought, 133 U. PA. L. REV. 685, 741-42 n.164 (1985); Rubin, The PracticeandDiscourse of Legal
Scholarship, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1835, 1835 (1988). Merleau-Ponty also appears in references to
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appropriate to our concerns for two interrelated reasons. In his philo-

sophical writings, Merleau-Ponty recognized both the unavoidably perspectival nature of our experience-which is always experience from
within a cultural and historical situation-and, at the same time, he

rejected the Cartesian skepticism and Sartrean freedom that follow from
traditional views of subject-object relations." In his political writings,
Merleau-Ponty faced a political dilemma strikingly similar to our own:
that of constructing a politics which simultaneously avoids the limitations of liberalism and the failures of Marxism (both Sartrean and otherwise).19 In the Sections that follow, I draw heavily on Kuhn and

Merleau-Ponty in arguing for a view of constitutional law that more fully
appreciates the implications of our situatedness and its role in shaping
both the possibilities of meaning and the difficulties of change.
II
PARADIGMS REGAINED

The indeterminacy critique seeks to unmask legal doctrine for the
social construction that it is. The critique assumes that, in the absence of
a formalist view of language as an acontextual reference to objective reality,20 law can only function as a cover for politics. In a sense, the indeMarxism. See e g., Schlag,An Attack on CategoricalApproaches to Freedom ofSpeech, 30 UCLA L.
REv. 671, 679 n.29 (1983); Richards, Book Review, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1188, 1192-93 (1985).
Although occasional substantive references to Merleau-Ponty's philosophical work appear in
the legal literature, these references are usually isolated and undeveloped. See, eg., Collier,
Precedent and Legal Authority: A CriticalHistory, 1988 WIs. L. REv. 771, 796 n. 112; Van Zandt,
The Relevance of Social Theory to Legal Theory, 83 Nw. U.L. REV. 10, 27 n.85 (1989). An
exception is Mootz, The OntologicalBasis ofLegalHermeneutics:A ProposedModel of InquiryBased
on the Work of Gadamer Habermas andRicoeur, 68 B.U.L. REv. 523 (1988) (relying on MerleauPonty's phenomenology of perception to complement his development of a legal hermeneutics).
My discussion of Merleau-Ponty does not pretend to assess thoroughly his philosophical and
political thought. Merleau-Ponty produced a substantial and difficult written corpus-at least ten
books are available in English translation. Moreover, his philosophical thought shifted in important
ways during the 1950s, moving from an emphasis on a philosophy of history to a Saussurean view of
language. Despite these important shifts, there are continuities in his philosophical thought that
bear upon the concerns of this essay-particularly in his effort to get beyond the subject/object
duality and the relation of this issue to the problems of politics. See generally K. WrITESIDE, supra
note 16 (general discussion of Merleau-Ponty's writings).
For a different application of Merleau-Ponty's thought to law, see W. HAMRICK, AN
EXsTENTIAL PHENOMENOLOGY OF LAW: MAURICE MERLEAU-PONTY (1987). I have reservations
about Professor Hamrick's approach, which both emphasizes different aspects of Merleau-Ponty's
thought and, more importantly, is premised on an understanding of law that is substantially at odds
with my experience of it.
18. See, eg., M. MERLEAu-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY OF PERCEPrION (C. Smith trans. 1962)
[hereinafter M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY].
19. See, eg., M. MERLEAU-PONTY, DALECnc, supra note 1. See generally K. WHITESIDE,

supra note 16.
20. Frederick Schauer has argued that there can be literal meaning and acontextual
reference-and, therefore, formalist law. Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988). In a
previous work, however, I pointed out that even the simplest terms come with culturally relative
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terminacy critique is half correct: Much of the rhetoric of legal
decisionmaking seems to promise a neutrality and objectivity that it does
not deliver. But after the indeterminacy critique has done its quite valuable work of unmasking the law's veneer of objectivity, what remains
becomes a self-consuming artifact. If social construction is all there is,
then where is the critical charge? A socially constructed law is only to be
faulted as such if one is holding out for something more, something truly
objective.
What the indeterminacy critique misses, moreover, is the stubborn
fact that our way of being-in-the-world is-contingently-to construct
certainty all over the place. And we do so without respite.
On the pretext that every rational or linguistic operation condenses a certain thickness of existence and is obscure for itself, one concludes that
nothing can be said with certainty. On the pretext that human acts lose
all their meaning when detached from their context and broken down
into their component parts (like the gestures of the man I can see but do
not hear through the window of a telephone booth), one concludes that
all conduct is senseless. It is easy to strip language and actions of all
meaning and to make them seem absurd, if only one looks at them from
far enough away .... But that other miracle, the fact that, in an absurd
world, language and behavior do have meaning for those who speak and
act, remains to be understood. 2 '
A critical constitutional theory that stakes its hopes on the indeterminacy critique has foreordained its own marginalization, because the question is not whether there is meaning, but rather how there is meaning and
what that meaning is.
We can begin to answer these questions only if we reject both the
belief that meaning has foundations in objective correspondence with the
world and the contrasting view that meaning can be nothing more than
the arbitrary result of unconstrained subjectivity. 2 2 This double renunciation has profound implications for constitutional law and its theory.
The repudiation of objectivism carries 'with it a firm rejection of the
determinacy of the analytic logic that ordinarily dominates the surface of
constitutional law and theory.23 At the same time, the repudiation of
values and contextual assumptions already built into their "literal" meaning. Winter,
Transcendental Nonsense; supra note 12, at 1178-80 (discussing H.L.A. Hart's proverbial rule
prohibiting "vehicles" in the "park"); see also Winter, An Upside/Down View of the
CountermajoritarianDifficulty, 69 TEX. L. RaV. (forthcoming June 1991) [hereinafter Winter,
Upside/Down View].
21. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SENSE Arm NoN-SENSE 39 (H. Dreyfus & P. Dreyfus trans. 1964)
[hereinafter M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SENSE AND NON-SENSE].
22. I have elaborated and defended the premises that underlie this approach to meaning and
rationality in the series of articles cited supra note 12.
23. For explanations of why the model of analytic rationality cannot work without objectivist
foundations, see Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 650-53; Winter, TranscendentalNonsense,
supra note 12, at 1107-10. For alternative presentations of constitutional doctrine in terms of
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pure subjectivism entails a consequent rejection of the view that law is
only instrumental and political.
For many, these renunciations may seem mutually contradictory or

even absurd: Either the object constrains the subject, or the subject must
command the object; if the analytic logic of the discipline (whether law

or theory) does not yield objective results, then it must follow that all
outcomes are subjective and politically motivated. But these alternatives

are only exhaustive if one holds to the distorting perspective of the traditional subject/object dichotomy that, in one way or another, frames
much of the current legal debate.2 4 The quandary of constitutional theory in a conservative era is a perfect example of the consequences of this
distortion: By separating and privileging theory over practice, main-

stream theory merely reenacts the subject/object dichotomy in yet
another inconclusive muddle. It should provide an abject lesson of the

dangers to legal thought posed by the subject/object duality and the litany of exhausted and discredited dichotomies that it entails-like fact/

value, mind/body, internal/external, public/private, freedom/constraint,
reason/passion, and so forth.25

In place of this naive, two-dimensional picture of subject-object relations, we need a more complex conception of the situated nature of all
human endeavor-including cognition. "[W]e are through and through

compounded of relationships with the world ....26 Meaning arises in
nonobjectivist models, see id at 1186-95 (first amendment); id at 1199-206 (congressional
commerce clause power); Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 12, at 1386-93, 1458-78
(standing doctrine).
24. See Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1107-13. Indeed, the underlying
assumption of the subject/object dichotomy is what unites objectivism and subjectivism. In this
sense, subjectivism is itself dependent on and a product of objectivist assumptions. See M.
MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 39 ("we pass from absolute objectivity to
absolute subjectivity, but this second idea is no better than the first and is upheld only against it,
which means by it. The affinity between intellectualism [i.e., idealism] and empiricism [i.e.,
objectivism] is thus much less obvious and much more deeply rooted than is commonly thought.").
25. Cf M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS 226-27 (R. McCleary trans. 1964) [hereinafter M.
MERLEAu-PoNrY, SIGNS]:
There were values and, on the other hand, realities; there was mind and, on the other hand,
body; there was the interior and, on the other hand, the exterior. But what if it were
precisely the case that the order of facts invaded that of values, if it were recognized that
dichotomies are tenable only this side of a certain point of misery and danger? ...
Our century has wiped out the dividing line between "body" and "mind," and sees
human life as through and through mental and corporeal, always based upon the body and
always (even in its most carnal modes) interested in relationships between persons.
See also W. HAMRICK, supra note 17, at 24-25 (For Merleau-Ponty, "the incarnation of form or
structure effectively generates a philosophy dedicated to moving away from a number of parallel
dualisms: mind and body, subject and object, perceiver and perceived, and the internal and the
external.").
26. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at xiii.
The world is not an object such that I have in my possession the law of its making; it is the
natural setting of, and field for, all my thoughts and all my explicit perceptions.... [Tihere
is no inner man, man is the world, and only in the world does he know himself.
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the imaginative interaction of the human organism with its world, and all
meaning is grounded in this experience. 27 We begin with the generalization of rudimentary interactions with the world into mental constructsmodels, metaphors, and schemata-that provide a measure of apparent
unity and determinacy in our experience of the world.2" Thus, we represent the phenomenon of law in terms of our own embodiment: A

body of decisional law-the corpusjuris--consists of seminal cases and
their progeny; our most basic legal principles are embodied in constitutions or statutes. 29 Intersubjective meaning-including communication-is possible in part because we are similarly embodied beings
interacting with the same general environment.30
We also exist in time. The physical and social world in which we
are situated is constantly in flux. Meaning, reference, and rationality are

all possible, but problematic. Humans cope by stabilizing contexts so
that they can communicate, interact, and contend with one another in a

predictable-and, therefore, relatively safe-manner. 31 Because some
measure of communication, cooperation, and constraint on conflict are
necessary to survival---especially in an industrialized, highly interdepen-

dent civilization-humans have a substantial investment in maintaining
this relative stability.32
Id. at xi.
27. See id. at 440 ("[flf I elect to see things from the point of view of Sirius, it is still to my
terrestrial experience that I must have recourse in order to do so .... ."); M. MERLEAU-PONTY,
SENSE AND NoN-SENsE, supra note 21, at 24 ("There can be no consciousness that is not sustained

by its primordial involvement in life and by the manner of this involvement.").
28. M. JOHNSON, THE BODY IN THE MIND: THE BODILY BASIS OF MEANING, IMAGINATION
AND REASON 29 (1987); G. LAKoFF, WOMEN, FIRE, AND DANGEROUS THINGS: WHAT

CATEGORIES REvEAL ABoUT THE MIND (1987). This material is discussed and explained in
Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1129-59.
29. For a discussion of the genesis and systematicity of these and related metaphoric
conceptions of law, see Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1207-24.
30. Id. at 1133-36 (shared experiences "motivate" communication); see also M. MERLEAUPONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 440:

In so far as I have hands, feet, a body, I sustain around me intentions which are not
dependent upon my decisions and which affect my surroundings in a way I do not choose.
These intentions are general... [in] that they are not of my own making, they originate
from outside me, and I am not surprised to find them in all psycho-physical subjects
organized as I am.
31. See P. BERGER & T. LUCKMANN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY: A TREATISE
IN THE SOCIOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 57 (1966).

32. "The inherent instability of the human organism makes it imperative that man himself
provide a stable environment for his conduct." Id. at 50; see also W. HAMRICK, supra note 17, at 27
("[T]he social world ... is organized so as to achieve and maintain an equilibrium with one's
environment."); cf C. PEIRCE, The Fixationof Belief, in THE PHILOSOPHY OF PEIRCE: SELECTED
WRITINGS 5, 10 (J. Buchler ed. 1940):
Doubt is an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves and pass
into the state of belief; while the latter is a calm and satisfactory state which we do not wish
to avoid, or to change to a belief in anything else. On the contrary, we cling tenaciously,
not merely to believing, but to believing just what we do believe.
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Nevertheless, the maintenance of these stabilized contexts is not
merely or even primarily an act of intersubjective will. It is, rather, a
function of the grounded nature of the cognitive process. Because these
socially constructed contexts necessarily precede any given individual,
each of us is unavoidably situated in already existing social practices and
conditions that form both the grounds of intelligibility for and the horizons of our world. As a result, our very ability to construct a world is
already constrained by the cultural constructs within which we are
situated.33 Thus, in a crucial sense, the grounded nature of our cognition
means that we unconsciously reproduce and maintain the stabilized,
socially constructed contexts in which we find ourselves. For this reason,
all forms of thought seem to have a built-in bias toward homeostasis even
though, up close, they are best understood as dynamic patterns of interaction and reformulation. Overall, the system tends toward equilibrium;
the homeostatic tendency is manifested in a sort of dynamic balance.34
Legal meaning is possible because of the temporary stability of context that is achieved through these cognitive and social processes. Legal
rules seem to work relatively unproblematically only to the extent that
"the context is so established, so deeply assumed, that it is invisible to the
observer."3 5 Within a legal/cultural community or subculture that
shares the same contextual, non-neutral assumptions, a system of meaning like constitutional law will work. Moreover, such a system will work
in a seemly neutral and unpolitical way precisely because it operates
unreflectively, without conscious attention to the assumptions that
undergird its meaning.3 6
Within these stabilized matrices, the epistemic and the political are
already mutually entailed in a manner that is likely to be imperceptible to
the participant. Judges, no less than others, are situated in and dependent upon the structures of social meaning that make communication
possible.3 7 Although this situatedness will not yield anything like deter33. See K. WHITESIDE, supra note 16, at 98 (in his existential theory, Merleau-Ponty "shows
that what we accept as reasonable in our personal lives and in our politics is a cultural product, the

result of innumerable concrete experiences and accidents that, from today's point of view, may
appear unreasonable"); Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supranote 12, at 2244-45, 2254 nn.99-100.
34. Cf M. TusHNEr, supra note 3, at 57 (noting the cohesive "pressures exerted by a highly
developed, deeply entrenched, homeostatic social structure"). In using terms like "homeostasis" and
"dynamic balance," I am trying to capture the sense of a cyclical process in which a stabilized
context is constantly disturbed, suffers imbalance, and then "rights" itself. I do not mean to suggest,
however, that the resulting equilibrium will always be the same-as I discuss at infra text
accompanying notes 40-42, 129-32, and 135-58.
35. S.FISH, Consequences, in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 13, at 320-21.
36. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 12, at 2258-60; see also Winter, Upside/Down
View, supra note 20; cf S.FISH, CriticalSelf-Consciousness, Or Can We Know What We Are Doing,

in DOING
37.

WHAT COMES NATURALLY,

supra note 13, at 465-67.

Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 12, at 2255-56.
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minacy,38 the stabilized matrices within which the judges operate will
have already demarcated the arguments and counterarguments they will
recognize as persuasive. 39 And this means that, in a conservative era, the
stabilized matrix will already be largely secure from penetration by the
very arguments and positions that those on the liberal-to-left of the political spectrum would want to urge on the Court. Hence, the quandary of
constitutional theory in a conservative era.
What I have described as a "stabilized matrix" is, in effect, Thomas
Kuhn's concept of a "paradigm" or "disciplinary matrix" that makes
possible the concrete puzzle-solving that is "normal science."' Kuhn's
influential account of the history of science identifies rationality as dependent upon such paradigms and describes scientific progress as a cycle of
normalization, crisis, and paradigm shift. In a previous essay, I used
Alasdair MacIntyre's extension of Kuhn's account 4 ' as a model with
which to explicate developments in the legal tradition.42 In the section
that follows, I further elaborate this model in an account of the development of modem constitutional law. I then examine some of the lessons
that those of us who would write, teach, and practice constitutional law
and theory in a conservative era might draw from this account.
38. See infra text accompanying notes 259-61.
39. See S.FISH,Anti-Professionalism,in DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY, supra note 13, at
230 ("the institutional space... defines both the present shape of things and the possible courses of
action by which that shape might be altered"); see also infra text accompanying notes 279-83.
Because the concept of incommensurability plays such a large role in the argument, it is
important to be clear what I mean by this. It is not a claim of total incommensurability or
incomprehensibility. Cf.D. DAVIDSON, On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme, in INQuIRIEs
INTO TRUTH AND INTERPRETATION 185-86 (1984) (arguing that complete failure of ability to
translate makes no sense). Within any given stabilized matrix, there will be intelligible

counterarguments that are not persuasive. In that case, it will be possible to challenge the dominant
position without seeming to violate the rules of the game. It can nevertheless be predicted that the
challenge will be unsuccessful.
This will occur, for example, when a conception that is central to one view is relevant but
peripheral to the other. Richard Sherwin suggests that just such a paradigm-dependent dispute
occurred in Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298 (1985) (prior illegally obtained confession does not taint
subsequent, post-Miranda confession).
[W]hat appears to the majority as a "speculative" theory of human behavior appears to the
dissenters as plain common sense. Conversely, the "fact" that an initial uncoerced
statement cannot "taint" a later, freely made one appears to the dissenters as "pseudoscientific" analysis, but is to the majority a plainly empirical observation.
Sherwin, DialectsandDominance"A Study of RhetoricalFieldsin the Law ofConfessions, 136 U. PA.
L. REV.729, 814 (1988). If, however, the dissenters' conception is so different that it is not even
peripheral to the majority's view, then we are likely to find the majority asserting that the dissent's
"theory is out of touch with reality." Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,
107 (1984) (characterizing Justice Stevens' invocation of the ultra vires concept of Ex parte Young
and its progeny). In either of these cases, we have a partial incommensurability that is sufficient to
render the liberal view functionally irrelevant to the dominant, conservative paradigm.
40. T. KUHN, supra note 15, at 23-24, 181-87.
41. A. MACINTYRE, WHOSE JUSTICE? WHICH RATIONALITY? 354-65 (1988).
42. Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 671, 679-81 (arguing that the legal academy is
currently in the kind of epistemological crisis that typically presages a paradigm shift).
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III
THE LESSONS OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW IN THE MODERN
AGE

A.

The Legal Realist Precedent

The problems of a progressive constitutional jurisprudence in a conservative era were faced by the legal realists and their New Deal allies.
Not surprisingly, many on the left have explicitly embraced the legal
realists as intellectual forebears.43 Mark Tushnet, for example, has
declared that "Legal Realism has a natural home in constitutional law
scholarship, where its tendency to reduce law to politics has enormous
persuasive power these days."'
For those who recognize the situatedness of meaning, nothing could
be more appropriate than the turn to history and the self-conscious study
of intellectual antecedents. Indeed, in this case, the parallels are powerful and instructive-if not necessarily what they are made out to be. In
my view, the parallels tend to be obscured by tendentious readings that

reduce both legal realism and critical legal studies to a simple instrumentalism.45 But, as the realists were fond of pointing out, there are always
multiple ways to construe any precedent. 46 Because all meaning is mean-

ing in a context, the persuasiveness of the analogy to legal realism will
depend on how one frames their similarities and differences.

To test whether the inferences hold-the identification of legal realism with current left scholarship and the conclusion that both reduce to
instrumentalism-we must consider more fully the respective contexts of

these scholarly efforts. To see whether there is a meaningful analogy
between their situation and our own, we must situate the legal realists in

their historical context and consider the constitutional law developments
in which they participated.
43. See, eg., Kennedy, Form and Substance in PrivateLaw Adjudication, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1685, 1732 n.108 (1976) (citing a number of legal realists); Tushnet, Critical Legal Studies An
Introduction to Its Originsand Underpinnings,36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 505, 506-07 (1986) ("The general
point of both [CLS and the Legal Realist] traditions was to emphasize the importance of relations of
power in the employment and development of law .. ");
Fischl, Some Realism About CriticalLegal
Studies, 41 U. MIAMI L. REv. 505, 524 (1987) (noting that both CLS and the Legal Realists
combine "a progressive political critique with a skeptical jurisprudence").
44. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 543.
45. Ronald Dworkin and Philip Bobbitt have adopted this mischaracterization. See R.
DWOmIN, supra note 4, at 151-53, 271-72 (identifying "pragmatism" with legal realism and critical
legal studies as an heir to legal realism); Bobbitt, Is Law Politics? (Review Essay), 41 STAN. L. REv.
1233 (1989) (characterizing Tushnet's approach as "prudentialist"). But see Binder, Beyond
Criticism, 55 U. Cm. L. REv. 888 (1988) (applying the indeterminacy critique to instrumentalism).
46. See, eg., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 66-69 (2d
ed. 1951) [hereinafter K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH]; K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION: DECIDING APPEALS 75-91 (1960) [hereinafter K. LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON
LAW TRADITION].
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The loose association known as legal realism was first and foremost
a movement of legal scholars and teachers. Legal realism was part of the
response to formalism.4 7 Its battles were fought in the halls and journals
of legal academia, and its major encounters were over the nature of legal
scholarship and the purposes, methods, and curricula of a law school. 48
These were not accidental engagements, but a logical consequence of the
nemesis against which they rebelled. For, to a large degree, formalism
was itself a product of changes in legal education and scholarship initiated during Langdell's stewardship at Harvard.49 Langdell's importance
had three related dimensions. At the theoretical level, he espoused the
purely logical or conceptual approach to law as a "science" that could be
deduced from a few basic principles manifested in legal doctrines contained in appellate decisions. At the educational level, he initiated the
case method that still dominates much of legal education. At the scholarly level, his theoretical approach recommended systematization of a
mass of decisional material into properly classified doctrines and basic
principles.5 0
These three developments made possible both the university law
school and the professionalization of the modem bar.5 ' The reduction of
law to concepts rendered apprenticeship obsolete as a means of preparation for legal practice, diminishing the sense of law as a practice that
takes place in a particular community and replacing it with an abstract
general method. The identification of legal doctrines contained in books
as the proper subject matter of legal study made it respectable to include
the law school in a university. The case method made large class instruction possible. The systematic approach to scholarship became a mechanism for the normalization and further dissemination of a standardized
47. W. TWINING, KARL LLEWELLYN AND THE REALisT MOVEMENT 10 (1973) ("legal
realism was in the first instance a reaction against an approach to law that was characterized as
'formalism' "); E. PURCELL, JR., THE CRisis OF DEMOCRATIC THEORY: SCIENTIFIC NATURALISM
& THE PROBLEM OF VALUE 74-77 (1973) (discussing formalism and the reactions to it).
48. See W. TwINING, supra note 47, at 42-55 (describing the curricular and deanship
controversies at Columbia Law School in the 1920s); E. PURCELL, JR., supra note 47, at 77-78 (legal
realism was a reaction to the professionalization of law teaching).
49. W. TWINING, supra note 47, at 10 (For critics like Holmes and Frank, "Langdell quite
explicitly symbolized 'the enemy.' "); G. GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 59 (1974) ("What
the realists had principally attacked, savagely and successfully, was the essentially Langdellian idea
that cases can be arranged to make sense-indeed scientific sense."); Singer, Legal Realism Now
(Review Essay), 76 CALIF. L. REV.465, 469 (1988) ("[Ihe realists rebelled, to some extent, against
Langdell's case method."); Grey, Langdell's Orthodoxy, 45 U. Prrr. L. REv. 1, 3-4 (1983)
(Langdell's "classical orthodoxy is the thesis to which modern legal thought has been the

antithesis").
50. W. TWI
oNG,
supra note 47, at 11-14.
51. G. GILMORE, supra note 49, at 97-98; see also Fischl, supra note 43, at 511 (discussing the
"causes" of "scientific jurisprudence"). Morty Horwitz traces the roots of this phenomenon to
changes during the 1820s and 1830s that were increasingly entrenched by mid-century. M.
HORWIrZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 256-66 (1977).
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version of the law.52 All together, these developments made possible the
stabilization of law as a "normal science." 5 3
Beginning with Holmes, Pound in his early days, Corbin, and Cook,.
the realists and their predecessors opposed the formalist focus on general
concepts and rules as providing a logical or mechanical means for deciding cases. This early opposition was taken further by the later, more
radical critiques such as the rule and fact skepticism of Llewellyn14 and
Frank."5 But these critiques did not amount to a general claim of indeterminacy, except perhaps in the hands of those later adversaries who
charged the realists with nihilism.5 6 To the contrary, the legal realists
believed that inquiry into empirical and social facts could provide a basis
for reforming law and reformulating legal practice.5 7
52. See W. TwNIN, supra note 47, at 14:
Between 1886 and 1920 Harvard scholars, notably Williston, Beale, Gray and Thayer, took
the lead in writing a series of monumental legal treatises which won immediate recognition
among practitioners as well as among legal scholars at home and abroad. . . . The
assumptions and attitudes underlying these treatises bore a close affinity to Langdell's
conception of law.
Langdell himself participated in this phenomenon both in the publication of his casebook on contract, C, Langdell A Selection of Cases on the Law of Contracts (1879), and his attempt to
systematize equity jurisprudence in a series of articles with the ironic title A Brief Survey of Equity
Jurisdiction. Langdell, A BriefSurvey of EquityJurisdiction, (pts. 1-8), 1 HARv.L. REV. 55 (1887),
1 HARv. L. REv. 111 (1887), 1 HARv.L. REv. 355 (1888), 2 HARV. L. REv. 241 (1889), 3 HARV.
L. REv. 237 (1890), 4 HARv.L. REv. 99 (1890), 5 HARV.L. REV. 101 (1891), 10 HARv. L. REv. 71
(1896); see also Langdell, ClassificationofRights and Wrongs, (pts. 1 & 2), 13 HARv. L. REV.537,
659 (1900).
53. For Kuhn, normal science depends upon the development of stable scientific communities
in which all community members "have undergone similar educations and professional initiations; in
the process they have absorbed the same technical literature and diawn many of the same lessons
from it." T. KUHN, supra note 15, at 177; see also id at 164-66 (role of professional education and
standardized textbooks in maintaining a scientific community and its paradigms).
54. See eg., K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH, supra note 46, at 12 ("We have
discovered that rules alone, mere forms of words, are worthless."); id at 61 ("Your application of a
rule of law bears then on what you have already decided to be the meaning of the facts. It does not
touch the raw evidence at all.").
55. J. FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN MIND 129 (1930) ("There never was and there never
will be a body of fixed and predetermined rules alike for all....Life rebels against all efforts at legal
over-simplification."); id at 125 ("[The judge's] general hunch... affects his report-both to himself
and to the public-concerning the facts. Only a superficial thinker will assume that the facts as they
occurred and as they later appear to the judge (and as he reports them) will invariably---or indeed
often--correspond.").
56. Although his sociological jurisprudence was a forerunner of legal realism, Roscoe Pound
was in later life amongst realism's most outspoken opponents. See, e'g., 1 R. POUND,
JURISPRUDENCE 271 (1959) ("There is a more or less complete skepticism as to the systematic
E. PURCELL, JR., supra note 47, at
character of official action as a quality of the legal order ....1);
159-69 ("While Pound had been one of the critics of legal realism, his comments had retained a
certain balance ....During the late thirties, however, he grew increasingly hostile.").
57. See E. PURCELL, JR., supra note 47, at 86-87 ("The realists were especially sympathetic to
the new social science because they shared many of its assumptions."); Fischl, supra note 43, at 520.
21 ("To overstate the matter somewhat, the Realists sought to substitute one form of science for
another."); Peller, The Metaphysics of American Law, 73 CALIF. L. REv. 1151, 1240-50 (1985)
("This conception of the significant methodological aspect of realist jurisprudence-that it 'reverses,
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This strand of realism dated back to Holmes, who observed, "For
the rational study of the law the black-letter man may be the man of the
present, but the man of the future is the man of statistics and the master
of economics." 5 8 Corbin, Hohfeld, and Cook, some of the early scholars
associated with legal realism, each had training in the natural sciences
before turning to law.5 9 Even the later, more radical realists kept faith
with some form of scientific or empirical naturalism. Llewellyn's preference for merchant practice as a basis for contractual rules is a wellknown and well-documented example; 6° in other areas, he advocated
reliance on the unreflexive, experientially and culturally grounded reason
that he referred to as "situation-sense" 6' 1 and "horse sense."' 62 Felix
Cohen's famous attack on formalist reasoning as "transcendental nonsense" concluded with the assertion that:
Legal criticism is empty without objective description of the causes and
consequences of legal decisions.... It is through the union of objective
legal science and a critical theory of social values that our understanding
of the human significance of law will be enriched.6 3
Even Jerome Frank, whom many think of as the most radically skeptical
of the realists, believed in the explanatory power of psychoanalytic theory."4 Indeed, none of these approaches simply reduced law to politics.
Moreover, the legal realists rarely addressed constitutional law in an
explicit or direct manner.65 For the most part, the legal realists focused
it upsets the whole traditional approach to law'.. .- was shared by other realists.") (quoting
Llewellyn, A Realistic Jurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L. RaV. 431, 443 (1930)).
58. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897).
59. W. TwINING, supra note 47, at 27 (Corbin studied biology, anatomy, and chemistry as an
undergraduate); id. at 36-37 (Hohfeld studied chemistry); id at 37 (Cook had graduate training in
mathematics and physics).
60. See eg., id. at 224-25, 306-07.
61.

K. LLEwELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 46, at 60-61. For an

explanation of Karl Llewellyn's concept of "situation-sense" as anticipating recent developments in
cognitive theory, see Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 12, at 2262-67.
62. By "horse sense," Llewellyn meant "the balanced shrewdness of the expert in the art." K.
LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW TRADITION, supra note 46, at 121.

63. Cohen, TranscendentalNonsense and the FunctionalApproach, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 809,
849 (1935). For an extension of Cohen's concept of "relativity's laws" and how they operate in
constitutional doctrine, see Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1170-71, 1193-95.
64. See J. FRANK, supra note 55, at 19-21, 98.
65. Two (largely forgotten) exceptions are Thomas Reed Powell and Karl Llewellyn. Powell,
The JudicialityofMinimum-Wage Legislation. 37 HARv. L. REv. 545 (1924), discussedat infra note
87; Llewellyn, The ConstitutionAs an Institution, 34 COLUM L. REv. 1 (1934), discussedat infra text
accompanying notes 86-89, 254-59 & 364-66.
Llewellyn's realist account of constitutional law is rarely cited. Powell's work, however, is
occasionally cited in contemporary constitutional law scholarship. See, e.g., G. STONE, L.
SEIDMAN, C. SuNsTErN & M. TUSHNET, supra note 11, at 740; Kennedy, supra note 43, at 1757
n.141.
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on areas such as contracts, 6 6 property,67 business law,68 and conflicts. 9
Some of this work did have constitutional overtones, of course, as we
shall see shortly.70 But the most influential contemporary progressive
constitutional law scholars, people like Felix Frankfurter and James
Landis at Harvard, were not considered realists by Llewellyn.7 1

The intersection between legal realism and constitutional law was
complex, and somewhat oblique. It had less to do with the substantive

positions of the realists than with the Court's formalist approach to both
constitutional and private law. In its economic substantive due process
decisions, the Court's twofold embrace of formalism allowed it "to
equate the 'liberty' secured by the due process clause ...with the 'free
66. See, eg., Corbin, Third Parties As Beneficiariesof Contractors'Surety Bonds, 38 YALE L.J.
1 (1928); Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931);
Oliphant, Mutuality of Obligation in Bilateral Contractsat Law, 25 CoLUM. L. REv. 705 (1925).
67. See, eg., Cohen, Property and Sovereignty, 13 CORNELL L.Q. 8 (1927). Robert Hale's
work challenged the underlying theoretical assumptions of both contract and property law. See
Hale Bargaining,Duress and Economic Liberty, 43 COLuM. L. REv. 603 (1943); Hale, Coercion
and Distribution in a Supposedly Non-Coercive State 38 POL. ScI. Q. 470 (1923).
68. See, eg., Clark, Douglas & Thomas, The Business Failures Project-A Problem In
Methodology, 39 YALE L.J. 1013 (1930); Moore & Hope, An InstitutionalApproach to the Law of
Commercial Banking, 38 YALE L.J. 703 (1929); Oliphant, Trade Associations and the Law, 26
COLuM. L. REv. 381 (1925).
69. See, eg., Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33 YALE L.J. 457
(1924); Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of Laws, 37 YALE L.J. 468 (1928).
70. See infra text accompanying notes 82-83 & 117-18.
71. See Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism, 44 HARV. L. REv. 1222, 1227 n.18 (1931)
[hereinafter Llewellyn, Some Realism] (referring to Frankfurter as a "sociological jurist," not a
realist). This article was Llewellyn's response to Pound, The Callfor a Realist Jurisprudence, 44
HARv. L. REv. 697 (1931). When Llewellyn first compiled his list of realists in preparing his
response, he characterized Frankfurter and Landis as "realists-in-part-of-their-work." He did not,
however, include them in his final version. Hull, Some Realism About the Llewellyn-Pound
Exchange Over Realism The Newly Uncovered Private Correspondence, 1927-1931, 1987 Wis. L.
REV. 921,959-60; cf Llewellyn, A RealisticJurisprudence-TheNext Step, 30 COLUM. L. Rnv. 431,
454 n.22 (1930) (earlier classification of Frankfurter's work with Landis and with Greene as

"realistic").
Legal historians have recently questioned Llewellyn's exclusion of Frankfurter and Landis from
his final list. In forthcoming work, Morty Horwitz argues that our perceptions of legal realism have
unfortunately been skewed by the partiality of Llewellyn's list. See also Hull, supra, at 964 (arguing
that the more inclusive list provides a fuller picture of the realist movement); see also Hull,
Reconstructing the Origins of Realistic Jurisprudence"A Prequel to the Llewellyn-Pound Exchange
Over Legal Realism, 1989 DUKE L. 1302 (detailing the influence of Pound on Llewellyn and the
reasons for the break between then).
Nevertheless, it is difficult to think of Justice Frankfurter as a legal realist when one considers
his response to Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938). In a letter to President Roosevelt
two days after the decision, Frankfurter wrote: "I certainly didn't expect to live to see the day when
the Court would announce, as they did on Monday, that it itself had usurped power for nearly a
hundred years.... How fluid it all makes the Constitutionl" C. WRIGHT,THE LAW OF FEDERAL
CouRTs 355 n.12 (4th ed. 1983) (citing M. FREEDMAN, ROOSEVELT AND FRANKFURTER 456
(1967)).
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will' from which they believed they could deduce the common law
rules."7 2
But the economic substantive due process decisions were also for-

malist in the more fundamental sense that they assumed the acontextuality of meaning. The concepts that they invoked-like "liberty of person
and freedom of contract" 7 3-- were treated as invariable regardless of context.7' Thus, in cases like Lochner v. New York 7' and Coppage v.
Kansas,7 6 the Court not only began with a principle from which to
deduce its conclusions, but also assumed that the meanings of "freedom"
and "contract" remain constant across changing circumstances. 77 It
therefore could see no relevant difference between the contracts of a corporation and its non-unionized workers, on one hand, and the prototypical arm's length bargain of free moral agents, on the other. 78 For the
formalist Court of the Lochner era, reasoning within the stabilized matrices that gave meaning to these concepts, the political and the epistemic
were already mutually entailed in a way that could seem only "neutral"
and "objective." ' 79 As such, the Court could unabashedly declare that
disparities of wealth were earned and legitimate.8 0 Disparities of wealth
over produccould no more make freedom "coercive" than a monopoly
8

tion could turn manufacturing into "commerce.

1

72. Kennedy, supra note 43, at 1754. Kennedy continued, 'This bold stroke integrated public
and private law." Id.
73. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 57 (1905).
74. But cf.West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379, 391 (1937) (asking what "freedom of
contract" is and noting that "Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation."),
discussedat infra text accompanying notes 425-42.
75. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
76. 236 U.S. 1 (1915).
77. See Singer, supra note 49, at 499 ("Roscoe Pound called formalism 'mechanical
jurisprudence' because the classical lawyers had a tendency to apply their general principles
relentlessly-regardless of the underlying policies or the consequences of these policies in specific
cases.").

78. The act.., is an illegal interference with the rights of individuals, both employers and
employ~s, to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best, or
which they may agree upon with the other parties to such contracts. Statutes of the nature
of that under review, limiting the hours in which grown and intelligent men may labor to
earn their living, are mere meddlesome interferences ....
Lochner, 198 U.S. at 61.
79. These "stabilized matrices" correspond to what Cass Sunstein calls a "baseline" or
"Lochner-like premise." Sunstein, supra note 9, at 882-83. The shortcomings of Sunstein's
"baseline" metaphor are explored in Winter, Upside/Down View, supra note 20, at n.2.
80. See Coppag 236 U.S. at 17-18 (It is "impossible to uphold freedom of contract and the
right of private property without at the same time recognizing as legitimate those inequalities of
fortune that are the necessary result of the exercise of those rights.").
81. See United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1, 17 (1895) ("[lit does not follow that an
attempt to monopolize, or the actual monopoly of, the manufacture was an attempt, whether
executory or consummated, to monopolize commerce, even though, in order to dispose of the
product, the instrumentality of commerce was necessarily invoked."); Kidd v. Pearson, 128 U.S. 1
(1888) (asserting that manufacturing is not commerce).
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It is thus not surprising that the constitutional progressives would
draw upon some of the antiformalist ideas and strategies of the legal realists. 2 To the extent that the realists sought to "replace formalistic
deduction of consequences from abstract concepts with explicit policy,
moral, and institutional analysis,""3 their ideas were useful to the constitutional progressives. But the overlap between the constitutional
progressives and the legal realists was far from complete.
The constitutional progressives were reacting to judicial interference
with progressive legislative initiatives. What they wanted was less judicial discretion and creativity, not more. The legal realists, on the other
hand, stressed that law was an ongoing judicial creation."4 Felix Cohen,
for example, favored a judicial decision on the basis of "such economic,
sociological, political, or ethical questions as a competent legislature
might have faced.""5 So too, Llewellyn's quite radical approach to constitutional law pressed for recognition of "the fact of creation by the
Court" and argued that "[o]nce such creation is recognized and the
implications of the recognitionfairlyfaced, there is no stopping short."8 16
Indeed, Llewellyn did not stop short. Breaking with the progressive
wisdom about Lochner-era cases like Coppage, he proclaimed:
[Tihere is no quarrel to be had with judges merely because they disregard
or twist Documentary language, or "interpret" it to the despair of original intent, in the service of what those judges conceive to be the inherent
nature of our institutions. To my mind, such action is their duty.... I
may feel, say in the Coppage and Abrams and Adkins Cases, that [they
were] quite misguided. But I cannot simultaneously defend the dissents
in those cases and deny the implicit premise common to majority and
dissent ....
The... point is therefore, obviously, that a sane theory of constitutional law would no more be a substitute for adequate personnel than is
the prevalent modified and halfway reworking of the ancient orthodoxy.
The only guarantee of judicial wisdom will remain the judge.8 7
82. Conversely, it is not surprising that the realists celebrated and built a program out of the
insights of older antiformalists like Holmes. Perhaps the most famous example of Holmes'
antiformalism is his observation in Lochner that "General propositions do not decide concrete
cases." 198 U.S. at 76 (Holmes, J., dissenting).
83. Singer, supra note 49, at 471.
84. See ag., Llewellyn, Some Realism, supra note 71, at 1236.
85. Cohen, supra note 63, at 810.
86. Llewellyn, supra note 65, at 4 n.8 (emphasis in original).
87. Id at 33-34 (emphasis in original). Thomas Reed Powell's position was no less

uncompromising. See Powell, supra note 65, at 573 ("[fln explaining the determination of
constitutional issues we must take account of the temper, as well as the outlook, of the judges before
whom the issues chance to come.").
These quotes demonstrate a problem with Duncan Kennedy's blanket statement that this
period's "altruists" abdicated the more radical option of "accepting the analogy of private and public
law, and then arguing that both were inherently 'political,' in the sense of requiring the judge to
make choices between the rival social visions of individualism and altruism." Kennedy, supra note
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Llewellyn's solutions to the constitutional crisis already under way in
1934 were typically straightforward: He suggested increasing the

number of Justices88 or requiring a supermajority vote of six, seven, or
even eight to invalidate a statite as unconstitutional., 9
With the onset of the New Deal, agreement between the realists and
the constitutional progressives on political objectives undoubtedly
increased. 90 But the radicalism recommended by the realists had little

appeal to those pursuing change in constitutional law. Rather, developments in constitutional law were largely dominated by other, more con-

ventional influences.
"In the crucible of events we become aware of what is not acceptable to us, and it is this experience as interpreted that becomes both thesis
and philosophy."9' 1 The "crucible" that shaped modem constitutional
law was the confrontation between the Old Court and the legislative
efforts of, first, the Progressive Era, and then the New Deal. The most
influential manifestos of this conflict were not the legal realist assaults on

the intellectual foundations of formalism, 92 but rather the decades of dissents by Holmes and Brandeis-the "Great Dissenters"-who had been
venerated by progressives and realists alike.93 These dissents opposed
judicial interference with social and economic legislation. But they also
supported judicial protection of civil liberties. 94 When Hughes replaced
43, at 1756 (emphasis in original). To support his characterization, Kennedy cites only to
mainstream judicial positions, most notably to opinions by Harlan Fiske Stone. See i& at 1756-58
nn.136-42. Whether Justice Stone should be categorized as one of the realists or one of the
constitutional progressives is an interesting question. As Dean at Columbia, he had been on the
defensive in the debate with the realists over educational reform. See W. TWINING, supra note 47, at
45-46. Early in his tenure on the Court, he simultaneously disparaged the circularity of legal
doctrines and articulated a strong preference for deference to the legislature. See, e.g., Tyson &
Brother v. Banton, 273 U.S. 418, 451 (1927) ("It is difficult to use the phrase ['affected with a public
interest'] free of its connotation of legal consequences, and hence when used as a basis of judicial
decision, to avoid begging the question to be decided."); i&dat 454 ("Choice between these views
takes us from the judicial to the legislative field.").
88. Llewellyn, supra note 65, at 23 n.33, 39 n.45.
89. IAL at 36 & n.42.
90. E. PURCELL, JR., supra note 47, at 93 ("Frank, Oliphant, Clark, Arnold, Douglas, and
Felix Cohen all became ardent New Dealers"); W. TwInNG, supra note 47, at 57-58, 68
(Frankfurter, Berle, Arnold, and Douglas served in New Deal administration); Biography ofFelix S.
Cohen, 9 RtrraaaS L. Rlv. 345, 347-49 (1954) (Felix Cohen worked on behalf of Native Americans
in Interior Department).
91. M. MERLEAu-PoNTY, DIALEC"IC, supra note 1, at 3.
92. See generally Kennedy, supra note 43, at 1748-60.
93. In 1975, Herbert Wechsler told my constitutional law class that, as a student at Columbia
in the late 1920s, he and his classmates treated the latest Holmes and Brandeis dissents as virtually
sacred texts to be read and studied. The legal realists shared this veneration of Holmes. See, eg., J.
FRANK, supra note 55, at 270-77; Llewellyn, Holmes, 35 COLUM. L. REv. 485 (1935).
94. See, eg., Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 372 (1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring);
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 672 (1925) (Holmes, J., dissenting); Abrams v. United States,
250 U.S. 616, 624 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
For Holmes, unlike his successors, the different judicial stances in economic and free speech
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Taft as Chief Justice in 1930, the Court pushed forward with these pioneering efforts. 95 By 1937, when the paradigm shift took place,9 6 the
constitutional philosophy that emerged was shaped by the very practices
that the constitutional progressives had opposed.9 7 Indeed, the new constitutional paradigm was a virtual mirror image of the Old Court's jurisprudence: judicial deference in areas of economic regulation9 8 and

judicial protection of civil rights and liberties. 99 It is thus not surprising
matters were sustained by a single philosophical underpinning: a thoroughly relativist view of truth.
Cf Abrams; 250 U.S. at 630 (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[Tihe best test of truth is the power of the
thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market ....");Lochner v. New York, 198
U.S. 45, 75-76 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting) (defending "the right of a majority to embody their
opinions in law" and arguing that "the word liberty in the Fourteenth Amendment is perverted
when it is held to prevent the natural outcome of a dominant opinion"); see also Winter,
Transcendental Nonsense supra note 12, at 1188-90. This apparently was Holmes' long-standing
view. See Holmes, Natural Law, 32 HARv. L. REv. 40, 40 (1918) ("I used to say, when I was
young, that truth was the majority vote of that nation that could lick all others.").
95. See; eg., Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, 716 (1931) (declaring state infringement on
freedom of the press unconstitutional); Stromberg v. California, 283 U.S. 359, 369-70 (1931)
(holding unconstitutional a state statute making it illegal to display a red flag in public).
96. The year 1937 is widely recognized as a watershed, reflecting a major shift in the legal/
social consensus on the constitutional status of the New Deal's regulatory programs. See, eg., B.
AcKERmAN, RECONSTRUCTING AMERICAN LAW 6-11 (1984); Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra
note 5, at 1053-57; Cohen, Field Theory and Judicial Logic, 59 YALE L.J. 238, 248-49 (1950);
Michelman, Law's Republic 97 YALE LJ.1493, 1522 n. 112 (1988). The decisions that manifested
this paradigm shift in constitutional law were West Coast Hotel v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (due
process), and NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (commerce clause). But the
shift manifested itself in other areas as well. A similar upheaval in federal civil procedure occurred
in 1938 with the decision in Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and the adoption of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Tribe, The Curvatureof ConstitutionalSpace: What Lawyers Can
Learn From Modern Physics 103 HARV.L. REV. 1, 25 (1989); see also Sunstein, supra note 9, at
881-82; infra text accompanying notes 400-08.
97. See Chemerinsky, The Supreme Court, 1988 Term-Foreword:The Vanishing Constitution,
103 HARv. L. REv.43 (1989).
In the 1930's, economic pressures from the Depression, political opposition by the
Roosevelt Administration, and intellectual assaults by the Legal Realists highlighted the
anti-majoritarian character of judicial review. The Supreme Court's invalidation of
popular New Deal legislation made it especially vulnerable to such criticisms. By the late
1930's, the new Justices had to define a role for the judiciary that did not offend their
earlier criticisms of the Lochner era Court. This was not simply a matter of appearance or
strategy; a strong consensus existed that the previous Court had acted improperly in
striking down needed social and economic legislation. In fact, since the mid-1930's,
discussions about constitutional law have been dominated by a desire to devise a role for
the Supreme Court that avoids the evil of Lochnerism.
Id at 63 (citations omitted).
98. See eg., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144 (1938); West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
99. See De Jonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (first amendment invalidates criminal
prosecution for attending peaceful meeting); Herndon v. Lowry, 301 U.S. 242 (1937) (same); Lovell
v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938) (city ordinance prohibiting distribution of literature without
discretionary permit from mayor held unconstitutional); Missouri ev reL Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S.
337 (1938) (Constitution requires admission of blacks to state law school); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S.
496 (1939) (striking down permit provision used to prohibit union activities on public streets and in
public meeting halls); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939) (handbilling ban unconstitutional);
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88 (1940) (statute banning all picketing unconstitutional); Cantwell
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that the only early twentieth-century substantive due process decisions
which survive as precedents are Meyer v. Nebraska 1oo and Pierce v.
Society of Sisters.10 1
What emanated from this shift looked less like a considered philosophical program than "a relatively sudden and unstructured event like
the ges[t]alt switch."' 2 The emergent justification for this new paradigm
first appeared in footnote four of Carolene Products.0 3 The appearance
of such a major "philosophical" statement as dictum in a footnote-as
well as its very tentative language"'4-underscores how exploratory, and
hesitant the new thesis really was.' 05 And there was reason for it to be:
The constitutional jurisprudence of footnote four and most of the rest of
this period was premised on an idealized-indeed, hopelessly romanticized-view of the majoritarian political process." °6 Moreover, the footnote four prescription for the post-Lochner, post-formalist period was
neither self-evident nor uncontested. Some of the constitutional progresv. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (ban on Jehovah's Witnesses' door-to-door ministry
unconstitutional); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941) (requiring integrated sleeping cars
on interstate train); Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141 (1943) (ban on door-to-door speech
unconstitutional); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory
flag salute unconstitutional); Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (restoring revoked
citizenship); Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 501 (1946) (ban on leafletting in company town cannot be
enforced by state criminal trespass law); Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (admission
of blacks to state law school); Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410 (1948) (state cannot
deny fishing license to resident alien); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558 (1948) (unrestrained
discretion in issuing sound amplification equipment unconstitutional); Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1949) (ordinance prohibiting inciting people to anger unconstitutional); Sweatt v. Painter,
339 U.S. 629 (1950) (separate law school not equal); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S.
637 (1950) (segregation of graduate student unconstitutional).
100. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
101. 268 U.S. 510 (1925); see infra text accompanying notes 466 & 516-23.
102. T. KUHN, supra note 15, at 122.
103. United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938).
104. As Jack Balkin points out, the footnote's three paragraphs begin with the rather diffident
phrases: "There may be narrower scope for.. ."; "It is unnecessary to consider now.. ."; and "Nor
need we enquire whether ...." Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U.L. REv. 275, 284-85 (1989)
(quoting CaroleneProducts, 304 U.S. at 152 n.4).
105. Cf Cover, The Origins of JudicialActivism in the Protection of Minorities 91 YALE L.J.
1287, 1316 (1982) ("For, whether or not the [Carolene Products] footnote is a wholly coherent
theory, it captures the constitutional experience of the period from 1954 to 1964. And that
experience, more than the logic of any theory, is the validating force in law.").
106. For arguments debunking this romanticized view of majoritarian politics, see Deutsch,
Neutrality, Legitimacy, and the Supreme Court Some Intersections Between Law and Political
Science, 20 STAN. L. REv. 169, 185 (1968) ("Even superficial analysis reveals ...that the contrast
between a Court wholly insulated from the desires of the electorate and a legislature and executive
devotedly registering the will of their constituents functions rather as a literary device than as a
description of reality."); Balkin, supra note 104, at 299-303 (discussing Carolene Products footnote
four as part of the opinion's "governing myth" behind its pluralist outlook); LaRue, Antitrust and
Politics, 33 ANTITRUST BULL. 745, 749 (1988) ("[W]e are a democracy in theory, but an oligarchy in
practice."); see also Ackerman, Beyond Carolene Products, 98 HARV. L. REV. 713 (1985); Miller,
The True Story of Carolene Products, 1987 Sup. Cr. REv.397.

1464

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1441

sives urged a more consistently deferential jurisprudence that would
defer to legislative determinations even when the subject matter was indi10 7
vidual rights.
They lost, of course. The footnote four paradigm provided the sta-

bilized context that makes possible both a system of meaning like constitutional law and a normalized legal practice. In this new version of
normal science, the empirical, policymaking action moved to the legislature; the limited but important sphere of protection of civil rights and
liberties was confided to the judiciary. This new paradigm made possible
the kind of systematization and concrete puzzle-solving that is the hallmark of normal science:108 "The legal academy of the 1950s was decisively influenced by a way of thinking in which systematic philosophy
was put aside in favor of the application of sound common sense to con-

crete legal problems generated by the ordinary operations of the govern-

ment."'' I9 These efforts reached a theoretical high point in the 1950s,
with Hart and Sacks' Legal Process materials,1 10 the first edition of Hart

and Wechsler's Federal Courts,"' Herbert Wechsler's Neutral
Principles,112 and Lon Fuller's Forms and Limits of Adjudication.113
In one sense, the legal realists were caught flat-footed by this para-

digm shift. Not surprisingly, they tempered their views in ways more
consonant with a period of normal science. Thus, the 1950s and 1960s
saw some very substantial moderations by Felix Cohen, 1

Jerome

107. See, eg., Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586 (1940) (upholding state
regulation requiring school children to salute the flag); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette,
319 U.S. 624, 646 (1943) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (dissenting from holding by Court that state
action forcing children to salute the flag is unconstitutional); Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549
(1946) (affirming dismissal of complaint seeking to restrain state officials from acting pursuant to
alleged gerrymandering election laws); Saia v. New York, 334 U.S. 558, 562 (1948) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (dissenting from holding that city ordinance forbidding unauthorized public use of sound
amplifiers unconstitutional); Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77, 89 (1949) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)
(concurring in judgment that city ordinance prohibiting "sound trucks" is constitutional); Baker v.
Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 266 (1962) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (dissenting from Court's holding that
plaintiff's complaint of denial of equal protection under state election laws presents a justiciable
cause of action). By far the most successful product of this deferential position was the modem
doctrine of standing. See Winter, The Metaphorof Standing, supra note 12, at 1447-57.
108. T. KUHN, supra note 15, at 35-38.
109. Tushnet, supra note 3, at 548.
110. H. HART & A. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BAsIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (tent.ed. 1958).
111. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTHM

(lst ed.
1953).
112. Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principlesof ConstitutionalLaw, 73 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1959).
113. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARv. L. REV.353 (1978) (first written
and widely circulated in the late 1950s and early 1960s and published only posthumously).
114. Compare Cohen, supra note 96, at 245 ("mhe real question is not whether judges should
follow precedent (or logic or the law of gravitation or anything else that they cannot help following,
whether they know it or not). It is, rather, how they should follow precedent .... ) (emphasis in
original; citations omitted) with Cohen, supra note 63, at 810-11 (arguing that formalistic legal
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Frank,' 1 5 and Karl Llewellyn' 6 of the radical, deconstructive positions
they had espoused in the 1930s.
Although I have argued that the legal realists had very little influence on the direction of change in constitutional law, it would be wrong

to conclude that legal realism was not a participant in the crisis that
paved the way for a paradigm shift. To the contrary. During the 1930s,

law underwent an intellectual crisis fueled by decades of industrialization
and change," 7 the economic breakdown of the Great Depression, the
confrontation between the Old Court and the New Deal, and the contin-

uing affirmation of the latter at the polls." 8 Legal realism contributed to
this crisis by undermining the intellectual foundations of the Old Court's

jurisprudence.
Nevertheless, the realists' skeptical critiques were neither the primary cause of the demise of the Old Court's formalism nor the primary
contributors to the ideology of the new paradigm. The new paradigm

assimilated the legal realists' preference for legislative freedom and
administrative decisionmaking, as well as a bastardized, normalized version of legal realism for the courts in the banal form of balancing tests
and policy analysis." 9 Beyond such vague influences, however, the legal
realists were unsuccessful in translating their critique into a mainstream
20
legal practice.'

reasoning does not account for the real reasons of decision and should be replaced with realistic,
empirical analysis of social fact and policy).
115. See J. FRANK, supra note 55, at xx (6th printing 1963) ("I do not understand how any
decent man today can refuse to adopt, as the basis of modem civilization, the fundamental principles
of Natural Law, relative to human conduct, as stated by Thomas Aquinas.").
116. See K. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BusH, supra note 46, at 8-10 (qualifying his earlier
assertion--"WVhat these officials do about disputes is, to my mind, the law itself"-and decrying the
distortion of his position that occurred in the controversy over realism).
117. See Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 678-79; see also E. PURCEL, JR., supra note
47, at 79:
The state of American law invited and even necessitated the devastating attacks of the
realists. The inconsistencies between the practices of a rapidly changing industrial nation
and the claims of a mechanical juristic system had grown so acute by the 1920s that, in the
minds of many, the orthodox jurisprudence could no longer justify and explain
contemporary practice.
118. See Ackerman, StorrsLectures,supra note 5, at 1053-57; see also Ackerman, Constitutional
Politics,supra note 5, at 510-15.
119. The Realists' constructive program provides the framework for most legal thought
today. One need only read a randomly selected law review article or... a randomly
selected student note or comment to find that the right answer to the question at issue can
be found by balancing the interests identified in the appropriate three-part [balancing] test.
Tushnet, supra note 43, at 507; see also Fischl, supra note 43, at 522 ("The principal legacy of Legal
Realism for mainstream legal thought is the introduction of 'social policy' analysis ... albeit in a
form that bears precious little resemblance to the far subtler version that the Realists seemed to have
had in mind.") (citations omitted); Singer, supra note 49, at 504 ("The realists were extremely successful at introducing interest balancing, line-drawing, policy analysis, purposive reasoning, and process concerns into legal thought.").
120. Singer, supra note 49, at 504.
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The Politics of Indeterminacy

What are the politics of the indeterminacy and "law is politics" critiques? It should be clear at the outset that the indeterminacy critique
has no inherent politics: It can't; the indeterminacy critique cannot
avoid being sucked down into the vortex of its own infinite regress. Followed to the necessary end of its logic, the indeterminacy critique must
undermine even the capacity to take a political stance and make the
political arguments that it purports to recommend. 12 1 What is really
underneath the law? Why, politics. And beneath that? Ideology, of
course. And what does that rest on? Well, after that, it's still only turtles all the way down.12 2
Here, the Wittgenstein maneuver just won't work. For if the meaning of politics and ideology comes from "form of life," 123 then there is no
reason that law can't originate there, too. 2 The indeterminacy critique
cannot escape the infinite regress by seeking sanctuary in reflexivity,
because that move is no less available to its target.1 25 And that, indeed,
is one lesson of the legal realist precedent.
All that remains, then, is the indeterminacy critique as pure critique.
But this means that, whatever legal regime might be in power-left or
right-the indeterminacy critique would be available to undermine its
claims. 126 This might appeal to some, especially if one views the exercise
of power as inevitably oppressive. But consider what this really means.
A politics of pure opposition is itself defined by what it opposes. It can
have no vision that is not already grounded (at least negatively) in the
121. See M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 168 ("We cannot have
'skeptical' politics because, appearances to the contrary, it chooses its goals and makes a selection of
facts (which it then asks us to recognize) according to values it does not acknowledge, proposing to
guide us to a definition of the 'possible' on the basis of these facts."); see also M. MERLEAU-PONTY,
DIALECTIC, supra note I, at 114-15 (complete skepticism as to "facts" makes all discussion

impossible).
122.

See Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 646 n.37 (collecting sources).

123. L. WITTgGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 88e (G. Anscombe trans. 1958) ("It
is what human beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the language they use. That is not
agreement in opinions but in form of life.") (emphasis in original).
124. Karl Llewellyn understood this perhaps better than anyone. See supra text accompanying
notes 60-62; infra text accompanying notes 169, 172, 253-58, 364-65 & 381-83.
125. To make this point clear, consider a variation on Roberto Unger's observation that "every
branch of doctrine must rely tacitly if not explicitly upon some picture of the forms of human
association that are right and realistic in the areas of social life with which it deals." R. UNOER,
THE CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES MOVEMENT 8 (1986). This "picture" does not take its form from a
"coherent, richly developed normative theory," because there is none that can account for all the
legal data. Id at 9. But, then, where does it come from? Necessarily, it arises from the already
extant social practices and conditions in which the relevant social actors are unavoidably situatedthat is, from existing forms of life. So where does law come from? Why, from a prior picture of
social relations. And where does that picture come from? Why, from those very social relations.
126. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 317-18; Balkin, Deconstructive Practiceand Legal Theory,
96 YALE L.J. 743, 786 (1987); Tushnet, supra note 43, at 516-17.
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given state of affairs. "[I]f one upsets the game in order to begin history
'
again at zero, no one can say exactly what he is doing."127
As pure critique, the indeterminacy and "law is politics" critiques
suffer the same problem as permanent revolution. Permanent selfcriticism may seem attractive to the intellectual, but:
Unfortunately, a government, even a revolutionary one, a party, even a
revolutionary party, is not a negation. In order to establish themselves
on the terrain of history, they must exist positively.... [There are only
people] who think and wish this or that, who are exuberant or discouraged, who see correctly or incorrectly, but who are in any case always in
the world.... A political apparatus which functions on a day-to-day
basis among [people] who are not all philosophers, who like to believe in
their leaders or to lay
the blame on them ...falls back into the positive
128
with all its weight.
Without a basis for a positive program that escapes its own critique, the
only certain thing is that some other, unknown but self-sustaining homeostasis will take its place. 129 This means, of course, that the indeterminacy and "law is politics" critiques preordain their own marginalization.
Thus, the second lesson of the legal realist precedent is that, to the
extent they succeed at all, the indeterminacy and "law is politics" critiques cannot expect success on their own terms. Those who would
destabilize a normal science like constitutional law cannot expect the tradition to look to them for a way out of the crisis, no matter how cogent
or "correct" the critique. That would happen only if progress and
change were driven by logic (of the old-fashioned objectivist kind)-only
then would the argument that trumps the old regime also replace it.
Kuhn's point, however, is precisely that "rationality" is paradigmdependent-and, therefore, that "progress" is not linear.1 30 Rather, both
"rationality" and "progress" are products of a homeostatic gestalt that
destabilizes and reformulates periodically. The reformulated paradigm
will contain radical new elements which render determinate the very
anomalies and critiques that caused the destabilization. It will also maintain substantial elements of the old paradigm, which is how it synthesizes
a sense of continuity with the reality of change.131
127. M.
128.

MERLEAU-PoNTY, DIALECTIc,

supra note 1, at 183.

L. at 89; see also id at 135-36 ("What one will have is not the already present and never

completed revolution... [but] continuous acts of rupture in the name of a utopia.").
129. Cf.id at 183 ("The only thing which is sure is that .. .yet another State will be
manufactured. It may be good, mediocre, or bad, that remains to be seen.").
130. T. KuHN, supra note 15.
131. MacIntyre explains that, to resolve a crisis without abandoning the tradition altogether, a
new paradigm will have to meet three conditions. First, it will have to be a "radically new" or
"conceptually enriched scheme" in order to resolve the inadequacies and incoherences of the
previous paradigm. A. MAcINTYRE, supra note 41, at 362. Second, it will have to account for why
the old paradigm failed. Id. Third, it will have to fulfill these conditions in a way that "exhibits
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Consequently, the most that can be expected as a result of attempts
at destabilization is that the target system may be induced to reformulate
in order to restabilize. But it is a foregone conclusion that the reformulation will not be along the lines of the destabilizing critique. The
destabilizations that provoke anomalies and deepen crises are predestined
for marginalization. Crisis is followed inexorably by a new paradigm
that resolves the old anomalies and once again makes normal science
possible. "Like a passion that one day just ceases, destroyed by its own
duration, a question burns out and is replaced by an unquestioned state
'
A destabilizing critique will leave its marks on the subseof affairs." 132
quent paradigm, as legal realism did. But its more radical destabilizing
elements will be normalized or marginalized in the new homeostatic system. This is how we humans make things work, how we stabilize meaning in the face of contingency and flux.
Another marginalization also occurs during times of crisis. Crisis
provokes resistance, as the guardians of the failing paradigm attempt to
circle the wagons in defense of the old ways.13 The current Court, for
example, is increasingly prone to plain meaning arguments-which they
seem to take quite seriously. 34 Now, we may know that there is no such
thing as "plain meaning." But the Justices are situated in a belief system
that takes as "objective" what is only conventional. They are not very
likely to hear, let alone be persuaded by, an argument from within the
indeterminacy critique-whether the unknowability of the framers'
intent, the polysemous character of language, or the contextuality of all
meaning. In times of breakdown and crisis, there is no lingua franca.
Thus, the ultimate lesson of the legal realist precedent is that the
indeterminacy position guarantees its own marginalization because no
homeostatic system (which is to say no form of thought) can tolerate
such radical destabilization. Those who would work for effective social
change need to cultivate a healthier respect for the resilience of homeostatic social systems. This does not mean, however, that the indeterminacy critique is either wrong or a mistake (a point I return to below).
some fundamental continuity ... with the shared beliefs [by] which the tradition ... had been
defined up to this point." Id MacIntyre's first and third conditions are parallel to Kuhn's criteria.

See T. KUHN, supra note 15, at 169.
132.

M. MERLEAu-PoNTY, SIGNS, supra note 25, at 3-4.

133. Resistance of this sort can be widespread. Accordingly, one sees that "a society's retreat in
the face of a situation in which the contingency of moral and social structures is clear. It is the fear
of the new which galvanizes and reaffirms precisely the very ideas that historical experience has
worn out." Id at 241. This may be an apt description of the Reagan-Bush era.
134. Se eg., Mallard v. United States Dist. Court, 109 S.Ct. 1814, 1818-19 (1989) (relying in

part on "common meaning" to find import of term "request" in statute is not equivalent to
"demand" or "command"); Chan v. Korean Airlines, 109 S.Ct. 1676, 1680-81 (1989) (relying in
part on dictionary to define "irregularity" of airline ticket under the Warsaw Convention).
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But it does mean that it runs the acute risk of incommensurability, like
constitutional law in a foreign tongue.
C.

The Instability of Normal Science

One of the frustrations with homeostatic systems of normal science

is that, within their stabilized contexts, there is no orderly way to undo
them. "Paradigms are not corrigible by normal science at all." 13 5 But

one of the nice things about such systems is their inevitable tendency
toward entropy and collapse: Normal science "ultimately leads only to
the recognition of anomalies and to crises."' 36 Thus, one lesson of con-

stitutional law in the modem age is that there is no ultimate solution to
37
the "problems" of constitutional law.1

As with all normal science, the process of concrete puzzle-solving
eventually produces anomalies.
Produced inadvertently by a game played under one set of rules, their
assimilation requires the elaboration of another set. After they have
become parts of science, the enterprise, at least of those specialists
in
1 38
whose particular field the novelties lie, is never quite the same.
The two-tiered, adjudicatory paradigm of the post-New Deal era provided a stabilized matrix for constitutional adjudication for nearly thirtysix years: from West CoastHotel v. Parrish 139 to Roe v. Wade.' 40 Nevertheless, barely halfway through this period, the paradigm produced a
decision so destabilizing that the enterprise of constitutional law would
never be the same again.
The decision, of course, was Brown v. Board of Education. "I Brown

is a textbook example of an anomaly because it is simultaneously the
logical consequence of the reigning paradigm and the anomaly that
would undo it.'4 2 Initially, judicial protection of civil rights focused on
135. T. KuHN, supra note 15, at 122. This is not to say that it is impossible to effectuate change
within a normal science. Rather, an understanding of the structure of a normal science makes
effective strategic action possible. See Winter, Bull Durham,supra note 12, at 677-79; see also infra
note 142.
136. T. KuHN, supra note 15, at 122.
137. Cf M. MERLEAU-PONTY, DIALECTIC, supra note 1, at 227 ("[A] system of conscious lives
will never admit of a solution the way a crossword puzzle does or an elementary problem of
arithmetic.") (emphasis in original). On the other hand, we could reconceptualize our notions of
problems and "solutions." See G. LAxoFF & M. JOHNSON, METAPHOR S WE LIVE By 143-44
(1980):
All of your problems are always present, only they may be dissolved and in solution, or
they may be in solid form. The best that you can hope for is to find a catalyst that will
make one problem dissolve without making another one precipitate out.... To live by the
chemical metaphor would be to accept it as a fact that no problem ever disappears forever.
138. T. KuHN, supra note 15, at 52.
139. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
140. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
141. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Brown is further discussed at infra text accompanying notes 444-93.
142. Brown not only exemplifies how the very effectiveness of normal science can produce

1470

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1441

the rights of individuals to equal access to public facilities.' 4 3 As long as
the Court dealt with only individual cases, the main thrust of the postNew Deal paradigm-deference to the majoritarian political process on
most issues-remained intact.
But the logic of these paradigm-produced individual rights cases led
inexorably to Brown. Inevitably, the attack on racial segregation challenged a practice that affected an entire class of people. Brown unsettled
the paradigm because there was no sensible way to provide just individual relief; only structural intervention could provide a meaningful remedy."4 Thus, Brown followed from the paradigm and, by necessary
implication, went beyond the interstitial, case-by-case efforts of the prior
judicial decisions to the wholesale disapproval of the laws, mores, and
social structure of an entire region.
Consequently, Brown opened up a tremendous anomaly in which
judicial review was seen as increasingly undemocratic. 145 This anomaly
was so vital a threat to the paradigm that it received an official name:
"the counter-majoritarian difficulty."' 14" In response to this anomaly,
constitutional specialists debated the propriety of these judicial actions
and the nature of their justificatory conceptualizations: "neutral principles," according to Wechsler, 4 7 prudential and moral considerations,
according to Bickel,141 "representation-reenforcing review," according to
anomaly, but it also illustrates how strategic action within normal science can be used to exploit that
tendency in the service of fundamental change.
One of the most important of the passive virtues has historically been the property of
randomness in the flow of litigation, which made it unlikely that the Court, after deciding
any given case, would immediately be faced with the situation that most stringently tested
the principle enunciated. It is precisely this saving element of accident, this opportunity to
avoid the testing of the outermost limits of a principle, that has been eliminated by the
activity of groups whose aim it is to utilize litigation as a means of pursuing social goals.
Deutsch, supra note 106, at 222-23.
143. See Missouri ex rel Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (admission of blacks to state
law school); Mitchell v. United States, 313 U.S. 80 (1941) (access of blacks to equal rail facilities);
Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (admission to law school); Sweatt v. Painter, 339
U.S. 629 (1950) (access to equal law school education); McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339
U.S. 637 (1950) (access to equal graduate school facilities).
144. See Potts v. Flax, 313 F.2d 284, 288 (5th Cir. 1963) (arguing that class-wide relief would be
necessary even in an individual case). I discuss Potts as an exemplar of a communal model of
adjudication in Winter, The Metaphorof Standing, supra note 12, at 1501.
145. Chemerinsky, supra note 97, at 63-64; Deutsch, supra note 106, at 183-84 ("constitutional
adjudication is . . . an anomaly in a democratic society, . . . a process in which a politically
irresponsible institution reviews the acts of duly elected legislative and executive officials"); see also
Amar, Law Story, 102 HARV. L. REv. 688, 703-05 (1989) ("Brown called into question every central
tenet of the legal process theory embodied in the first edition of The FederalCourts and the Federal
Syste. ").
146. A. BicKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT AT THE BAR OF
PoLrrcs 16 (1962).
147. Wechsler, supra note 112.
148. A. BicKEL, supra note 146.
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Ely. 149 Not everyone, of course, saw the paradigm as internally coherent
and rationally defensible; even during this period of stabilization, some
understood the historically and culturally contingent nature of reasoning
in constitutional decisionmaking. 5 0 But, as Kuhn reports, the claims of
authentic pioneers are rarely persuasive absent a full-blown crisis that
shakes the profession's faith in its reigning paradigm.' 5 1
Roe reopened and deepened the anomaly.15 2 What's more, it did so

at a time of substantial cultural and political ferment: the end of the
Vietnam War era, the cooling of 1960s passions, the resurgence of the

feminist movement, the Watergate crisis. Not incidentally, this is also
when the critical legal studies movement is born. 5 3 Its birth marks the
beginning of another period of crisis.

Critical legal studies, like legal realism before it, has made invaluable contributions-deepening our understanding and advancing the

transformative process of crisis and transition. Indeed, one just doesn't
think about constitutional law the same way after a decade and a half of

critical legal studies. A thoughtful, well-conceived casebook like Gerald
Gunther's classic (classic, that is, relative to constitutional law as a normal science circa 1975)154 begins to seem almost quaint: a relic of a sim-

pler time when things like "means/ends analysis," "two-tiered equal
149. J. ELY, supra note 6.
150. With regard to Wechsler's call for neutral principles, Deutsch observes that "the insight
that the historical context may well determine the proper classification of a given principle," means
that
a neutral principle becomes one that is perceived as adequately general in terms of the
historical context in which it is applied. The question that such a reformulation raises,
however, is this:
perceived as adequately general by whom?... [P]erceived as adequate by
the very society that imposes the requirement of adequate generality to begin with ....
Deutsch, supra note 106, at 195. With regard to Bickel's formula for the savvy mix of principle and
prudence in judicial review, Deutsch observes:
The limitations that have thus helped to make the Court's work manageable are not to be
found explicitly set out in the constitutional texts. They exist, rather, as cultural understandings, as implicit assumptions, and it is precisely these agreements that have increasingiy been breaking down.
Id. at 224.
151. T. KuHN, supra note 15, at 75.
152. See J. ELY, supra note 6, at 2-3 ("T]he controversial abortion decision of 1973, Roe v.
Wade, ...
forced all of us who work in the area to think about which camp we fall into ....").
153. See Fletcher, Why Kant, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 421,424-26 (1987) (applying Kuhn's analysis
and identifying a school or movement as a group sharing a common text and common questions,
thus locating critical legal studies' origin with the publication of Roberto Unger's Knowledge and
Politics in 1975 and Duncan Kennedy's Form andSubstance, supra note 43, in 1976). For accounts
of the impact of these contemporary phenomena on the founders of critical legal studies, see Gordon,
New Developments in Legal Theory, in THE PoLITICs OF LAW: A PROGRESSIVE CRrrIQUE 281, 28384 (D. Kairys ed. 1982) [hereinafter THE PoLrIcs OF LAW]; Binder, On CriticalLegal Studies As
Guerrilla Warfare, 76 GEO. L.J. 1, 14-24 (1987).
154. See G. GUNTHER, Preface to the Ninth Edition, in CONSTITUTIONAL LAW at xxiii-xxiv
(11th ed. 1985) (outline prepared with Herbert Wechsler in the 1960s formed the basis for the
seventh and eighth editions; its "imprint remains strong" even in the ninth edition published in
1975).
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protection analysis," and "strengthened 'rationality' scrutiny" with
' actually seemed to mean something. As a
"bite" 155
result of the increasing application of the "law is politics" and indeterminacy critiques to
actual legal doctrines and constitutional theories, what was for quite
some time a tolerable anomaly looks more and more like a crisis that is
out of control. 156 For example, Mark Tushnet has argued that no one of
the Grand Theories of constitutional law can solve the anomaly and save
the paradigm.157 This is as we might expect if, as I have argued above,
objectivism is a myth and rationality a function of stabilized matrices.
As Jan Deutsch observed as early as 1968, "the breakdown of accepted
limitations on the meaning of legal concepts, most evident in constitutional law but by no means confined to that area, makes it increasingly
158
difficult to formulate even partially complete and coherent systems."'
In Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, I hazarded the claim that
we are now in the throes of a full-blown crisis.' 5 9 If this claim is right,
then we should expect a paradigm shift within the next few decades. In
the context of this cycle of crisis-to-paradigm-shift, there are two basic
strategies: (1) One can try to implement one's affirmative program by
trying to appeal to (and/or reconstruct) a normal science from within; or
(2) one can try to undermine an existing normal science by provoking or
deepening crisis. But if one chooses the latter-and there are times when
that choice is appropriate-then one must accept the fact that one has
unavoidably chosen marginalization.
There is, however, another alternative. One way to appeal to a normal science under attack is to offer a new paradigm or radical way out of
the crisis that, nevertheless, maintains enough of the old tradition to
assuage the inevitable drive for homeostasis. Personally, I think that is
where we should concentrate our efforts. This reconstructive project
does not mean that we should give up the hard-won insight that law is
155. See Gunther, The Supreme Court, 1971 Term-Foreword:In Search of Evolving Doctrine
on a Changing Court .4Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REV. 1, 20-24 (1972).
156. See T. KuHN,supra note 15, at 67-68:
[Tihe awareness of anomaly [lasts] so long and [penetrates] so deep that one can
appropriately describe the fields affected by it as in a state of growing crisis. Because it
demands large-scale paradigm destruction and major shifts in the problems and techniques
of normal science, the emergence of new theories is generally preceded by a period of
pronounced professional insecurity. As one might expect, that insecurity is generated by
the persistent failure of the puzzles of normal science to come out as they should. Failure
of existing rules is the prelude to a search for new ones.
157. M. TusN', supra note 3, at 2l-146. For an excellent discussion of the failings of various
versions of republicanism and communitarianism to provide a coherent theory for judicial review,
see Kahn, Community in Contemporary ConstitutionalTheory, 99 YALE L.J. 1 (1989) (discussing
Ackerman, Michelman, Sunstein, Fiss, Cover, and Dworkin).
158. Deutsch, supra note 106, at 235.
159. Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 671, 679-81 (arguing that the legal academy is
currently in the kind of epistemological crisis that typically presages a paradigm shift).
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politics, just that we should relinquish our unsophisticated notion of

politics.

16

IV
THE MEANINGS OF CONSTITUTIONAL POLITICS

A.

The Politics of Epistemia

Only an impoverished notion of politics-and a correspondingly
narrow conception of law-would translate both legal realism and critical legal studies into instrumentalism. What is dramatic, important, and
positive about these critiques is their philosophical pragmatism, not their
crass instrumentalism. The slogan "law is politics" is true enough, but
we should be quite careful not to reduce it (and our claims) to a naive
"they do whatever they please." "Ideology" is not itself a sufficient
explanation for the law; there remain the obvious questions of where the
socially situated individual gets his or her ideology and, even more
importantly, how that ideology affects decisionmaking in either law or
politics.
An effective constitutional politics must pay close attention to the
larger cultural constructs and stabilized matrices in which lawyers,
judges, and laypersons are always already situated. The mutual entailment of the epistemic and the political means also that the epistemic, the
political, and the legal are already one. Consider the following example
from an ongoing debate in constitutional theory. Mark Tushnet has
argued that Ronald Dworkin's distinction between a constitutional "con-.
cept," the idea or principle incorporated into a constitutional provision,
and the particular "conceptions" expressed by the framers 16 1 is subject to
manipulation by varying the level of generality. 162 In Bowers v.
Hardwick; 163 for example, the majority opted for a relatively particularized characterization. Accordingly, it found no privacy right because
our historical and constitutional tradition had never sanctioned homosexual sodomy. 16 The dissent, on the other hand, chose a more generalized formulation. It would have found a privacy right because of our
society's general commitment to privacy in matters of sexuality. 6 5
160. See also Schlag, Images of the Political: The Normative and the Epistemic (forthcoming
1991) (questioning the dominant normative understanding of "law is politics").
161. R. DwoRKiN, supra note 4, at 70-72; IL DwoRKiN, TAKiNG RI GHTs SERIOUSLY 134-36
(1977).
162. M. TUSHNET, supra note 3, at 135.
163. 478 U.S. 186 (1986).

164. Id. at 190-94.
165. M. TuSHNET, supra note 3, at 135 (discussing Bowers 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, J.,
dissenting)). Subsequently, Justice Scalia has suggested that the way to avoid indeterminacy and

value-imposition is to fix the level of generality at "the most specific level at which a relevant
tradition protecting, or denying protection to, the asserted right can be identified." Michael H. v.
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At this point, Philip Bobbitt joins the debate and argues that
Tushnet has it wrong because, at least in the case of unenumerated
rights, the level of generality has nothing to do with it.1 66 Invoking a
variant of the modem constitutionalist's favorite distinction-the means/
ends distinction-Bobbitt argues that the level of generality doesn't matter because it isn't the permissibility of the desired legislative end (that is,
whether it is seeking to regulate homosexual sodomy or intimate sexuality) that determines the statute's constitutionality. It is, rather, a question of permissible means: Are the means constitutionally compatible
with the American ethos of limited government? And he answers this
question too without resorting to ends by invoking a structural analogy
and arguing that: "If a particular statutory means is denied to the federal government, then it is denied to the states, even if the goal involved
is permitted to the states." 167 Thus, he concludes:
Even if the purpose of the statute were to promote world peace and harmony and every single American took an oath claiming to believe that
statute would deliver it, the means employed might still offend our ethos.
If the majority in Bowers is persuasive, it is precisely because the actual
conduct of homosexual sodomy did not, traditionally, correspond to our
notions of intimacy but instead seemed (perhaps erroneously) more like
licentiousness. Whether or not the argument regarding Roe is persuasive
also depends on whether the specifies of a woman's carrying a fetus to
term corresponds to our ideas of intimacy. If they don't, then the level of
generality-whether or not Americans want to protect privacy,
on the
16 8
one hand, or fetal life on the other-is simply irrelevant.
But is it? The last two sentences seem to contradict each other. How
can the level of generality be irrelevant when the legitimacy of Roe
"depends on whether the specifics of a woman's carrying a fetus to term
corresponds to our [general] ideas of intimacy"? It seems obvious that if
the judges see pregnancy as "intimate," the case is won. But if they see
pregnancy as pregnancy, or sex as procreation, then the case is already
lost before one gets anywhere near the Constitution.
Does that mean that the generality version of the indeterminacy critique is correct? Well, almost. What is more to the point, and much
Gerald D., 109 S. Ct. 2333, 2344 n.6 (1989) (joined only by Rehnquist, C.J.). For an effective
rebuttal of Scalia's proposal, see Tribe & Doff,Levels of Generality in the Definition of Rights, 57 U.
Cm. L. Rnv. 1057, 1085-96 (1990). Tribe and Dorf's own proposal for ascertaining appropriate

levels of generality is superior to Justice Scalia's only in that it does not pretend to value-neutrality.
It fails, however, to survive its own critique. Because it relies almost entirely on convention as the
mediating device for ascribing characterizations to traditions of legal precedent, it fails to account
for the effects either of unexamined cultural processes of categorizations (see discussion at infra text
accompanying notes 169-72) or of cultural change and reinterpretation (see discussion at infra text
accompanying notes 330-419).
166. Bobbitt, supra note 45, at 1294-96.
167. Id. at 1296.
168. Id
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more revealing, is that all the legal and political work of constitutional
decisionmaking is being done at the epistemic level. Roe'and Bowers
both depend on preexisting, extra-legal (which is to say, cultural)
processes of categorization. What ultimately decides the issue is not the
legal rule, but rather the concept of "intimacy" that the judges bring to
the case.169 If the judges know intimacy only in the context of a traditional heterosexual marriage, if they know lesbians and gays only as
Other, then Bowers is always and already lost. But if the society is one in
which homosexual relationships can be seen and manifested in all the
tender, loving capacities that human relationships can muster at their
best, if the judges know of such people and can see them as people just
like themselves, then the case is won (or, better yet, might never need to
be brought).
What I think we should conclude from this discussion is that an
effective constitutional politics must begin long before the questions of
legal doctrine and its manipulability are reached. The mutual entailment
of the epistemic and the political means that not only is law politics, but
also-more importantly-that law is nested in and entirely contingent on
the wider social practices and understandings that are sedimented in any
culture.170 The assertion that presidents and legislators "tend to deal
with fundamental political-moral problems.., by reflexive reference to
the established moral conventions,"' 17 ' necessarily applies equally to
judges. Because those conventions are already entailed in our language
and already entrenched in our conceptualizations, there is little else to

which they could refer. 172
This insight requires that we cultivate a truly pragmatist politics
that struggles with the much harder task of making constitutional mean169. Although I come to the insight by way of cognitive linguistics, see Winter, Transcendental
Nonsense, supra note 12, at 1151-56, 1180, the point was made by Karl Llewellyn 55 years ago: "[I]f
there is any slightest doubt about the classification of the facts-though they be undisputed-the
rule cannot decide the case; it is decided by the classifying." Llewellyn, supra note 65, at 8 (citation
omitted).
170. For demonstrations, see Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 12, at 2267-71
(affirmative action); Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1186-96 (first amendment).
For further discussion and examination of the concept of "sedimentation," see infra text
accompanying notes 236-72.
171. M. PERRY, supra note 8,at 100; see also id at 101 (characterizing the political branches in
contradistinction to the judiciary).
172. Judges see these institutions not as they are, but through the spectacles (a) of what
they may have been, (b)of the honorably received ideology about them-which is of
necessity vastly older than themselves.... The picture fits into a background shaped in
unthinking childhood, uncritically accepted, all deviating and modem factors slighted.
Llewellyn, supra note 65, at 34 (emphasis in original); cf.Deutsch, supra note 106, at 260 ("fT]he
search for factors that effectively impose restraints on the discretion of the individual Justice must be
carried beyond the realm of his work experience to that of his schooling, both formal and
informal.").
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ing. As I explain below, this task is much more difficult than might be
assumed. It calls for a constitutional politics of a different order.
B.

The Politics of the Subject

In assessing the magnitude of a truly constitutional politics, we can
quite profitably begin with Frank Michelman's plea for a "dialogic con1 73
ception of politics."
Pragmatic political argument is animated and constrained by a consciousness of its situation within, and answerability to, a public normative culture and history-within and to, if you like, a normative
practice.... If pragmatic political argument does locate itself within a
public normative history, it also adopts a critical and always potentially
transformative attitude toward that history. It regards that history as
always containing resources that can be applied to its own critical reexamination and, therefore, as always ripe for the transformative exercise
of what has been called
interpretation, or internal development, or recol174
lective imagination.
This passage highlights the idea that all argument is shaped by its situation, its normative culture, and its history and at the same time is always
in the process of transformative elaboration. In this view, what is noteworthy about Michelman's description of dialogic politics (and rare in
legal scholarship) is the recognition that human endeavor is simultaneously situated and imaginative. 175 Yet, even Michelman's description
falls short in three critical respects that, ultimately, undermine his
stance. As I will show, each of these shortcomings is nested in a single
more fundamental misconception.
First, Michelman's conception of "dialogue" is much too polite and
intellectualized.1 76 In a world in which even the most civilized order
does violence in its day-to-day operations, 177 meaning frequently must be
173. Michelman, Bringing the Law to Life: A Pleafor Disenchantment, 74 CORNELL L. REV.
256, 257 (1989).

174. Id. at 258 (footnotes omitted).
175. The other notable exception in the literature is Drucilla Cornell's Institutionalizationof
Meaning, Recollective Imaginationand the Potentialfor TransformativeLegalInterpretation, 136 U.
PA. L. REv. 1135 (1988), to which Michelman explicitly refers.
176. See K. WHITESIDE, supra note 16, at 265 ("intellectuals ... are particularly prone to
believing that it is possible to translate ideals directly in practice"); Schlag, Missing Pieces: A

Cognitive Approach to Law, 67 TEX. L. REv. 1195, 1210 (1989) ("The hallmark of rationalist
consciousness is the privileging of ego-centered reason.").
177. See M. MERLEAU-PoNTY, HUMANISM AND TERROR: AN ESSAY ON THE COMMUNIST
PROBLEM 33-36 (J. O'Neill trans. 1969); Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1601
(1986); see also K. WHITESIDE, supra note 16, at 188-89 (summarizing Merleau-Ponty's view:
"[L]iberals tend to overlook the complicity of their principles with the violence of political life.
Liberalism is an ideology in the phenomenological sense-not a 'mask' for practice, but the
existential accompaniment of concrete political decisions.") (citations omitted).
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written "in the medium of blood."' 17 To the extent that meaning is
grounded in a form of life, it follows that "[to make meaning, one must
do meaning."' 179 Constitutional meaning-and, therefore, constitutional
politics--depends upon more than argument or pure politics; constitutional meaning depends as well upon a dialogue that is founded in and
sustained by lived human experience and committed action.
"[P]rescription, even when embodied in a legal text, [cannot] escape its
,,10 Indeed, constitutional meaning
origin and its end in experiene ....
begins in the grounded cognitive process by which we translate social
experience into cultural meaning.
If today we believe it reasonable... that workers attain more than a
marginal economic existence or if we find racism detestable, it is because
people struggled, through strikes and protest and violence, to vindicate
those claims. That is to imply that concrete events, not just abstract reasoning... are responsible for constituting what is rational.' 8 '
178. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term-Forewora- Nomos and Narrative 97 HARV.L.
REv. 4, 47 (1983).
179. Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1231 (emphasis in original); see also
Law, Equality: The Power and Limits of Law, 95 YALE L.J. 1769, 1783 (1986) ("Even the most
fundamental negative rights, such as the right to speak or to control our bodies free from
governmental constraint, acquire concrete meaning only as people act collectively to claim them.").
Michelman approaches this insight in his deft argument-building on Justice Blackmun's
dissent in Bowers, 478 U.S. at 204.05-that the right to a homosexual lifestyle can be grounded in an
associational right because it "has come to signify... a more personally constitutive and distinctive
way, or ways, of being." Michelman, supra note 96, at 1533. Miechelman is persuasive on this point.
See infra text accompanying notes 511-22. But he fails, I think, to appreciate its full import: If
activity and behavior are accorded protection because they are now understood to be constitutive of
self and meaning, then mutually conflicting forms of life must be equally protected.
The depth of the conflict this creates for Michelman becomes clear when one considers his
argument for banning pornography because it promotes subordination of women and, as such,
causes them harm. See Michelman, supra note 96, at 1532 n.161. The argument founders because
to concede that pornography expresses a point of view on the subordination of women is to concede
that it has a constitutive effect for its consumers (however disgraceful and unreconstructed they may
be). Cf Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 567 (1969) ("[Ihe State may no more prohibit mere
possession of obscene matter on the ground that it may lead to antisocial conduct than it may
prohibit possession of chemistry books on the ground that they may lead to the manufacture of
homemade spirits.").
Worse yet, Michelman's argument for banning pornography undermines his Bowers argument.
As he acknowledges, stable homosexual relationships are uniquely threatening to conservative
values. Michelman, supra note 96, at 1533 n.166 (quoting Law, Homosexuality and the Social
Meaning of Gender, 1988 Wis. L. REV. 1,24, 31-32). But the very reason that legislative majorities
have traditionally sought to ban homosexual conduct is that they experience it as harmful to the
security of their heterosexual family values (although, in my view, they are wrong and mistaken in
this belief).
It is difficult to see how Michelman's republican pluralism helps us mediate such conflicting
world views. In the end, one suspects that the choice and imposition of values (for homosexual
privacy, against pornography) cannot be avoided. One may find these values laudable, as I do, but
they are not derivable from or materially advanced by Michelman's republicanism.
180. Cover, supra note 178, at 5.
181. K. WHrrEsIDE, supra note 16, at 98. Michelman comes close to this insight when he
discusses the role of "action" in producing what he refers to as "generative indeterminacies."
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This is the lesson of the Edmund Pettus Bridge and the Voting Rights
Act,' 8 2 the Civil War and the fourteenth amendment, indeed of the
American Revolution and the Constitution itself.
Second, Michelman's dialogic politics is far too rationalist to realize
his transformative aspirations. As long as Michelman relies on "interpretation" and recognizes an "answerability to... a public normative
culture,"' 8 3 his conception of politics remains too closed, too static, too
bound by normal science and its internal processes. 18 4 As Kuhn has
noted: "Given a paradigm, interpretation... is central to the enterprise
that explores it. But that interpretive enterprise... can only articulate a
paradigm, not correct it."' 85
It is true, of course, that Michelman has questioned Kuhn's periodization of normal science and crisis and allied himself with
Feyerabend's notion that science always contains the marginal as well as
the normal. Thus, for Michelman, "[a] shift from pre- to post-transformation practice is more like a movement from margin to center-a shift
of attention-than it is like the total replacement of one 'world' by
Michelman, supra note 96, at 1529. Thus, he points to the role of "self-emancipatory activity of
Black Americans" in shaping the meaning of equal protection during the Warren Court era. Id. at
1529-30. It is unclear, however, that he means the same thing by "action." For, after stating that
generative indeterminacies "are products of action, the creations of motivated acts of perception and
cultivation," he immediately follows with the question: "Action by whom, then? Most likely, it
would seem, by those who enter the conversation ...." Id. at 1529 (emphasis added).
Similarly, the lesson that Michelman draws from the civil rights movement concerns not the
necessity of action, but rather the locus of dialogue. The civil rights movement, he suggests, counsels
an expanded sense of "dialogic engagement," "in the encounters and conflicts, interactions and
debates that arise in and around town meetings and local government agencies; civic and voluntary
organizations;... workplaces and shop floors; public events and street life; and so on." Id. at 1531.
But the kinds of concrete, even bloody experiences identified by Whiteside and Cover as a ground for
meaning seem remarkably absent from this version of Michelman's conception of "normatively
consequential dialogue." Id.
In forthcoming work, Michelman comes closer still: He recognizes the communicative content
of action. Nevertheless, there is a subtle but important difference between recognizing that action
can express (symbolic) meaning and understanding that action constitutes meaning. See infra text
accompanying notes 240-48 & 286-306.
182. See, e.g., J. WILLIAMS, EYES ON THE PRIZE: AMERICA'S CIVIL RIGHTS YEARS, 19541965, at 252-85 (1987) (detailing the events at Selma that led to the passage of the Voting Rights
Act); see also Fiss, The Law Regained, 74 CORNELL L. REV. 245, 250 (1989):
Political activity and organization is often needed... to challenge the unsatisfying answers
courts sometimes give to the aggrieved ....Sometimes that political activity proceeds in
heated and unruly ways-that too is a lesson of the civil rights era. Courts heard what the
people were saying at the lunch counters of Greenville, on the streets of Birmingham, and
on the road from Selma to Montgomery, and responded accordingly.
183. Michelman, supra note 173, at 258.
184. And, thus, he risks much the same stasis that he identifies as the shortcoming in
Ackerman's approach. Michelman, supra note 96, at 1521-24 (discussing Ackerman, Storrs
Lecture.%supra note 5).
185. T. KUHN, supra note 15, at 122; see also id. at 123 ("No ordinary sense of the term
'interpretation' fits these flashes of intuition through which a new paradigm is born.").
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But this alliance with Feyerabend is an improbable one.

Feyerabend's view of the simultaneity of normal and marginal science
explains the shift from one to the other as a product of blind contingency.'8 7 "Revolutions," according to Feyerabend, "are the outward
manifestation of a change of the normal component that cannot be
accounted for in any reasonable fashion."' 88 Feyerabend sees scientific
revolutions as no more than a chance shift in attention because he is an

antirationalist. But Michelman is advocating "a communicative practice
of open and intelligible reason-giving."' 9 He wants people to change
their positions in response to dialogue, because they are persuaded by
reasons. In the end, Feyerabend's nonrational skepticism is incommen-

surate with Michelman's description of situated normative dialogue.
Thus, Michelman cannot cherish "all moments as potentially transformative"'19 and still insist on dialogue as the modality of transforma-

tion. "Intelligible reason-giving" depends on a stabilized matrix that
establishes a context for communication, 191 as Michelman does acknowledge elsewhere: "The persuasive character of the process depends on the
normative efficacy of some context that is everyone's-of the past that is

constitutively present in and for every self as language, culture,
186. Michelman, supra note 96, at 1523 (discussing Feyerabend, Consolationsfor the Specialist,
in CRMCISM AND THE GRowTH OF KNOWLEDGE 197, 207-10 (1. Lakatos & A. Musgrave eds.
1970)); cf P_ UNGER, supra note 125, at 15-22, 88-90 (discussing the practice of deviationist
doctrine).
187. The younger generation, always eager for new things, seizes upon the new material
and studies it avidly. Journalists, always on the lookout for headlines-the more absurd,
the better-publicize the new discoveries ....
These are some reasons for the differences
which we perceive. I do not think one should look for anything more profound.
..
••Jo assume that... people will change their allegiancein a reasonablefashion is
carrying optimism and the quest for rationality too far. The normal elements, i.e. those
elements which have the support of the majority, may change because the younger
generation cannot be bothered to follow their elders; or because some public figure has
changed his mind; or because some influential member of the establishment has died and
has failed (perhaps because of his suspicious nature) to leave behind a strong and influential
school, or because a powerful and non-scientific institution pushes thought in a definite

direction.
Feyerabend, supra note 186, at 213-14 (emphasis added).
As I have explained elsewhere, this invocation of blind contingency is the common and inevitable conclusion of all social coherence theories. For a discussion of these problems with respect to
Rorty's account of scientific progress, see Winter, TranscendentalNonsense supra note 12, at 112327. For a discussion of these problems with respect to Fish's account of change, see Winter, Bull
Durham, supra note 12, at 664-76.
188. Feyerabend, supra note 186, at 214 (emphasis added).
189. Michelman, supra note 7, at 34.
190. Michelman, supra note 96, at 1523.
191. "Human society is not a community of reasonable minds, and only in fortunate countries
where a biological and economic balance has locally and temporarily been struck has such a
conception of it been possible." M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 56; cf
Michelman, supra note 96, at 1506 (republican constitutionalism may not be possible in modem
American society because, historically, it has "usually involv[ed] some combination of political
hierarchy, civic regimentation, and organicist culture").
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worldview, and political memory." 192 But, as we have seen, stabilized
matrices are largely secure from penetration by precisely those
arguments that might undo them. 93 This is another way of saying that
Michelman, too, is ensnared in the quandary of constitutional theory in a
conservative era.
The third and closely related difficulty is that Michelman conceives
of public normative culture and history as "always being ripe" for transformation through rational argument; 194 he recognizes neither inertia nor
resistance. Yet, there is "an adversity which hides it from the grasp of
the strongest and the most intelligent of men. "195 This adversity is, typically, more visible to those who understand the world as a product of
blind contingencies for, otherwise, radical change would be a rather
effortless and more common event. Thus, Feyerabend complains that the
hegemony of scientific culture renders it largely secure from challenge:
"What is worthwhile and what is not are to such a large extent determined by the existing institutions and forms of life that we hardly ever
arrive at a proper evaluation of these institutions themselves."' 196 But
those who, like Michelman, are committed to reason have a tendency to
197
see the social world as compliant to that reason.
The very fact that we are always already situated-that is, constituted in part by culture and history-means that it is difficult for us to
get underneath the particular turtle upon which we stand. 198 Adversity
is the "inertia of the infrastructures" that are the grounds of human possibility.19 9 This phenomenon is manifested no less in the sphere we
192. Michelman, supra note 96, at 1513 (emphasis in original).
193. See supra text accompanying notes 31-39 & 129-34.
194. Michelman, supra note 173, at 258. Ironically, Michelman makes a closely related point in
his response to Owen Fiss: "'Crit' scholars, using a different vocabulary from Fiss's, might have
chosen the term 'reification' for the sort of obstructive intellectual force of which he complains." Id.
at 269.
195. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS, supra note 25, at 218; see also id. at 239 ("a matter of a sort
of inertia, a passive resistance, a dying fall of meaning-an anonymous adversity") (emphasis in

original).
196. Feyerabend, supra note 186, at 209. Thus, Feyerabend's explanation of why "the
revolutionary elements become visible only on such rare occasions" as described by Kuhn (that is, in
times of crisis) is that the resistance of the institutional structures of normal science "becomes
especially strong and noticeable in periods where a change seems to be imminent." Id. at 213. But,
as noted above, Feyerabend argues that it is pure contingency that brings on such change. See supra
note 187.
197. See Schlag, supra note 176, at 1211 ("[I]n principle, the rationalist self knows few (if any)
limits on its capacity to understand or explain the world .
").
198. Stanley Fish takes the extreme position that it is never possible to do so. See S. FISH, supra
note 36, at 467 (There can be no "option of stepping back from one's beliefs in order to survey or
reform them" because "being situated . . . means that one cannot achieve a distance on one's
beliefs."). For a demonstration that reflection-what I call "situated self-consciousness"--is
possible, see Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 661-64, 681-84.
199. M. MERLEAu-PONTY, DIALECTIc, supra note 1, at 64. Van Zandt makes a closely related
critique of Unger. See Van Zandt, Commonsense Reasoning Social Change, and the Law, 81 Nw.

1990]

INDETERMINACY AND INCOMMENSURABILITY

1481

denominate political than in the personal one: "Inertia is a guiding principle in politics as well as physics, and the very existence of our institutions-the persuasive testimony of history-itself serves to produce a
significant degree of acceptance." 2"
Ultimately, each shortcoming in Michelman's description of dialogic politics is related to a single, more fundamental issue: the nature of
subjectivity. Consider the subject to whom Michelman addresses his plea
for a dialogic conception of politics. It is, first of all, a subject capable of
deciding whether to heed this plea.201 It is a subject that, although
"answerable" to a "public normative culture,""2 2 is presumedly free (at
least initially) to disregard that culture. This subject "locate[s] itself
within a public normative history."2 "3 "[I]t also adopts a... transformative attitude toward that history." 2" Now, this is hardly a subject constrained by its situation. Indeed, in Michelman's actual formulation, the
subject is constrained because it chooses to be constrained-that is, it is
"constrained by a consciousness of its situation."20 5
In short, Michelman's subject is a relatively autonomous subject.2 6
Thus, this subject purports to be able to make meaning solely through
intellectual argument, to shift its attention freely from center to margin
in search of transformative possibilities, and to do so without let or hindrance from history, culture, or institutions. Michelman's subject is
hardly situated at all; on the contrary, it is capable of holding history at a
U.L. REV. 894, 921 (1987) ("[lit is precisely because formative contexts are individuals' own
products whose pragmatic utility is constantly reaffirmed through daily use that they take on a
correctness or plausibility that is difficult to challenge.").
200. Deutsch, supra note 106, at 216.
201. Thus, Michelman suggests that "legislatures restricting constitutionally valued liberties...
in genuine and reasonable pursuit of constitutional values carrying greater weight" might more
readily be believed by a Court willing to "ask whether those who suffer restrictions of their liberties
.. Can
c fairly be expected to accept that restriction as consonant with a good-faith exercise in
dialogic politics." Michelman, supra note 173, at 267-68. But does anyone seriously think that the
Ku Klux Klan can be persuaded by dialogue to accept a legal restriction on, or to give up the right
to, racially derogatory speech? Can a doctrine of implied (dialogic) consent be far behind?
202. Id. at 258.
203. Id. (emphasis added).
204. Id (emphasis added).
205. Id (emphasis added). Michelman is joined by Duncan Kennedy in just this mistake. See
Kennedy, A CulturalPluralistCasefor Affirmative Action in Legal Academia, 1990 DuKE L.. 705,
745 ("[Ciulture and ideology provide a vocabulary from which 'individuals' pick and choose to
produce themselves ....").
206. The phrase is Pierre Schlag's. Schlag, supra note 14, at 37. Within the legal academy,
Stanley Fish and Pierre Schag have done the most to make us conscious of the significance of
situatedness and the degree to which legal scholars unconsciously presuppose a classical
transcendental subject. See generally S.FIsH, supra note 13; Schlag, supra note 176; Schlag, 'Le
Hors de Texte
Cest Moi"-The Politics of Form and the Domestication of Deconstruction. 11
CARDoZO L. REV. 1631 (1990). The ideas in these paragraphs owe much to their work and to hours
of intense conversation with Pierre.
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distance so that it can "regard" it as a "resource. ' 207 Indeed, in just this
syntactical way, Michelman's formulations constantly reproduce the subject/object dichotomy: He speaks of the subject and its history, the subject answerable to its culture, the subject adopting an attitude toward
history, the subject transforming that history. 20 8
Perhaps I am being unfair to Michelman. 20 9 He does, after all, set
out to acknowledge the situatedness of political argument. He recognizes
that it takes place (read: it must necessarily take place) within a given
history and normative culture. Indeed, that is why, with no irony
intended, I can refer to his position as a "profitable" place to begin. Nevertheless, an undertone of autonomous subjectivity keeps breaking
through the surface of Michelman's discussions of situatedness.
We can see this process at work in his description and rejection of
"strong republicanism. '2 10 In this version of republicanism, "[p]olitical
engagement is considered a positive human good because the self is
understood as partially constituted by, or as coming to itself through,
such engagement. ' 21 1 The suspicion that this really is a self-constituting
consciousness (rather than a situated, constituted self) is confirmed when
he tells us that one advocate of strong republicanism is Kant, who, he
suggests, contends: "[W]e are free only insofar as we direct our actions
in accordance with reasons or ends that we, as it were, legislate to ourselves upon conscious, critical reflection." 2" 2 Michelman hesitates to recommend strong republicanism only because he is not willing to accept its
transcendentalist underpinnings. 213 Nevertheless, he explicitly endorses
the supervenient role of consciousness.21 4
Thus, in his description of republican jurisgenesis, Michelman
reduces situatedness to "a fund of public normative references conceived
as narratives, analogies, and other professions of commitment" upon
which "subjects draw."2 1 What is salient about this "fund" is that it
207. Michelman, supra note 173, at 258; see also Schlag, supra note 176, at 1237 (discussing the
"tendency of thought to solidify into opaque substances that can be carved and dissected, as if they
were things in the world").
208. Cf Schlag, Contradictionand Denial, 87 MICH. L. REv. 1216, 1220 (1989) ("Consciously,

we all know that subject and object are not radically separate. Pre-consciously, however, we often
use metaphors that succeed nonetheless in radically separating the two ....").
209. As Pierre Schlag warns, we are prone to "project such crude and primitive views of

subject/object relations onto the texts of others" when they are only "our own pre-conscious
constructions." Id.
210. Michelman, supra note 96, at 1503-04.
211. Id at 1503.
212. Id at 1503 n.36.
213. Id at 1504 ("I do not know what is good for the soul. I do not Inow in what (if anything)
personal freedom essentially consists. I do not know whether citizenship is a fundamental human

good.").
214.

Id

215. Id. at 1513.
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consists of elements that a consciousness can identify, wield, and otherwise profess. What is salient about this subject is not that it is constituted
by this fund, but that it draws on it. Although its tools may be limited by
history, the subject's choice is nevertheless always already free. Thus, it
is not surprising that Michelman describes republican politics as "all but
indistinguishable" from Dworkin's conception of "law as the institutionalized form of self-consciousness on the part of community members
about their situatedness in a common past, required by a conception of
personal and political freedom that involves our continuing to be ourselves even as we reconsiderwhat we are and ought to be about. '2 16 Who
should we be today? Why, the best we can be, of course.2 17
It is instructive when someone as astute as Frank Michelman cannot
talk about situatedness without, ultimately, eschewing it and thus undermining his own point. I would suggest that this phenomenon is itself a
product of adversity and a testimony to the inertial hold of situatedness.
Michelman, no less than others, is situated in a normative discourse that
presupposes the traditional subject/object dichotomy.2 18 Accordingly,
this dichotomy is constantly-and unconsciously-reinscribed in his
discourse.
Why does this matter? It matters for the same reasons that we have
already encountered in the quandary of constitutional law in a conservative era. The homeostatic tendencies of all forms of thought tend toward
reproduction of the status quo and against radical transformation.
Attempts at transformative action cannot possibly be effective if they
unconsciously reproduce the very context they are trying to transform.
Thus, if we are to undertake the project of a constitutional politics, our
first step must be to identify and reject the politics implicit in the traditional view of subject/object relations: the politics of the relatively
autonomous subject.
The politics of the relatively autonomous subject is the politics of
constitutional formalism. This subject is one that either constitutes its
context or, at least, is free to overcome or transform it according to its
desires (in essence, the neo-Kantian subject). It is the politics of late
nineteenth-century "[d]emocratic optimism" which believed that as long
216. Id.at 1514 (emphasis added) (discussing R. DwoiRuN, supra note 4).
217. Of course, something is only "best" relative to an idealized model of what we think it
should be. Thus, Dworkin's concept of law as integrity-in which one is obligated to make
something "the best it can be," R. DwoRKIN, supra note 4, at 229-is necessarily indistinguishable
from (and collapses back into) the cultural values that unconsciously animate the situated,
constituted self. Moreover, as I have explained elsewhere, Dworkin's concept is really only a
dressed-up version of the cognitive phenomenon of prototype effects-that is, part of the basic
cognitive process by which one configures new input in a manner that makes sense, to make it a
coherent whole or a "best example" of an existing idealized cognitive model or reigning paradigm.
Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 12, at 2261-62 n.119.
218. See supra text accompanying notes 22-25.
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as "the rights of man are guaranteed, no liberty any longer encroaches on
any other, and the co-existence of men as autonomous and reasonable
'
subjects is assured." 219
It is the politics in which "formal equality" is

sufficient to free the subject because context and situation do not effec-

tively restrict outcomes. In short, it is the politics of Lochner and its
progeny.
The politics of the relatively autonomous subject is the world view

in which each subject is free (in Justice Peckham's words) "to make contracts regarding labor upon such terms as they may think best,"2 2
regardless of context and situation. It is a world view in which there is

nothing incongruous about simultaneously maintaining (in Justice
O'Connor's words) "that the sorry history of both private and public
discrimination in this country has contributed to a lack of opportunities
for black entrepreneurs, ' and that "[there are numerous explanations
for this dearth of minority participation, including... both black and
white career and entrepreneurial choices."2'22 It is a world view in which
"personal" rights like the right to privacy are fully guaranteed without
regard to the social, financial, and institutional conditions that would
make their attainment even remotely plausible.2 2 3

It is, of course, an absurd world. It is a fairytale world in which we
are always and already free, never constrained by context or situation. It
is a world where the only cognizable constraints are those created by the
choices of other autonomous subjects, and they can always be controlled

by the law (at least when those choices are unreasonable).224 And it is a
dangerous world.225 It is dangerous not only because it is the world of
retrogressive Justices, but also because it is the world unconsciously
219. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SENtE AND NON-SENSE, supra note 21, at 102-03.
220. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 61 (1905); see also supra notes 73-78 and
accompanying text.
221. City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 499 (1989).
222. Id. at 503. But cf Lou Reed, Dirty Blvd, (sound recording on the album NEw YORK (Sire
Records 1989)) ("no one here dreams of being a doctor or a lawyer or anything/they dream of
dealing on the dirty boulevard").
223. See e.g., Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316-17 (1980) (denial of federal funding for
abortions for poor women does not violate equal protection); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,474 (1977)
(equal protection clause does not require state that funds child birth for indigent women to fund
abortions as well); see also Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040, 3052 (1989)
("[flt is difficult to see how any procreational choice is burdened by the State's ban on the use of its
facilities or employees for performing abortions.").
This is what Larry Tribe disparages as the "Newtonian" approach to reality. Tribe, supra note
96, at 14-17. "[W]hether by deploying carrots or by wielding sticks, as long as the state keeps its
hands to itself, any change in social parameters simply constitutes a different menu of outcomes
within which private citizens remain free to make their own choices." Id. at 17.
224. See Croson, 488 U.S. at 509 (The city can "tak[e] appropriate measures against those who
discriminate," including actions "to break down patterns of deliberate exclusion.") (emphasis
added).
225. See Williams, The Obliging Shell: An Informal Essay on Formal Equal Opportunity, 87
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assumed by otherwise discerning legal academics who, we can be certain,
oppose the outcomes of each and every one of the cases I have just noted.
But, and we should be very clear on this, it is the only kind of world in
which all one needs is a slightly better theory and everything can be
made all right.
This partial theory-skepticism should not be mistaken for irrationalism, however. With Michelman, I believe that situated agents are nevertheless capable of acting from within a given context to transform it.
Moreover, I believe that this transformative capacity is rationality (at
least, properly understood). But before this situated-rationality can be
properly understood, the full import of Michelman's description of dialogic politics must first be appreciated. All dialogue is situated in and
dependent upon a constitutive nomos that is already given.
The nomos... constitutes a world in which subjects find themselves; it is
not a creation of individuals' subjective value choices. "This nomos is as
much 'our world' as is the physical universe of mass, energy, and
momentum.... Our apprehension of the structure of the normative
world is no less fundamental than our appreciation of the structure of the
physical world." Subjects find themselves in a world of meaning in just
the same way that they find themselves in a world of space and time.2 26
Situatedness-including (as we shall see) the social constitution of the
subject itself-is unavoidable.
C. The Meaning of Situatedness
The full implication of situatedness is easy to miss as long as one
understands it solely as a matter of context or as an external precondition
that must be taken into account. The problem with this still naive view is
that it reinscribes a distinction between the internal and the external,
between the subject and its objects." 7 To locate the subject within a
social, cultural, and historical situation is to reestablish that subject as an
entity somehow separate from that situation.
Situatedness, therefore, must be understood as much more than a
MICH. L. REv. 2128, 2142 (1989) ("So-called formal equal opportunity... misse[d] the heart of the
problem. It put the vampire back in its coffin, but it was no silver stake.").
226. Kahn, supra note 157, at 57-58 (quoting and discussing Cover, supra note 178, at 5). This
is one reason it cannot be that a "community talks itself into an historical identity." Id at 3; see
infra text accompanying notes 273-92. The other reason is that "concrete events" play a role in
"constituting what is rational." K. WHrrESIDE, supra note 16, at 98.
227. See M. MAERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 362:
We must therefore rediscover, after the natural world, the social world, not as an
object or sum of objects, but as a permanent field or dimension of existence.... It is as false
to place ourselves in society as an object among other objects, as it is to place society within
ourselves as an object of thought, and in both cases the mistake lies in treating the social as

an object.
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container in which the subject finds itself.22 8 Situatedness is, rather, a
way of describing the epistemological ecology in which we are simultaneously constituting and constituted. We are constituting because meaning
arises in the imaginative interaction of the human being with the environment. We are constituted because the situated quality of human existence means that both the physical and social environment with which we
interact is already formed by the actions of those who have preceded us.
For Merleau-Ponty, existential philosophy
tak[es] as [its] theme not only knowledge or consciousness understood as
an activity which autonomously posits immanent and transparent objects
but also existence, i.e., an activity given to itself in a natural and historical situation and as incapable of abstracting itself from that situation as it
is of reducing itself to it.... The "subject" is no longer just the epistemological subject but is the human subject who... thinks in terms of his
situation, forms his categories in contact with his experience, and modifies this situation and this experience by the meaning he discovers in
them.22 9
It is precisely in this double sense of "constitutional" as simultaneously
constituted and constituting that we must come to understand the situatedness of what Merleau-Ponty calls "the human subject." And it is in
this double sense that we must consider this situated-subject and its role
in "constitutional politics. ' 23 0 We are unavoidably constituted by the
political actions of our predecessors and, at the same time, constituting
through our politics the world that our successors will inherit.
To understand the nature of the situated-subject, however, two
things must be clear. First and foremost, the situated-subject is not simple self-consciousness. That part of ourselves with which we seem to
have relatively direct contact, the part that seems self-present, is but the
tip of the iceberg. Like the head that sits atop our bodies, it is but one
part of an entire superstructure that makes consciousness possible.2 3 1
Second, the situated-subject is always already social. Like the "state
of nature," the solitary subject is a theoretical construct impossible in the
real world. No human infant could survive without the nurturance of
228. See Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 661-64, 681-84 (describing the limitations of
the "container" metaphor).
229. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SENSE AND NON-SENSE, supra note 21, at 133-34. But cf. M.

supra note 25, at 94 ("This subject which experiences itself as constituted
at the moment it functions as constituting is my body.").
230. Cf L. TamE, CONSrTrUTIONAL CHoIcES at vii (1985).
231. We have known as much since Sigmund Freud, although one would find very little in legal
scholarship since Jerome Frank that even attempts to take this insight seriously. Notable exceptions
are Lawrence, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection:Reckoning With Unconscious Racism, 39
STAN. L. REV. 317 (1987), and Cornell, The Doubly-Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine,
75 CORNELL L. REv. 644 (1990).
MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS,
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other people;2 32 its earliest experiences already provide it with an entire
repertoire of psychological mechanisms, defenses, complexes, and personality traits. The solitary subject is at best a literary device, 233 at worst

an oxymoron:
Solipsism is a "thought experiment"; the solus ipse [the self alone] a
"constructed subject." This isolating method of thinking is intended
more to reveal than to break the links of the intentional web. If we could
break them in reality or simply in thought-if we could really cut the
solus ipse off from others and from Nature [,] ... there would be fully
preserved, in this fragment of the whole which alone was left, the references to the whole it is composed of. In short, we still would not have
the solus ipse.234
What this means is that, because the subject is fashioned in its interaction
with its physical and social world, it always already contains those relationships within it as the imaginative abstractions of those
interactions.2 35
Both these points about the situated-subject are captured in the concept of sedimentation. Originating in the late writings of Husserl, the
concept expresses the way meanings and assumptions build up within the
subject and, once internalized, operate without the subject's conscious
awareness.2 36 For example, Merleau-Ponty describes how embedded
knowledge of both the physical and social world is used casually without
reflection.
When I move about my house, I know without thinking about it that
walking towards the bathroom means passing near the bedroom, that
looking at the window means having the fireplace on my left, and in this
small world each gesture, each perception is immediately located in relation to a great number of possible coordinates. When I chat with a friend
whom I know well, each of [our] remarks... contains, in addition to the
meaning it carries for everybody else, a host of references... without our
needing to recall previous conversations with each other .... In the same
way there is a 'world of thoughts', or a sediment left by our mental
processes, which enables us to rely on our concepts and acquired judgments as we might on things there in front of us... without there being
232. It is only in fictional and mythical contexts like the story of Tarzan or the legend of
Romulus and Remus that infants can flourish without other humans, and even then some other
species must fill the parental role.
233. See supra note 232.
234. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS, supra note 25, at 173-74 (discussing Husserl) (footnotes

omitted).
235. See, eg., Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 12, at 2231-32 (discussing the
unconscious elaboration of image-schemata).
236.

E.

HUSSERL,

THE

CRISIS

OF

EUROPEAN

SCIENCES

AND

TRANSCENDENTAL

PHENOMENOLOGY 52 (D. Carr trans. 1970) (referring to "the implications of meaning which are
closed off through sedimentation or traditionalization, i.e., of the constant presuppositions of [our
own] constructions, concepts, propositions, theories").
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2 37
any need for us to resynthesize them.

The process of sedimentation is a necessary adaptation without which
consciousness would hardly be possible. With sedimentation, "[mI]any
the way for
actions are possible on a low level of attention," "opening
'2 38
innovations, which demand a higher level of attention.
Sedimentation is the "deposit" of the subject's past interactions with
its physical and social situation. It operates as a gestalt that, once integrated, can be invoked without being fully reactivated.2 39 Once a mean-

ing is sedimented, it can become self-reinforcing. 2

Sedimentation is

another way of describing the process by which we form, internalize, and
then operate by means of idealized cognitive models. 4 1
Sedimentation accounts both for intersubjectivity and for community. Because many subjects are situated in the same environment, social
experiences such as routine or habitual interactions between subjects give

rise to mutual or reciprocal sedimentations. Through such sedimentations, shared social experiences develop into "institutions."'2 42 Property
is such an institution:
People routinely think of and treat material goods, whether personal arti237. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 129-30 (emphasis added).
238. P. BERGER & T. LucKMANN,supra note 31, at 54; see also id at 50-57 (explaining the
related process of "institutionalization," discussedat infra note 242 and accompanying text).
239. Merleau-Ponty gives the example of communication of abstract meanings in philosophical
discourse:
We begin reading a philosopher by giving the words he makes use of their "common"
meaning; and little by little... his speech comes to dominate his language, and it is his use
of words which ends up assigning them a new and characteristic signification. At this
moment he has made himself understood and his signification has come to dwell in me.
... [F]rom this point on the preparatory stages of expression-the first pages of the
book-are taken up again into the final meaning of the whole and are directly given as
derivatives of that meaning, which is now installed in the culture. The way will be open for
the speaking subject (and for others) to go straight to the whole. He will not need to
reactivate the whole process; he will possess it eminently in its result.... Sedimentation
occurs, and I shall be able to think farther.
M. ME LEAU-PONTY, SIGNS, supra note 25, at 91-92; accord E. HUSSEL, supra note 236, at 361.
240. See M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 441 ("[W]e must
recognize a sort of sedimentation of our life: an attitude towards the world, when it has received
frequent confirmation, acquires a favoured status for us.").
241. Building on earlier work with "frames" and "scripts," the concept of an idealized cognitive
model (ICM) was developed by George Lakoff to explain the structure of linguistic categories. G.
LAxKor, supra note 28, at 68-76, 145-72. As I have explained:
An ICM is a "folk" theory or cultural model that we create and use to organize our
knowledge. It relates many concepts that are inferentially connected by means of a single
conceptual structure that is experientially meaningful as a whole. For example, our
understanding of the words "buy," "sell," "cost," "goods," "advertise," "credit," and the
like, are made meaningful by an ICM of a commercial transaction that relates them
together as a structured activity. The use of any of these words individually evokes the
entire picture or model, the ICM-a sort of holistic, standardized account.
Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1152-53 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original); see also Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 12, at 2233-40.
242. P. BERGER & T. LucKMANN,supra note 31, at 51 ("Institutionalization occurs whenever
there is a reciprocal typification of habitualized actions by types of actors.").
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cles, real estate, or capital, as owned by them. This conclusion is not
merely abstract theory, but is bolstered and evidenced in everyday activities. Individuals in routine activity treat things as subject to the absolute
control of particular persons, and such treatment is consistently validated
of others and the pragmatic usefulness of the
by the reactions
24 3
treatment.
In this way, a legal institution like property "is a social structure...

which is a form of praxis, of living intersubjective relationships." 2'
The same process of sedimentation occurs with respect to interactions of subjects with the shared objects of a society. Thus, purely physi-

cal things form a master mold that helps shape individual situatedsubjects:
The spirit of a society is realized, transmitted, and perceived through the
cultural objects which it bestows upon itself and in the midst of which it
lives. It is there that the deposit of its practical categories is built up, and
2 45
these categories in turn suggest a way of being and thinking to men.
Cultural objects are therefore much more than the furnishings of the
community. By shaping the thought of those who use them, they motivate a way of life common to a particular group of people. What constimilieu that it creates for
tutes a community is the meaning-saturated
246
itself and that it transmits to its members.

An obvious contemporary example is the automobile, which has
shaped social attitudes in quite fundamental ways. For example, the car

and the interstate highway system have given us the particular contemporary configuration of our cities as a center business district ringed by

highways that provide access to suburbs and satellite work sites.247 This
configuration in turn entails entire sets of values and lifestyle patterns

characteristic of suburban or city living.248 But the impact of the
243. Van Zandt, supra note 199, at 924 (footnotes omitted); see also W. HAMRICK, supra note
17, at 43 ("In the social world, it is institutions... that solidify this goal of equilibrium and cement
the historical unity and identity of a society.").
244. W. HAmRicK, supra note 17, at 144. For Merleau-Ponty, "[t]he profound philosophical
meaning of the notion of praxis is to place us in an order which is not that of knowledge but rather
that of communication, exchange, and association." M. MERIEAu-PoNTY, DIALECIc, supra note
1, at 50. But in order properly to understand this explanation (that is, without losing the component
of praxis that is action), it is important to recognize that, for Merleau-Ponty, "communication" is a
crucial metaphor: "[The whole of nature is the setting of our own life, or our interlocutorin a sort of
dialogue." M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 320 (emphasis added).
245. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SENSE AND NON-SENSE, supra note 21, at 131.
246. K. WHrrESIDE, supra note 16, at 75 (emphasis in original). Although this insight is rare in
legal scholarship, it is not absent altogether. See Binder, supra note 45, at 909.
247. In the nineteenth century, firsf the streetcar and then the urban railway had similar effects
on the concentration of commercial activity in the center of town and the development of the first
suburbs. D. SCHUYLER, THE NEW URBAN LANDSCAPE: THE REDEFINITION OF CITY FORM IN
NINETEENTH-CENTURY AMERICA 150-53 (1986).
248. See J. RAE, THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE: A BRIEF HiSToRY 239 (1965) ("The
breakdown of rural isolation, the explosion of Suburbia, the construction of superhighways, the
traffic congestion, the smog, the revision of social habit patterns, and the geometrical increase in
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automobile goes much deeper. Consider the television advertisement
that advises the viewer to buy a particular make because: "It's not just

your car; it's your freedom."
The upshot of sedimentation is that, one way or another, even the
solus ipse already manifests "the references to the whole it is composed

of."'' 9 Thus, the most important conclusion to be derived from the
insight that we are situated beings is not that we are always already in a
social context, but rather that the social is always already in us: "Society

for man is not an accident he suffers but a dimension of his being. He is
not in society as an object is in a box; rather, he assumes it by what is
innermost in him."250 This is how, as Michelman says, the past can be
"constitutively present in and for every self as language, culture,

worldview, and political memory. "251
Sedimentation, however, is not stasis. 25 2 Sedimentation is simulta-

neously conservative of past experience and an "invitation to a
sequel."2'53 Llewellyn artfully described this in his explanation of the

Constitution as an ongoing institution that
generates attitudes not only of general and specific approval (in the main)
of whatever happens to have become existing practice, but also attitudes
productivity resulting from the adoption of the assembly-line technique all came about because the
automobile in the United States was seen as a commodity for general and multipurpose use, rather
than as an item of luxury."); see also R. OLDENBURG, THE GREAT GOOD PLACE (1989). By
emphasizing the automobile, I do not mean to suggest that it is an exclusive cause. Rather, it is the
interplay of prior, related material choices that shapes an entire form of life:
Though proclaimed as offering the best of both rural and urban life, the automobile

suburb had the effect of fragmenting the individual's world....
The typical suburban home is easy to leave behind as its occupants move to another.
What people cherish most in them can be taken along in the move. There are no sad
farewells at the local taverns or the corner store because there are no local taverns or
corner stores. Indeed, there is often more encouragement to leave a given subdivision than
to stay in it, for neither the homes nor the neighborhoods are equipped to see families or
individuals through the cycle of life. Each is designated for families of particular sizes,
incomes, and ages. There is little sense of place and even less opportunity to put down
roots.
Id. at 4.

249. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS, supra note 25, at 174. At the level of ideas, the "prior
deposit of normative references compos[es] the imprint of a people's history as a ...political
community." Michehman, supra note 96, at 1517.
250. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SENSE AND NON-SENSE, supra note 21, at 128-29; see Winter,
TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1135 ("[C]ulture is both 'in' us and that which we are
embedded within.").
251. Michelman, supra note 96, at 1513.
252. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 130 ("IThe word 'sediment'
should not lead us astray: this acquired knowledge is not an inert mass in the depths of our
consciousness."). At this point, it is particularly important to be precise about the geological
metaphor. Sediment is not bedrock, but the softer alluvial deposit of rivers and floods.
253. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, IN PRAISE OF PHILOSOPHY AND OTHER ESSAYS 108-09 (J. Wild, J.
Edie & J. O'Neill trans. 1963) [hereinafter M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHILOSOPHY] ("those events
which sediment in me a meaning, not just as survivals or residues, but as the invitation to a sequel,
the necessity of a future").
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less capable of definition-sets, or built-up predispositions in the participants, to deal with situations those participants have previously never

met or thought of, along the lines of the ways they know-so that in
certain measure both direction and nature of new developments can be
predicted ....254

Sedimentation must, therefore, be understood as a twofold dynamic that
is simultaneously backward- and forward-looking. The backward

dimension of thought is one prominent source of adversity.255 The forchange, is what
ward-looking dimension, the trajectories of growth and
256
meaning."
of
advent
"the
as
to
refers
Merleau-Ponty
Advent, however, is not self-actuating; it must always be "taken up
and developed by human intentions. ' 25 7 Thus, sedimentation plus

advent does not equal determinism. Human rationality is a dynamic process of meaningful interaction in and with an environment that is con-

stantly in flux. Whatever our "built-up predispositions," we inevitably
encounter situations that we "have previously never met or thought

of."'258 In this context, to react along the lines marked out by our sedimented knowledges is unavoidably to act imaginatively in a new circumstance, reasoning in terms of a known one. Thus, the subject is neither
254. Llewellyn, supra note 65, at 27 (emphasis in original). Thus, sedimentation is backwardlooking in precisely the way that Llewellyn identified in connection with institutions. "An
institution is in first instance a set of ways of living and doing. It is not, in first instance a matter of
words." Id. at 17 (emphasis in original). Moreover,
it is action which comes first, to be followed by delayed perception of that action, then by
rationalization of the action delayed still longer, and finally by conscious normatization of
what has been perceived or rationalized. Before these latter processes have been worked
out, the lines of the action commonly have shifted. [Thorstein] Veblen's eyes were keen:
"A man's ethics are modelled on the conditions of his grandfather's time."
Id. at 17 n.30; cf P. BERGER & T. LuCKMANN, supra note 31, at 64-70.
255. Cf K. MARX, THE EIGHTEENTH BRUMAIRE op Louis BONAPARTE 15 (1963):
Men make their own history, but they do not make it just as they please; they do not make
it under circumstances chosen by themselves, but under circumstances directly
encountered, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all the dead
generations weighs like a nightmare on the brain of the living. And just when they seem
engaged in revolutionizing themselves and things, in creating something that has never yet
existed, precisely in such periods of revolutionary crisis they anxiously conjure up the
spirits of the past to their service ....
As Merleau-Ponty uses the term "adversity," it appears to refer to more than one phenomenon. He
also invokes an "indeterminate adversity without intention or law." M. MERLEAU-PONTY, DIALECTIC, supra note 1, at 38 n.l. Used in this sense, adversity is a result of contingency: "the idea of a
fundamental element of chance in history." M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS, supra note 25, at 218; see
K. WHITESIDE, supra note 16, at 266-67 (criticizing Merleau-Ponty for not differentiating and defining the forms of adversity that obstruct social and revolutionary movements).
256. M. MERLEAU-PoNTY, DiALECTIC, supra note 1, at 17 ("[History does not work
according to a model; it is, in fact, the advent of meaning."). Merleau-Ponty borrowed the term
"advent" from Paul Ricoeur. M. MERLEAu-PONTY, SIGNS, supra note 25, at 68 n.26 (referring to
P. RlCOEUR, OBJECTrirry AND SUBJECnVITY IN HISTORY AND TRUTH 36 (C. Kelbley trans.
1965)).
257. M. MERLEAU-PoNTY, DIALECTIC, supra note 1, at 18.
258. Llewellyn, supra note 65, at 27.
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autonomous in its ability to transform its context nor determined by the
objects of its past introjections.25 9
From an ex ante perspective, then, advent is necessarily plural. At
the same time, meaning is not indeterminate. Our situatedness constrains us: We do have choices, but they are not infinite. Only some
possibilities will flow from a given history; other trajectories will be
blocked by the adversity of the sedimented past we carry inside us.2"
Which is to say that advent and adversity are two sides of the same coin.
This is what I have described as "nondeterminacy"-that is, the "sense
that humanly constructed meanings are not determinate, but are nevertheless framed and constrained by the systematic nature of the cognitive
process.

'2 61

In the next Section, I will consider some of the implications of these

related phenomena of sedimentation, adversity, and nondeterminate
advent. At this point, however, it is important to recognize that these
phenomena are frequent and familiar experiences for those who work

with legal doctrine. 262 Maitland's famous dictum-"[t]he forms of
action we have buried, but they still rule us from their graves" 26 3 -is

perhaps the best-known recognition in legal scholarship of adversity in
legal doctrine. Less well-known is how the writ system, as sedimented in
the private rights model, continues to shape modem standing doctrine.2 64
By the same token (since it is the same coin), standing doctrine is also
one of the most stunning examples of advent understood as the way

existing possibilities of meaning are taken up and developed by human
intentions. As I have chronicled, the constitutional doctrine of standing
was fashioned by Justices Brandeis and Frankfurter from unrelated
equity doctrines in order to effectuate jurisdictional limitations on a
Court whose substantive initiatives they opposed.265
259. See M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SENSE AN NON-SENSE, supra note 21, at 134 (The subject is
"as incapable of abstracting itself from that situation as it is of reducing itself to it.").
260. See M. MERLAu-PoNry, PHILOSOPHY, supra note 253, at 112 ("Now this working of the
past against the present does not culminate in a closed universal history or a complete system of all
the possible human combinations .... Rather, it produces a table of diverse, complex probabilities,
always bound to local circumstances [and] weighted with a coefficient of facticity .....
261. Winter, The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 12, at 2245.
262. For examples of adversity in legal doctrine, see Fischl, Sel, Others, and-Section 7:
Mutualism and ProtectedProtestActivities Under the NationalLabor Relations Act, 89 COLUM. L.
Rnv. 789, 844-58, 861-62 (1989) (in interpreting remedial labor legislation, courts and lawyers
continue to replicate the very set of assumptions about self-interested action that the statute was
designed to overturn); Sunstein, ConstitutionalismAfter the New Deal, 101 HARv. L. REv. 421,475
(1987) (' The New Deal was largely a response to a perception that the common law catalog of rights
was underinclusive. It is an ironic fact that for the first generation after the New Deal, the judicial
role remained rooted in the common law .... ."); id. at 502 ("Notwithstanding this understanding,
pre-New Deal conceptions of legal rights permeate modem public law.").
263.

F. MArLAND, EQurrY: ALSO THE FORMS OF ACTION AT COMMON LAW 296 (1909).

264.
265.

See Winter, The Metaphor of Standing,supra note 12, at 1376-78, 1388-91, 1475-78.
Id at 1440-51, 1454-57.
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Metaphors frequently operate as the mechanisms of imagination
that mark out trajectories for the advent of meaning.26 6 The advent of
standing doctrine was marked out, in part, by the already prevalent use
of the metaphor "a standing in court."26 7 Although the original usage

was a reference to the litigant's entitlement to an injunction (and thus a
question of the merits),2 6 the phrase is redolent of jurisdictional considerations (to have no standing in court is to be someone who cannot be
heard by the judge). Other examples for which I have provided detailed
accounts include Justice Holmes' reconstruction of conventional metaphors for mind and ideas in the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor26 9 and
Chief Justice Hughes' skillful refashioning of the "stream of commerce"
metaphor in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin.2 7 0

In each of these instances, moreover, the advent of constitutional
meaning was also dependent on much wider cultural developments such
as the ascendancy of laissez-faire in the late nineteenth century27 1 and the
political and economic exigencies of the Great Depression,2 72 respec-

tively. Each of these opinions, therefore, illustrates the situated,
dynamic, multidimensional process by which meaning is constituted.
Meaning is not simply the product of social coherence or pure subjectivity: The elaboration of meaning is simultaneously the product of past
266. Winter, Transcendental Nonsense, supra note 12, at 1183 ("[Tlhe available metaphors
conventional in the culture both create and constrain the possible extensions of the available
models."). For a fuller discussion of the cognitive means by which models are elaborated and
extended, see G. LAKOEF, supra note 28, at 91-112 (development of radial categories); id. at 104-09
(chaining in linguistic category); id at 77-80 (role of metonymies in developing new meanings); id at
419-44 (chaining and transformation of image-schemata in the elaboration of the linguistic category
defined by the polysemous uses of the preposition "over").
267. See, eg., Debs v. United States, 158 U.S. 564, 584 (1895); Florida v. Anderson, 91 U.S.
667, 675 (1876); Ritchie v. Franklin County, 89 U.S. (22 Wall.) 67, 77 (1874). These cases and their
relationship to modem standing doctrine are discussed in Winter, The Metaphor ofStanding,supra
note 12, at 1418-25, 1437-38. The role of the metaphor, however, is only one part of a complex story
of doctrinal development that is carefully traced in id at 1417-57.
268. This was true as late as 1926. See General Inv. Co. v. New York Cent. R.R., 271 U.S. 228,
230-31 (1926) ("Whether a plaintiff seeking such [equitable] relief has the requisite standing is a
question going to the merits, and its determination is an exercise of jurisdiction. If it be resolved
against him, the appropriate decree is a dismissal for want of merits, not for want of jurisdiction.")

(citations omitted).
269. Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting); see also
Winter, TranscendentalNonsense; supra note 12, at 1188-91.
270. 301 U.S. 1 (1937); see also Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1199-206.
In Jones & Laughlin, Hughes reorganized the cognitive model for interstate commerce
issues. In doing so, he did not operate free-form, as a subjectivist might have it. Rather, he
worked with the metaphoric material already in the cases to refashion commerce clause
doctrine in a manner that was neither predetermined by the materials nor completely
arbitrary.
Id at 1199.
271. Winter, TranscendentalNonsens supra note 12, at 1186-90.
272. See supra text accompanying notes 117-18.
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sedimentation, current human intentions, and larger cultural contexts
that support its advent.
D. ConstitutionalPolitics
An effective constitutional politics must take into account the
sedimented cultural context in which we are unavoidably situated. Strategic transformative action is nevertheless possible because reflection is
possible.2 73 But to be effective, that reflection must simultaneously be
tempered by an appreciation of adversity and nurtured by an understanding of its transformative capacities. "The choice which we make of our
life is always based on a certain givenness. My freedom can draw life
away from its spontaneous course, but only by a series of unobtrusive
deflections which necessitate first of all following its course-not by any
absolute creation." 274 This lesson is difficult, in part because it seems to
run significantly counter to the Enlightenment-bred, "normative selfunderstanding of democracies that public decisions are reached by auton' '2 7
omous... citizens in a process of unconstrained exchange of opinion.
But this lesson of constraint is an important one for, "without the roots
which it thrusts into the world, it would not be freedom at all." 2 76
I explore these insights in the subsections that follow. Much current
legal theory champions dialogue and "communicative practice" as a
transformative methodology. I question this dialogic strategy in the first
subsection, testing it against the constraining effects of sedimentation and
contrasting its efficacy with that of committed action. In the second, I
elaborate a role for legal scholarship-clearly, a form of dialogue-when
it is practiced as situated reflection. Only then, in Part V, will we be
positioned to attempt a meaningful dialogue concerning the implications
of situatedness and its potential as a catalyst for the advent of new constitutional meanings.
L

Normative Dialogue and TransformativeAction

Because we are not autonomous consciousnesses free of all prior
commitments, we cannot be as uninhibited in our ability to sift our context for transformative possibilities as Michelman would like. We can
choose to look to the margins; indeed, we should. But the problem
remains that what we are most likely to see is that which conforms to our
own, already sedimented perspective.
273. See Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 681-91

(discussing "situated self-

consciousness").

274.
275.
note 96,
276.

M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 455.
S.BENHABIB, CRTIQUE, NORM, AND UTOPIA 283 (1986), quoted in Michelman, supra
at 1502 n.30.
M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 456.
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[I]t is inevitable that the characteristics of our own worldviews,
decentered and reflexive as they are, will come into play. To understand
is to understand in a certain context ....We cannot divest ourselves of
the constituents of our culture at will or by an act of277
fiat; they are the
ones we bring to bear on the analysis of any situation.
It is only a conceit of consciousness-"the forgetfulness in the presumption of rational mind to complete cultural autonomy" 2 74-which leads us
to think that our choices are basically free and intentional.
This means, however, that normative dialogue cannot suffice as a
modality of transformation.2 79 Just as much of the legal and political
work of constitutional decisiomaking is being done at the epistemic
level, so too does most of the work of persuasion occur well below the
surface of dialogue. In the end, what matters most is not one's conscious
willingness to be persuaded by good faith arguments, but rather the
unconscious standards or animating structures by which one understands
an argument as persuasive.28 0

This point can be illustrated with the following hypothetical. Consider a good faith normative dialogue about the use of coercive criminal

sanctions for racist and misogynist speech. One participant is a committed civil libertarian, the other a dedicated feminist. Both of the participants sincerely declare that they are open to argument and persuasion.
Yet they disagree on basic issues: whether suppression of speech or subordination of women is the greater evil, whether the chosen means exact

too high a cost, and so on. By what rational, normative arguments will
each be brought to appreciate the weight that the other places on her
values? The very depth of each participant's conviction will be reflected
in the correspondingly high burden of persuasion she imposes on the
other's argument. 8 1
This example may not seem much like openness to persuasion, or
even very much like argument. But it is only a stronger version of what
we do at all times, even when we are open to persuasion.
When we hear an argument ....[wie think "that's not what we should
want out of life, that's not what the world is like" and dismiss it out of
hand ("that can't be true"). Or We think "yes, that's right, that's the way
277. S.BENHAIB, supra note 275, at 272.
278. J. O'NEILL, supra note 16, at 4.
279. Cf Van Zandt, supra note 199, at 927 ("[C]hange rarely occurs from consciousness-raising
or from appeals of rational moral persuasion ....This is because the individual's sense of social
order... is a grounded 'rational' sense."); see also supra text accompanying notes 135 & 185.
280. See Miechelman, Possession vs. Distributionin the ConstitutionalIdea of Property, 72 IowA

L. REv. 1319, 1325 (1987) ("Ultimate consensus on important matters of public policy is not [i]n the
cards, even among citizens entering in good faith into mutual civic dialogue.").
281. Cf A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE 7-19 (2d ed. 1984) (ascribing the incommensurability
of much contemporary moral argument to the loss of the shared tradition in which the terms :of
moral argument were formerly grounded).
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it is" and accept it (sometimes
feeling we had already believed the argu28 2
ment before we heard it).

We necessarily evaluate arguments and information in terms of some set
of unconscious assumptions, beliefs, standards, frames of reference, and
the like.2 3 As long as participants in dialogue remain unself-conscious,
they will be unaware of these animating structures and their vulnerability
to persuasion will be severely limited.
This is not to say that meaningful dialogue can never take place.
Persuasion will be possible to the extent that the participants are situated
in some common matrix or shared assumptions to which they both can
refer.2 In the case of normative argument, a participant may be persuaded by an argument that appeals to some other assumption or belief
she already holds. But transformative dialogue cannot overcome incommensurables without a means for more radical conversion.
Some alternative means exist. A skillful narrative may bring one to

comprehend another's experience or perspective, perhaps effectuating a
normative "gestalt switch" or perhaps just changing one's appreciation
of the stakes. 285 But, even so, one will unreflectively evaluate these arguments and narratives in terms of one's already sedimented assumptions

and beliefs. Thus, as long as one's partner in dialogue remains unselfconscious, her very perceptions of truth or falsity as well as her evaluations of what is compelling or unpersuasive will be determined unreflectively by these preexisting understandings.
The problem with prescriptions for more and better normative dialogue is precisely that they ignore this cognitive level, the underlying
stratum at which most of the work is done. These prescriptions necessarily presuppose the relatively autonomous subject, magically capable of

transcending her own limitations with a single, rationalist bound. For
282.

Frug, Argument As Character,40 STAN.L. REv. 869, 920-21 (1988); see also supra note

39.
283. The nomenclature is immaterial. The critical point is, as argued by Stanley Fish, that there
is no clear space to stand; these unconscious structures are the very condition of consciousness. See,
e.g., S. FisH, supra note 36, at 459; see also Moore, Trial by Schema: Cognitive Filters in the
Courtroom, 37 UCLA L. REv. 273 (1989) (discussing the role of cognitive schemas in jury
decisionmaking).
284. Michelman recognizes this point: "The persuasive character of the process depends on the
normative efficacy of some context that is everyones-of the past that is constitutively present in
and for every self as language, culture, worldview, and political memory." Michelman, supra note
96, at 1513 (emphasis in original). For further development of this point, see my Contingency and
Community in Normative Practice, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 965 (1991).
285. In The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 12, at 2271-79, I describe how storytelling works
either by appealing to assumptions already held by the audience or by bringing the audience to
undergo vicariously in its imagination the experiences of the protagonist. In the latter case, there
can be truly transformative argument. See id. at 2277-79. But note that the work of persuasion
issues not in a narrowly conceived practice of reason-giving, but rather in an imaginative act of
empathy. Another modality is a task-centered approach that seeks to reconstitute group
identification around a common goal. See infra text accompanying notes 300-01.
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proponents of normative dialogue, the key to success lies in the subject's
openness to persuasion and her willingness consciously to set aside her
own values in order to consider the perspectives of others.2" 6 This is a
noble vision, but one that is fundamentally flawed.
The most powerful determinants of belief are not idealistic constructions in the form of personal projections that need to be opened to the
different perspectives of others. Rather, the most powerful determinants
are those embodied in the social interactions that give rise to the situatedsubject's acquisition of cultural "truth." Because the resulting assumptions and beliefs are internalized as the very grounds of consciousness,
they are largely imperceptible to the conscious subject: These conceptualizations are transparentin the sense that they act as an invisible cognitive filter through which the subject sees the social world.2 87 As long as
the subject remains unreflective, this transparency will project the
mutual entailment of the epistemic and the political in a way that will be
experienced as "objective." In contrast, minority views will seem merely
288
perspectival rather than "true."
Thus, widely shared, internalized assumptions and beliefs are difficult to overcome precisely because they are more than simply dominant
ideas open to conscious, intellectual reconstruction. They are difficult to
overcome because they are embodied in and constantly reinforced by the
sedimented social field of public interactions, cultural objects, and common experiences-"the meaning-saturated milieu"2'89 in which we are
always already situated. If the resulting sedimentations are to be overcome, it will be only because we have acted to transform that social field
directly.
From this perspective, the naive faith in normative dialogue as a
means to accomplish change begins to look like nothing so much as faith
in a "talking cure." But it is only the most vulgar understanding of psychoanalysis that thinks one can solve deep-seated personal problems
solely by introspection. Reflection is, rather, an experiential process. It
assumes a given situation, but it must work itself out in a new one. 2 ° So,
286. Because rationalist consciousness views all other selves as capable of the same
intellection, at least in theory, the rationalist assumes that reasoned deliberation must
govern all interpersonal enterprises. If all parties conduct this deliberation in good faith,
the better argument will necessarily win the day. If the better argument does not prevail, it
can only be because some of the parties have chosen to be disingenuous, dishonest, or
fraudulent, or because they still do not understand the rules of the game.
Schlag, supra note 176, at 1211 (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted).
287. For an explanation of these terms and their derivation from widely shared metaphoric
understandings, see Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 682-86.
288. See supra text accompanying note 39.
289. K. WHITESIDE, supra note 16, at 75.
290. By taking up a present, I draw together and transform my past, altering its
significance, freeing and detaching myself from it. But I do so only by committing myself
somewhere else. Psychoanalytical treatment does not bring about its cure by producing
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too, an effective constitutional politics cannot be waged solely at the level

of theory, of normative dialogue, or even of legislation.29' It must first
germinate in action and then take root in the forms of life that are neces-

sary to ground each-theory, dialogue, or legislation-as an expression
of meaning.
Real change comes through committed action. In both senses of the
term, constitutional meaning begins in the grounded cognitive process by
which we translate social experience into cultural meaning. Like all

meaning, law is grounded in a form of life; it is the entirely contingent
product of wider social practices and understandings. Accordingly, a

truly transformative constitutional politics must be sustained by lived
human experience and committed social action.2 92 Radical transforma-

tion is only possible within the context of committed social movements
or wholesale social ferment like the civil rights movement or the New
Deal.

In contrast to the rigors of a truly transformative constitutional politics, consider the law's naive response to the historical entrenchment of

racism in America. We prohibit it, as if "it" were an identifiable thing
held in consciousness that could easily be ascertained and just as easily

banished. But, as Charles Lawrence has thoughtfully argued, the intent
standard makes no sense whatsoever if one understands racism as a mat-

ter of deeply sedimented, socially produced "tacit understandings" and
"cultural stereotypes., 293 To define as discriminatory only those acts
accompanied by conscious intent is to remove only the fruit of the poisonous tree, leaving the roots, the trunk, and the branches all intact.
direct awareness of the past, but in the first place by binding the subject to his doctor
through new existential relationships. It is . . . a matter of reliving this or that as
significant, and this the patient succeeds in doing only by seeing his past in the perspective
of his co-existence with the doctor. . . The same applies in all cases of coming to
awareness: they are real only if they are sustained by a new commitment.
M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 455; see also Schin, Generative
Metaphor A Perspectiveon Problem-Setting in Social Policy, in METAPHOR AND THOUGHT 254, 277
(A. Ortony ed. 1979) ("[lIt is significant that the participants are involved in a particular concrete
situation; at the same time that they are reflecting on the problem, they are experiencing the phenomenon of the problem.") (describing problem-solving in industrial research).
291. See West, Progressive and Conservative Constitutionalism, 88 MICH. L. REV. 641, 717-21
(1990) [hereinafter West, Constitutionalism]. West exhorts us to redirect progressive
constitutionalism toward the legislative process. In a dramatic conclusion, however, she recognizes
that her program fatally lacks grounding in our current social context: "The key, of course, is to
create a progressive Congress, and behind it a progressive citizenry. We presently have neither, to
put it lightly." Id. at 721. And so, with stunning alacrity, she has already retreated from the
suggestion that we can rely on civic-minded legislators to vindicate individual and minority rights.
See West, The Supreme Court 1989 Term-Foreword Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARv. L.
REV. 43, 62 (1990).
292. In TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1224-33, I provide a more extended version
of this argument that explains the grounding of legal rights in social experience. I return to this idea
in the next Section. See infra text accompanying notes 361-70, 381-83, 409-18 & 501-02.
293. Lawrence, supra note 231, at 323.
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Because the law considers only relatively autonomous subjects and their
intentional actions, it is entirely blind to the ways in which social
assumptions about race are already sedimented in the unconscious.2 94
As a result, most of the influence of racial prejudice on individual and
social action is obscured. Worse yet, it is sanitized: "[R]acially
prejudiced behavior that is actually the product of learned cultural preferences is experienced as a reflection of rational deduction from objective
29
observation, which is nonprejudicial behavior., s
Once we understand racism as a fumction of sedimented social practices and perceptions, the nature of the legal landscape changes dramatically. Consider the Civil Rights. Act of 1875,296 the Reconstruction
2 97
statute struck down by the Supreme Court in the Civil Rights Cases
and vindicated as constitutional by later Warren Court decisions.2 98 In

providing for the integration of all public facilities including inns, taverns, and theaters, the drafters understood that any real attempt to ameliorate the problem of race must begin at the level of day-to-day
* 299
experience.
Studies in the social sciences have repeatedly shown that

the most effective way to overcome racial prejudice is to bring together
interracial groups under conditions of equality and involve them in sus-

tained work on a common task.3 "° It is positive experience of the
Other-rather than being told to respect the Other or learning about the
Other-that is the most powerful persuasion of all. One can only begin
to imagine how the law might look--on affirmative action or in providing
294. See id.at 322 ("We do not recognize the ways in which our cultural experience has
influenced our beliefs about race or the occasions on which those beliefs affect our actions.").
295. Id. at 339; see also Freeman, Legitimizing Racial Discrimination Through
Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review of Supreme Court Doctrine, 62 MINN. L. RPv. 1049,
1052-57 (1978).
296. 18 Stat. 335, 336 (1875) (sections I and 2 declared unconstitutional; sections 3 and 4
repealed (1948); section 5 omitted as obsolete).
297. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
298. See Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968); United States v. Guest, 383 U.S.
745 (1966); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294 (1964); Heart of Atlanta Motel v. United States,
379 U.S. 241 (1964).
299. The original draft of the statute would have included churches and cemeteries as well, but
this was too controversial and was not included in the final bill. For an exploration of the
assumptions about the social and the personal that animated the proponents of this statute, see
Gudridge, Privileges and Permissions: The Civil Rights Act of 1875, 8 LAW & PHIL. 83 (1989).
300. See Amir, The Role of Intergroup Contact in Change ofPrejudice andEthnic Relations in
TOWARDS THE ELIMINATION OF RACISM 245 (P. Katz ed. 1976); Cook, CooperativeInteraction in
Multiethnic Contexts, in GROUPS IN CONTACT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF DESEGREGATION 155 (N.
Miller & B. Brewer eds. 1984); Cook, Experimenting on Social Issues: The Case of School
Desegregation, 40 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 452 (1985); Gaertner & Dovido, Prejudice, Discrimination,
and Racism: Problems, Progress, and Promise, in PREJUDICE, DISCRIMINATION, AND RACISM 315,
318-19 (J.
Dovido & S. Gaertner eds. 1986); Slavin & Madden, School PracticesThat Improve Social
Relations, 16 AM. EDUC. REs. J. 169 (1979). Much of this work builds on the "contact hypothesis"
articulated by Gordon Allport in his classic work. G. ALLPORT, THE NATURE OF PREJUDICE 26181 (1954).

1500

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1441

remedies in school and employment cases-if the equal protection clause
were read as pointing to an associational imperative0 1 rather than as an
invitation to judicial mind-reading or a quest for a chimerical statistical

parity.
And yet, that being said, the contrast between the hostile judicial
reaction to the Reconstruction statute and the judicial acceptance of its
more recent counterparts illustrates what it really takes to accomplish
change. Michelman describes the legal developments of the 1950s and
1960s as a process in which, "the judicial agents of the challengers'
accumulating citizenship drew on interpretive possibilities that the challengers' own activity was helping to create.""3 2 Surely so. But just as
surely, this understates the case. To recognize these "generative indeterminacies" as "products of action, the creations of motivated acts ofperception and cultivation," 30 3 is to ignore the dogs, the hoses, the tear gas,
the billy clubs, the bullets, and the guns. It is to ignore the quite literal
way in which the actions of the civil rights protesters said: "'We do
mean this in the medium of blood' (or in the medium of time in jail); 'our
lives constitute the bridges between the reality of present official declarations of law and the vision of our law triumphant.' "'I
There is nothing metaphoric about Cover's invocation of the constitutive impact of violence, as I was reminded quite dramatically when I
quoted this passage not long ago at Michigan's "Legal Storytelling" symposium.10 Afterward, one of the participants shared with me a poignant
personal vignette. "When I was a child," she said, "my parents took me
with them to a civil rights demonstration. I still remember the hatred
and seething violence in the faces of those on the streets as we rode by
with the other protesters. It was palpable. I never understood how my
parents could have risked a child's safety in that way. A child. I
resented it. But this afternoon, when you mentioned Cover's point about
'the medium of blood,' I understood that my parents were right. It was
necessary.
2. The Role of Scholarship
I have argued that the transformative potential of constitutional
politics resides in the kind of collective actions that are capable of constituting a form of life. But I do not mean to suggest that there is no meaningful role for the legal scholar. The social is not merely an external state
301. See infra text accompanying notes 481-91 & 503-22.
302. Michelman, supra note 96, at 1530.
303. Id. at 1529 (emphasis added).
304. Cover, supra note 178, at 47 (emphasis changed from original).
305. Symposium: Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REv. 2073 (1989).
306. I am grateful to Professor Mar Matsuda for allowing me to retell her story.
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of affairs in which we are situated like an object in a box; it is maintained
equally by what is internalized in us. These internalizations are amenable to reflection, and that reflection can be harnessed to facilitate change.
Instead of seeking to transform the world with a better theory, the
situated scholar engages in what I have identified as "theory with a
small-t."13 ° This kind of theory does not seek a determinate formula to
govern practice. Rather, it begins with the exploration of the larger cultural constructs and stabilized matrices in which lawyers, judges, and
laypersons are always already situated.3 0° From there, it seeks out the
ways those constructions are sedimented in the legal mind. Its goal is to
unearth the underlying cultural models that animate legal doctrine and
structure judicial decisionmaking. °9
When successful, this form of theory is capable of exposing the inner
mechanisms by which the political and the epistemic in legal doctrine are
mutually entailed. For example, the individualist and merits-neutral,
process orientations that characterize modem standing doctrine are not
simply the products of political or ideological choices. Rather, they are
antecedent entailments of the "standing" metaphor itself and, together
with the kinds of social institutions discussed above, the ontological
effects of sedimented ways of thinking. 10 Similarly, the first amendment
cases that protect corporate speech and wealthy supporters of political
campaigns 31I are not mere manipulations in favor of the powerful. They
are also direct reflections
of a first amendment that is itself conceptualized in market terms. 31 2
The methodology of this project is not deductive logic, but what I
307. Winter, Bull Durham,supra note 12, at 644-45, 690-91.
308. Jan Deutsch issued this call some time ago, citing the need
to examine the origins and content of the community agenda that defines the conditions for
group interaction, and the degree to which that agenda has been internalized by
participants in such interaction. Potential groups simply represent potential changes in the
community agenda, and an adequate account of their crystallization therefore crucially
involves a description of the psychological mechanisms in terms of which changes are
introduced into individuals' perceptions of the norms and goals of the society in which they
live, the roles they are to play within that society, and the constraints society has imposed
upon those roles.
Deutsch, supra note 106, at 259.
309. Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 690-91.
310. On the individualist entailment, see Winter, The Metaphor of Standing supra note 12, at
1387-88 ("In the metaphorically structured reality of the law of standing, there are no forests and no
ecosystems. There are only trees; and only the trees have 'standing.' "). On the process entailment,
see id. at 1388-91, and supra text accompanying notes 267-68.
311. See, e.g., Central Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557 (1980);
First Nat'l Bank v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765 (1978); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976); cf.Virginia
State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
312. Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1194-95 ("[T]he protections afforded
wealth by current first amendment doctrine may be part of the interest that accrues to the wealthy in
a society that values wealth and power and invokes them as the source domain for potent cultural
models and metaphors."); see also Michelman, supra note 280, at 1340-50 (emphasizing the role of
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have called "situated self-consciousness. '3 13 Situated self-consciousness
seeks to uncover the stops and pedals of our internal constructions. Situated self-consciousness is the reflective capacity to reveal what MerleauPonty calls "the links of the intentional web."' 314 "[I]t involves the
capacity to unravel or trace back the strands by which our constructions
weave our world together. Although we may be situated in a web of
belief, there is nothing that prevents us from making those beliefs translucent and, thus, amenable to reflection. '3 15 Situated self-consciousness
is the imaginative, reflective process through which the transparent conceptualizations that unconsciously structure legal decisionmaking can be
recognized and laid bare. It is a method for unveiling our most basic
criteria of choice.
Situated self-consciousness is not, however, a means by which to
achieve some spontaneous freedom to reconstruct the social world. To
the contrary, the potential yield of situated self-consciousness is rather
more like a topographic map of the sedimented social field in which
transformative efforts necessarily take place. 6 Consider, however, how
useful such a "map" would be to legal advocates. To the extent that it
accurately charts the lines of advent and roadblocks of adversity, this
"map" would be a sketch that distinguishes between arguments that are
merely plausible and those that are likely to be persuasive. Indeed, it is
in just this way that legal theory can best inform legal practice.
For those concerned with social change, such a "map" would at the
very least alert us to the topology of adversity that constrains transformative attempts. Armed with such a "map," one might begin meaningfully to explore lines of advent that could usefully be pursued: the
potential elaborations and transformations of the culture's existing models and metaphors that provide the possible trajectories of change.
Armed with such a "map," one might begin to understand the processes
that (to marry Merleau-Ponty to Kuhn) might be characterized as normal advent. In short, one might begin to understand the ordinary workings of the imagination that, in our ignorance, are mysteriously
attributed to the "strong poet" or "creative genius."
A second task for theory with a small-t would be to develop new
paradigms and useful generalizations that could serve as springboards for
the formal, possessive dimension of the property concept at work in these cases); Tushnet,
Corporationsand FreeSpeech, in THE PoLrmcs OF LAW, supra note 153, at 253-55 ("money talks").
313. Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 685-86.
314. M. MERLEAu-PoNTY, SIGNS, supra note 25, at 173, quoted in full at supra text
accompanying note 234.

315. Winter, Bull Durham, supra note 12, at 685-86 (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
316. Cf M. MERLEAu-PONTY, DL~AEtnC, supra note 1, at 199 ("Like perceived things, my
tasks are presented to me, not as objects or ends, but as reliefs and configurations, that is to say, in

the landscape of praxis.").
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more comprehensive change. Examples within the canon of legal scholarship might include Charles Reich's classic, The New Property,31 7 and

Abram Chayes' groundbreaking article, The Role of the Judge in Public
Law Litigation.3 8 This is what we might call revolutionary advent, and it

is a task requiring more than ordinary imagination. It may involve, as in
the former case, the radical reconceptualization of an existing legal con-

cept like "property" to adapt its historical purposes to the substantially
different social context of the regulatory state. Or, as in the latter
instance, it may involve generalizing from existing but unrecognized

practices to reconceptualize a concept like "adjudication." Or it may
require other imaginative capacities,3 19 such20 as the ability to adapt the
3
conceptual apparatus of another discipline.

Still, the socially situated nature of all transformative efforts means
that they are both constrained by adversity and contingent upon their
social and intellectual context. Thus, without an adequate theoretical
"map" of the sort described above, transformative theoretical efforts are
likely to run headlong into adversity. Predictably, the sedimented nature
of a concept like "property" will not support every reformulation. 321 For
example, Rodney Smolla has described the way in which Reich's reconceptualization ultimately subverted itself: "By urging the Court to treat

government benefits as property, the new property metaphor invited the
analysis that would surface in [Board of Regents v. ] Roth ."322 According
to Smolla, the Court invoked
the more formal legal reasoning to which lawyers are accustomed in
defining the spatial and temporal dimensions or "nature" of an interest.
Justice Stewart noted that in defining "liberty" and "property," the
Court (and he might have said the legal profession) had "observed cer317. Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
318. Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv. 1281 (1976).
One of the most significant contributions of Cover, Fiss, and Resnik's Procedure is that it devotes
over 200 pages to develop and examine Chayes' model of public litigation. R. COVER, 0. Fiss & J.
RESNIK, PROCEDURE 219-427 (1988).

319. One example coming from within the practice of normal science is the capacity to use a
known but previously unrelated experience to reconceptualize an existing practice. See Winter, Bull
Durham, supra note 12, at 674-76, 686 (discussing Schiin, supra note 290). Another is the ability to
understand and adapt another culture's construction of the world to reformulate a paradigm and
resolve an anomaly. A. MAcINTYRE, supra note 41, at 394-95, discussed in Winter, Bull Durham,
supra note 12, at 671-72.
320. Law and economics might be an example; although from a liberal-to-left perspective, one
would perhaps see it as an example of counter-revolutionary advent.
321. See Smolla, The Reemergence of the Right-PrivilegeDistinctionin ConstitutionalLaw: The
Price of Protesting Too Much, 35 STAN. L. REv. 69, 81 (1982) ("The term 'property,' after all,
carries with it the baggage of hundreds of years of Anglo-American legal tradition.").
322. Ia at 79 (discussing Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972)). "Of course it was
never the intention of Charles Reich that his writing be turned against recipients of largess, but,
ironically, the development of the entitlement theory is directly traceable to the new property
analogy." Id.
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tain boundaries.".. . "Property" is a concept connoting circumspection
323

Not surprisingly, then, "[t]he ultimate fate of the new property concept
serves as a valuable lesson in the perils of thinking by analogy. ' 324 One
must first get clear one's lines of advent.
Transformative theoretical efforts are contingent because they
depend upon the existence of significant anomalies within the prevailing
matrix. This is true in two senses. First, the effort to develop a new
paradigm will usually be generated by the pressure to resolve major
anomalies. Second, the potency of any proposed new paradigm will be
directly proportionate to the perceived severity of the anomalies. The
more destabilizing the anomalies, the more likely it is that a truly revolutionary paradigm will be accepted. In short, the success of this form of
theoretical endeavor is a function of the degree of crisis.
There is also a role for what Michelman identifies as "interpretation,
or internal development, or recollective imagination. 3 2 But it, too, is a
function of the degree of crisis. In the absence of anomaly and crisis,
interpretation is nothing so much as the practice of normal science.
Interpretation can nevertheless contribute to transformative efforts in
three distinct ways. First, interpretation can extend a normal science to
the point at which it begins to break down as a tool for puzzle-solving.
Second, interpretation can deepen an ongoing crisis by amplifying its
anomalies. The indeterminacy critique is an example; it has power right
now because it undermines the already destabilized matrix of the law by
demonstrating its inability to live up to objectivist expectations.3 2 6
Third, interpretation can play an important role during times of crisis by seeking to deflect, dampen, or shape the impact of adverse decisions not fully secured by a prevailing matrix.
Whatever the Court says about civil rights, capital punishment, or abortion, the meaning of its constitutional interpretation is as much a matter
of our understanding, our interpretive commitments, as it is a matter of
the understanding of the Justices. We are part of the context, the larger
frame, in which legal interpretation has meaning and resonance. This is
323. Ideat 81 (quoting Roth, 408 U.S. at 572) (emphasis added). For a particularly thoughtful
discussion of the role of the boundary metaphor in structuring both our conceptions of property and
"self," see Nedeisky, Law, Boundaries, and the Bounded Self, 30 REPRESENTATIONS 162 (Spring

1990).
324. Smolla, supra note 321, at 81. In light of the above discussion, however, one might
disagree with Smolla on just what that lesson is.
325. Michelman, supra note 173, at 258 (citations omitted).
326. Examples of this kind of argument include Kelman, Interpretive Construction in the
Substantive CriminalLaw, 33 STAN. L. REv. 591 (1981); Singer, The Playerand the Cards:Nihilism
and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L.J. 1 (1984); Tushnet, Following the Rules, supra note 10. For an
explanation of the function of philosophical argument during times of crisis, see T. KUHN, supra
note 15, at 88.
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the insight
that follows when we understand that objectivism is a
327
myth.

Still, in the end, the effective practice of constitutional politics cannot
rely on purely interpretive efforts. For the ultimate persuasiveness of
these interpretations will depend on their ability to take root in the actual
experiences and institutions of the culture. 328 And this requires social
action. "We take our fate in our hands, we become responsible for our
history through reflection, but equally by a decision on which we stake
our life, and in both cases what is involved is a violent act which is vali329
dated by being performed.,
V
THE SITUATED-SUBJECT'S

GUIDE TO THE CONSTITUTION

In this final part, I explore some of the implications for constitutional law of the insight about situatedness. These explorations are deliberately tentative and nondeterminate because I take seriously my own
arguments about situatedness and the limits it imposes on theory and on
normative dialogue. Thus, I do not propose to come up with a radical
new "theory" of the Constitution that would transform our current (conservative) practices. Nor do I attempt to convince you by adducing reasons to show that my vision of the situated-subject's Constitution is
supported by a better normative argument. Rather, I attempt to engage
you in a colloquy that draws in two different ways upon your own situatedness. First, I try to persuade you that an understanding of the
Constitution as a fully situated phenomenon in all its dimensions is "correct" because it makes the most sense in terms of what you already know
to be true of your own experience.3 30 Second, I try to show you that the
significance of the insight about situatedness is already part of the constitutional canon (how could it not be?). I close with an invitation to
327. Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1229 (emphasis in original) (footnote
omitted) (discussing Cover, supra note 178, at 5-7).
328. Cf Cover, supra note 178, at 44 ("[A] legal interpretation cannot be valid if no one is
prepared to live by it.").
329. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at xx. One must admire Cover's
wisdom as well as his honesty when he acknowledges the nature of his constitutional commitments:
I... celebrate the achievements of federal courts in destroying apartheid in America .... I
favor federal courts taking a lead in reforming institutions when the other officials fail ....
I support those efforts because I believe them right and justified, because I am sufficiently
committed to them to join with others in imposing our will on those who disagree. At
times the federal courts have been our allies in those commitments. There is every reason
to believe that such a convergence of interests was temporary and accidental; that it is
already changing and will soon be a romantic memory of the sublime sixties.
IL COVER, 0. Fss & J. RnsNiK, supra note 318, at 730 (previously unpublished note found
posthumously).
330. To the extent that this is what Michelman has in mind when he advocates a dialogic
politics, there is less difference between us than might have been suggested at supra Part IV(B).
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explore the potential this creates for the advent of new constitutional
meanings.
What we will find, I hope, is that an enhanced notion of constitutional politics entails a reciprocally enhanced conception of constitutional law. To the situated-subject, both the phenomenon of law and the
character of the Constitution take on a different, somewhat richer cast.
Where mainstream efforts treat constitutional law as if it were (or, rather,
should be) the product of a consistent theory, I suggest that it must be
seen as the dynamic product of the relentlessly jurisgenerative processes
of social and cultural construction. In this view, the Constitution necessarily slips the bonds of mainstream theory as the advent of constitutional meanings play out in an unceasing process of situated jurisgenesis.
In contrast to Bruce Ackerman's account of amendment outside the
strictures of article V, which he calls "dualist democracy," 3 1 I provide
examples of this third, socially situated mode of constitutional lawmaking. I call this "trimorphic constitutionalism" because it recognizes
three, structurally distinct forms (from the Greek tri morphos) of constitutional lawmaking. I argue that this third, "trimorphic" form of constitutional jurisgenesis is both descriptively and democratically superior.
In the final section, I will invite you to consider already sedimented
aspects of the tradition from a different angle. My immediate goal is to
induce in you a constitutional gestalt switch-that is, to prompt you to
see constitutional law from a perspective that would suggest lines of
advent different from our current, coiservative trajectory. The more
long-range purpose of this endeavor is to lay the groundwork for a new
constitutional paradigm. I call this endeavor "reconstitutive constitutionalism" because it seeks a more meaningful, legal recognition of our
inexorable interdependence.33 2 I will not attempt to provide a fully
formed picture of what that reconstituted paradigm might look like.
For, whatever it might be, it cannot be the product of a single mind. On
the contrary, it must be made real in shared social experience.
Before I can make my affirmative argument, however, there are two
potential objections that must be considered. Each in its own way builds
upon the insights explored in this paper: thus, I have called them the
"incommensurability objection" and the "historicist objection," respectively. Although each of these objections is sensitive to-indeed, premised on-an appreciation of the situatedness of the legal enterprise,
each founders because of its residual dependence on the subject/object
dichotomy.
331. Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics, supra note 5, at 461-62; Ackerman, Storrs Lectures,
supra note 5, at 103843.
332. See Winter, The Metaphorof Standing supra note 12, at 1478-516.
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A. Avoiding the Subject/Object Dichotomy
1. The Incommensurability Objection
The incommensurability objection finds it difficult even to conceptualize where one might locate situatedness in our Constitution, conceived as it was by a generation steeped in Enlightenment premises of
rationalism and individualism.33 3 If, as I have argued, the law should be
understood as a stabilized matrix which determines the arguments and
perspectives that will be understood as relevant, then the entire history of
the Constitution is incommensurate with-and therefore should be
secured from-fancy Continental ideas like "situatedness. ' ' 334 The idea
of a reconstitutive constitutionalism sounds like nothing so much as the
project of a philosophical Schneiderman-that is, someone who "can be
attached to the Constitution no matter how extensive the changes are
that he desires, so long as he seeks to achieve his ends within the frame' '3 3 5
work of Article V.
The problem with this objection, however, is that it reinscribes the

subject/object dichotomy, presupposing both an objectification and a certain essentialism. This objection treats the concept of a stabilized matrix
as somehow separate from the actual community that embodies it.3 36 It
views the Constitution as a "thing" into which the framers deposited
their ideas, a text into which they inscribed their individualist assumptions. But the subject and its objects cannot be separated in this fashion:
A stabilized matrix is nothing more than the beliefs, assumptions, and
mental processes of actual people; it is not a property of the texts that
they draft and interpret. It follows that no antecedent matrix can determine subsequent interpretations by other people at a later time.337
Because the Constitution is a text to be interpreted, it necessarily changes

as new assumptions mediate the reading of its text.338

333. I choose this phrasing to capture the shared premises of both the Lockean liberals and the
republicans, as the discussion of Michelman demonstrates.
334. See Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics supra note 5, at 453-55 (complaining that America
remains "an intellectual colony, borrowing European categories to decode the meaning of its
national identity").
335. Schneiderman v. United States, 320 U.S. 118, 140 (1943) (declining to consider "this
extreme position"). For a thoughtful discussion of Schneiderman, see S. LEVINSON,
CONSTITUTIONAL FArrn 122-54 (1988).
336. Cf Kuhn, Second Thoughts on Paradigms,in THE STRucTuRE OF SCIENTIFIC THEORIES
459, 460 (F. Suppe ed. 1972) CA paradigm is what the members of a scientific community, and they
alone, share. Conversely, it is their possession of a common paradigm that constitutes a scientific
community of a group of otherwise disparate men.").
337. This is not to say that, within a given culture, a text can be interpreted in just any way.
Rather, the processes of sedimentation and the phenomena of adversity and advent will affect
subsequent readings. There will be variance and nondeterminacy in interpretation, but not radical
indeterminacy. See, eg., Winter, The Cognitive Dimension,supra note 12, at 2245-55.
338. For literary and cultural examples, see id at 2252-55.
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A single example should suffice to demonstrate both that the
Constitution constantly changes and that this process of change can sus-

tain the advent of a new understanding that recognizes situatedness in
our Constitution. Consider the fourth amendment's protection "against
unreasonable searches and seizures."3'39 Its scope has varied widely,
depending on the mediating concept used to characterize the protected

interest. For much of our history, this constitutional provision was
understood to protect a sphere of autonomy marked out by the common
law protections of property and persons." ° In this form, the fourth

amendment was both broader and narrower than its modem counterpart-prohibiting the search for and seizure of "mere evidence,"34 ' but
permitting wiretapping.3 42 When reconceptualized in terms of "privacy," however, exactly the opposite became the case.3 43 Reformulated
again as "a legitimate expectation of privacy" 31---well, the story is wellknown.
Arguably, the framers' underlying individualist assumptions remain
constant throughout these doctrinal permutations. In this sense, the
individualist assumption is deeply sedimented in the legal mind.3 45 The
crucial point, however, is that th6 meaning and shape of this individualism have changed continually and dramatically as the mediating conceptions have varied.346 And this fact of constant change in our
constitutional conception of the individual is sufficient to illustrate my
argument for the situated-subject's Constitution. For the purpose of this
exercise is not the effacement of the individual. Quite the contrary, my
critique has been that-without consideration of context and situationthe individualist promise of constitutional formalism can only be a cruel
339. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
340. See, eg., Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298 (1921); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S.
616, 630 (1886).
341. Gouled, 255 U.S. 298 passim.
342. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928).
343. See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
But see Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MiNN. L. REV. 349, 385 (1974)
('The effect of Katz is to expand rather than generally to reconstruct the boundaries of fourth
amendment protection.").
344. See eg., Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517 (1984) (prisoner has no legitimate expectation of
privacy in prison cell); Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 740 (1979) (no legitimate expectation of
privacy in the numbers dialed on one's phone); United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (no
legitimate expectation of privacy in records of deposit slips and canceled checks held by bank).
345. For such an argument, see Winter, The Metaphor of Standing,supra note 12, at 1481-91;
Fischl, supra note 262, at 861-63.
346. See White, JudicialCriticism, 20 GA. L. REv. 835, 849 (1986) ("The Court's view on these
questions does much to define what it means to be a citizen in our country, for these cases tell us
what actions by officials count as intrusions .. ");see also Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v.
United States (1886-1976), 76 MICH. L. REv. 184, 194 (1977) ("To the extent that the decisions
following Boyd and Gouled reduced the obstacles to governmental seizure of an individual's
property, they also narrowed his effective zone of privacy.").
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hoax.3 4 7 Instead the thrust of my argument is toward the reconceptualization of the individual in a manner more true to its actual
348
situatedness.
2.

The HistoricistObjection

The historicist objection recognizes that there is no critical charge to
the insight that we are socially constructed and applies the point with a
vengeance. The objection starts from the premise that "a society is not a
collection of pure, free, and equal consciousnesses but is first of all a
system of institutions to which consciousnesses owe whatever effective
reason and liberty they might have."3 49 If everything is socially and historically contingent in this way, then it is all the more critical that we
preserve the inherited values and social structure because they make us
who we are.350 In this view, the idea of the situated-subject's
Constitution could only yield a conservative Burkean organicism.
What is asserted by an organic or evolutionary theory is that the purposes
of legal rules cannot be fully known. Put more cogently .... legal rules
... should presumably contribute to the maintenance of an effective
social order, we cannot expect to know precisely how they do so and
what the long-term effects of changes or revisions might be. Our constitutional stance should therefore be preservative and incremental, building carefully, by analogy, upon traditional modes of operation. So
viewed, the justification "we have always done it that way" is not so
much a retreat from reasoned and purposive decision making as a
profound acknowledgement of the limits of instrumental rationality.3 51
There are three related problems with the historicist objection.
First, it presupposes that, although our values are contingent, our reality
is relatively stable. It necessarily assumes that the fundamental nature of
347. See supra text accompanying notes 219-25.
348. As I have argued elsewhere, this is not the elimination of freedom, but the very condition
of its possibility. Winter, Bull Durham, supranote 12, at 655-56, 684-85. As Merleau-Ponty puts it,
the situated-subject is
a being with a natural and social situation but one who is also open, active, and able to
establish his autonomy on the very ground of his dependence. ... [Tihe bond which
attaches man to the world is at the same time his way to freedom; ... man, in contact with
nature, projects the instruments of his liberation around himself not by destroying
necessity but, on the contrary, by utilizing it ....
M. MERLEAu-PONTY, SENSE AND NoN-SENSa, supra note 21, at 130.
349. Id. at 103.
350. Kronman, Precedent and Tradition, 99 YALE L.. 1029, 1066 (1990) ("We must respect
the past because the world of culture that we inherit from it makes us who we are."). Kromnan,
however, goes further and argues that we have a duty to preserve this otherwise perishable world of
culture, including law. Id. at 1052-54, 1064-68.
351. Mashaw, The Supreme Court's Due Process Calculusfor Administrative Adjudication in
Mathews v. Eldridge: Three Factorsin Search ofa Theory of Value, 44 U. CHi. L. Rnv. 28, 55 (1976)
(emphasis in original); see also West, Constitutionalism, supra note 291, at 654-55, 675-76
(constitutional conservatives treat the past as the only reliable source of wisdom and values).
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the problems facing a society do not change drastically over time: The

historicist prescription-stick to the tried-and-true as augmented by
incremental adjustment-only makes sense if there is a relative stability
to the physical and social realities with which a society grapples.35 2 But

as soon as the historicist objection acknowledges contingency, it must
also acknowledge the contingency of history itself.35 3 There can be no
guarantee that changes in historical circumstances are gradual rather
than drastic aid, therefore, that appropriate legal change should be

incremental rather than radical.
The second problem with the historicist objection is that it depends
upon a strong distinction between the substance of a rule and its animat-

ing spirit. On one hand, it necessarily assumes that the substance of the
received rules is relatively clear and determinate: only then could we

preserve and follow those rules (as augmented by incremental adjustment, of course). At the same time, however, it is utterly skeptical of our
ability to know either the purposes of those rules or the means by which

they operate. Thus, it presupposes that we can know the meaning without the reason, that the what somehow remains stable even as the why
354
and the how recede into oblivion.

The third problem with the historicist objection is that it puts the
past and present in conflict. While it esteems society's values and seeks
to nurture them for the fragile, precious creations they are,355 it is utterly
skeptical of the capacity of contemporary humans to create equally valuable constructions. Where our forebears were wise and ruled by reason,
we are decadent and likely to be ruled by passion.35 6 Indeed, the histori-

cist objection necessarily assumes that-even though, by hypothesis, we
are constructed along their lines-we are somehow unable rationally to
respond to changing circumstances as well as they were.35 7
352. See Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 5, at 476 ("However well Burkean
incrementalism may fit the British experience, it falsifies the distinctive character of the American.");
Mashaw, supra note 351, at 54 ("Since social and economic forces are dynamic, the processes and
structures that proved functional in one period will not necessarily serve effectively in the next.").
353. Kronman seems to acknowledge contingency when he recognizes that "the effort to
reproduce, unaltered, an existing mode of human life almost always results in its modification,
despite the intentions of those involved." Kronman, supra note 350, at 1052. Nevertheless, he does
not seem to account for this factor in his subsequent argument.
354. As I have demonstrated elsewhere, however, even simple words like "vehicle" and "park"
come with their purposes and contexts already built into our very understandings of the terms.
Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1178-80.
355. Cf Rorty, Thugs and Theorists: A Reply to Bernstein, 15 POL. THEORY 564, 579 n.28
(1987) ("[Ihe moral intuitions of the average middle-class member of a modem Western society are
contingent, fragile, precious creations, not the expression of something universally human.").
356. In this view, "[tihe political man is he who has recognized the price of existing things and
defends them against private fantasy." M. MERLEU-PONTY, SENSE AND NON-SENSE, supra note
21, at 103.
357. See Michelman, Conceptions ofDemocracy in American ConstitutionalArgument: The Case
ofPornographyRegulation, 56 TENN.L. REv. 291, 316-18 (1989) (conventional approach to judicial
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A common thread runs through each of these distinctions: some
things are dependable, others not; some things are solid, others ephemeral. Mostly, of course, reality, the rules, and the past are (relatively)
solid and reliable. On the other hand, values are contingent; the spirit or
purpose of the inherited rules are unknowable; and contemporary people
are unreliable. If any of this sounds vaguely familiar, it is because it
replicates the subject/object dichotomy. The object-that is, reality, the
rule, the past-is good. The subject-that is, current values, the intention behind the rules, present-day humans-is subjective and bad.
Because the historicist objection depends on the subject/object
dichotomy, it carnot withstand the reconceptualization of subject-object
relations. If the situated-subject is both constituted and constituting,
then it is simultaneously dependent on its past and every bit as involved
in the world as its forebears. Whatever the inherited social constructions
that constitute it, the subject inevitably encounters new situations that
require imaginative new interactions. Thus, the historicist objection fails
both in its conception of the past and in its false limitation of the future.
By the same token, it fails because the contingency of the future can
never be obviated. "Under the pretext of objectivity it freezes the future
and eliminates change and the will of men from history."3'5 8 At the same
time, the historicist objection also fails because the past of values and
rules is never separate and behind and, thus, not something that needs to
be preserved. "[T]here is no ... completely real and accomplished history[ ] because the historical reality of which we can speak has meaning
only for a [person] who is situated in it and wants to go beyond it and
therefore has meaning only within a framework of possibilities."35' 9 The
past is, rather, the sedimented knowledge with which one interacts with
the problems of the present. It is this sedimentation that is preservative
of the past.36 At the same time, this sedimentation is always an interaction with a incessantly dynamic present.
B.
L

Relentless Jurisgenesis

Jurisgenesisin Action

Like the late Robert Cover, Merleau-Ponty understood the deeply
human capacity for jurisgenesis: the relentlessness with which humans
enforcement of the Constitution imagines "the Constitution's own founding moment as on the
yonder side, before the Fall, a part of Edenic time, and only posterity's politics (only all the rest of
political timel) as after the Fall").
358. M. MERLEAu-PoNT, SENSE AND NON-SENSE, supra note 21, at 168.
359. M. MERLEAU-PONTY, DiALEcrIc, supra note 1, at 134 n.70; see also M. MERLEAUPoNTY, PHENOMENOLOGY, supra note 18, at 173 ("[Tlhere is history only for a subject who lives
through it, and a subject only in so far as he is historically situated.").
360. Cf M. MERLEAU-PONTY, SIGNS, supra note 25, at 96 ("Truth is another name for
sedimentation, which is itself the presence of all presents in our own.").
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construct the normative world that they inhabit. "All several men need
do is live together and be associated with the same task for some rudimentary rules and a beginning of law to emerge from their life in common."3'6 1 This enhanced conception recognizes law as one of the ways
humans cope by stabilizing contexts in which they can interact and communicate with each other.36 2 Viewed in this way, we cannot even begin
to understand the phenomenon of law as long as we consider only those
products of "the strictures of provenance that characterize what we call
formal lawmaking."3'63 Rather, law is the unmistakable product of
human interactions as they are institutionalized first in social practice
and then as cultural and legal norms.
Karl Llewellyn's 1934 article on constitutional law provides a wonderfully wry example. Llewellyn argued that the Constitution could only
be understood as an ongoing institution deeply rooted in our mores and
cognitive makeup. 3 To illustrate his point, Llewellyn cited the thenunbroken practice initiated by George Washington in which the
President serves only two terms. He was careful not to claim too much.
Nevertheless, he did assert that, as an ingrained governmental practice,
the two-term rule was every bit as much a part of the Constitution as the
presidential veto.
Do I mean that the Supreme Court would, on demand, declare the third
election of a president to be void? Of course not. I mean that institutions
which sit so firmly that the Supreme Court never gets a chance to pass on
variations from them attain the zenith of fundamental law's
365
perfection.
The irony, of course, is that six years later Roosevelt would be elected to
a third term. Even so, there is a kind of cultural "truth" value to sedimented social practices that is not to be denied. In 1951, the
Constitution was amended to provide that: "No person shall be elected
to the office of the President more than twice .... 366
Not all such practices end up codified in the text of the Constitution
itself. Nevertheless, there is a powerful trajectory that runs from social
practice through institutionalization as cultural norm to constitutional
command. Consider the double irony of the right to travel. The right is
361. M. MERLEAu-Polry, SENSE AND NON-SENsE, supra note 21, at 118. Compare id. with
Cover, supra note 177, at 1602 n.2 ("Mhe creation of legal meaning is an essentially cultural activity
which takes place (or best takes place) among smallish groups.") (emphasis in original).

362. See supra text accompanying notes 21-23 & 31-36.
363. Cover, supra note 178, at 18.
364. Llewellyn, supra note 65, at 18 ("[A] firmly established constitution... involves ways of
behavior deeply set and settled in the make-up of these people-and it involves not patterns of doing
(or of inhibition) merely, but also accompanying patterns of thinking and of emotion...
365. Id at 14 (footnote omitted).
366. U.S. CONST. amend. XXII, § 1.
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considered "fundamental,"3 67 "firmly established and repeatedly recognized, '3 68 despite the fact that it appears nowhere in the Constitution
and despite the inability of the Court even to agree on which provision in
the Constitution provides a textual anchor for the right. 369 And, yet, it
makes perfect sense. In their amicus brief in the Webster case, Norman
Redlich, Frank Michelman, Stephen Neuwirth, and the late Denise
Carty-Bennia, put it aptly:
[U]nenumerated rights traditionally have reflected powerful historical
forces that inevitably influence constitutional interpretation. The right to
travel, nowhere specified in the constitutional text, becomes understandable when one considers the ambulatory nature of early American society,
in which settled communities were rare, and immigration and the conquering of the frontier were urgent national concerns.37 °
Indeed, what could be more fundamentally American than the right to
travel? (Remember the ad? "It's not just your car; it's your freedom.")
The emergence and institutionalization of the right to travel as an
unspecified, textually ungrounded constitutional right is a powerful
exemplar of the constant process of constitutional jurisgenesis.
2. Trimorphic Constitutionalism
a. Ackerman's DualistDemocracy
In the received wisdom, judicial review is seen as
countermajoritarian because it invalidates -the products of the
majoritarian political process. Bruce Ackerman refers to this view as
"monistic democracy" because, regardless of differences over such issues
as when judicial review is nevertheless appropriate, the underlying
assumption is that the essence of democracy lies in the ordinary electoral
process by which the populace chooses the legislature and executive.37 1
In contrast, Ackerman argues that our historical tradition supports a
"dualist democracy" that distinguishes between normal politics and a
"higher track" of constitutional politics.37 2
[Tihe Constitution establishes a two-track law-making system. If our
elected politicians hope only to win normal democratic legitimacy for an
initiative, they are directed down the normal lawmaking path and told to
367.

United States v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966).

368.

Id

369. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 630 (1969) ("We have no occasion to ascribe the
source of this right to travel interstate to a particular constitutional provision.").
370. Brief for a Group of American Law Professors As Amicus Curiae in Support of Appellees
at 15, Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 109 S. Ct. 3040 (1989) (No. 88-605). Of course, the
phenomenon has even deeper roots in the common law. See I W. BLAcKsToNE, COMMENTAmREs
*130 (1765) ("[P]ersonal liberty consists in the power of loco-motion, of changing situation, or of
removing one's person to whatsoever place one's own inclination may direct .....
371. Ackerman, ConstitutionalPoliticn; supra note 5, at 462-65.
372. Id at 461-62; Ackerman, Storrs Lectures, supra note 5, at 1039-43.
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gain the assent of the House, Senate, and President in the normal ways.
If, however, they hope for higher lawmaking authority, they are directed
down a specially onerous lawmaking path .... 373
To make higher law, which includes amendment of the Constitution
outside article V, it is necessary first to traverse "the specially onerous
'374
obstacle course provided by a dualist constitution for this purpose.
Along this route, a movement must
first, convince an extraordinary number of its fellow citizens to take its
proposed initiative with a seriousness that they do not normally accord to
politics; second, allow opponents a fair opportunity to organize their own
forces; third, convince a majority of Americans to support transformative
initiatives as their merits are discussed, time and again, in the deliberative
37 5
fora provided by the dualist constitutional order for this purpose.
Ackerman identifies Reconstruction and the New Deal as two pivotal,
376
but not exclusive, examples of this method of higher lawmaking.
Ackerman's notion of dualist democracy yields a distinctive defense
of and limitation on judicial review. In his scheme, the judiciary's duty is
to preserve the fruits of constitutional politics from the vicissitudes of
normal politics.
[T]he dualist sees the discharge of the preservationist function by the
courts as an absolutely essential part of a well-ordered democratic
regime. Rather than threateningdemocracy by frustrating the statutory
demands of the political elite in Washington, D.C., the courts serve
democracy by protecting the hard-won judgments of a mobilized citizenry against fundamental change by political elites who have failed to
establish the requisite kind of mobilized support from the citizenry at
37 7
large.
In a closing metaphor, Ackerman compares the American republic to a
train steaming through history. While the passengers periodically choose
a new engineer or debate a new course, the courts, he says, must always
' 378
"remain in the caboose, looking backward.
Others will no doubt find fault with the dualist thesis because it is
373. Ackerman, Constitutional Politic,. supra note 5, at 464 (emphasis in original).
374. Id. at 462.
375. Id. at 461.
376. Ackerman notes and discusses the differences between Reconstruction and the New Deal.
During the former, Congress was the primary locus of transformative efforts and the recalcitrant
branch was the Executive. In the latter, it was the executive that took the initiative and the Court
that resisted. Moreover, although the Reconstruction Era partially nationalized the process, the
states were still nominally involved in ratification. In the New Deal, however, the process was
nationalized in its entirety. IA at 511-15.
What is distinctive, however, is that in each case the trajectory of this second of the dualist
paths accords with the following schema: "Constitutional Impasse-> Triggering Election->
Challenge to Institutional Legitimacy-> Switch In Time." Id. at 509.
377. Id. at 465 (emphasis in original).
378. Id. at 546 (emphasis omitted).
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incommensurate with the text of the Constitution and the received
understanding. 79 For my part, I think that Ackerman's analysis is useful and important as an account of certain constitutional paradigm shifts.
Compared to the parsimony of the monists, Ackerman's constitutional
populism is refreshingly generous.3 8 0 On the other hand, even
Ackerman's enlarged sense of constitutional jurisgenesis is both unduly
restrictive and insufficiently democratic. First, a dualist understanding
of democratic constitutionalism is at least one track too few; only a threetiered, trimorphic constitutionalism can begin to describe the actual
practice of American constitutional law. Second, regardless of its
descriptive accuracy, the dualist account leaves something to be desired
on its own normative terms. In contrast, the third track that I identifya track of ordinary, everyday jurisgenesis-looks surprisingly more
democratic.
b.

Three-Track Jurisgenesis

Ackerman's dualist theory is unable to accommodate the realities of
constitutional jurisgenesis, as the emergence of the right to travel illustrates. Imagine Ackerman at the starting gate of the dualist track:
"O.K., People. Here's the drill. You see, there are these four hurdles
you will have to clear before you can change the Constitution outside
article V. Now ..... " By the time he has finished describing the first
hurdle, the Constitution has already changed-and without our noticing.
The event, moreover, cannot be captured and domesticated by the rubric
of "interpretation," at least not as that term is conventionally understood
within constitutional law and practice. Consider again the right to
travel, which isn't derived from any particular constitutional clause.
The most interesting constitutional changes are not those that are
self-consciously mediated by interpretive strategies, but rather those that
happen without conscious awareness of "change." Here, as elsewhere,
Llewellyn's eye was keen:
[A] rule is made up of a series of words, a nexus of linguistic symbols....
[T]o an indeterminate degree, every symbol ... has what may be called
latent content: it has an unambiguous and predictable (along with an
ambiguous and not fully predictable) capacity for expanding. Once
something new and different appears, something not thought of before, it
can be felt to fit within existing categories. In this sense, every category
in fact has an immanent expansive capacity. This expansive capacity is
clearly predictable to some extent, but only to some extent. [Assume a]
hypothetical case [in which] every lawyer would expand the rule the
379. See, eg., Tushnet, supra note 3, at 539 n.1.
380. See also Amar, PhiladelphiaRevisited: Amending the Constitution OutsideArticle V, 55 U.
C-i. L. REv. 1043, 1044 (1988) (discussing the "right of majority of voters to amend the
Constitution... in ways not expressly provided for by Article V").
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same way. But when he does so, he does so instantaneously; he does not
see the expansion.... Nevertheless he has, even if unwittingly, expanded
the category.38 1
This expansive capacity, moreover, is dependent on the development
of social norms. "All words (that is, linguistic symbols) and all rules
composed of words continuously change meaning as new conditions
emerge." 382 Thus, the most important concern for the legal
decisionmaker is
whether [she] can make the direction and degree of semantic change in a
legal rule (or a verbal symbol used by the rule) keep up with the corresponding change in the real-life situation. If the change sanctioned by
the judge keeps up more or less, but not quite, one then speaks of the
law's mild conservatism. If the change on the judge's part is noticeably
not keeping up, one then speaks of a crisis in decision making. And,
finally, if the change on the judge's part is keeping up perfectly, neither
383
judge nor layman realizes that any change has occurred ....
What was salient about the pre-1937 New Deal period was that judicial
change was demonstrably not keeping up. Almost everybody knew it,
and the consequences could not be ignored-which is another way of
saying that the anomalies were escalating out of control and a fullfledged crisis was under way.
These insights have intriguing implications for the conventional
conceptualization of the countermajoritarian difficulty. They suggest
that, in times of crisis like the New Deal, it is the absence of judicial
"innovation" that is widely perceived to be undemocratic. In times of
relative stability, on the other hand, cases like those involving the right to
travel are decided in the ordinary course of constitutional jurisgenesis.
Indeed, there may be little awareness of the change and even less concern
with the democratic dimensions of the process. But it is nevertheless
democratic-in a trimorphic sort of way, of course.
c.

Coming Up Short P Reconstruction and the Problem of Method

Ackerman's dualist theory betrays its shortcomings as soon as we
apply its own normative democratic commitments to the actual historical
record. Consider first Ackerman's careful account of the events that led
to the adoption of the fourteenth amendment.384 At the encouragement
381. K. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 74-75 (P. Gewirtz ed., M. Ansaldi
trans. 1989) (emphasis in original) (footnote omitted). In the omitted footnote, Llewellyn explained
what he meant by "an immanent expansive capacity": "Sociologically immanent, that is, if one
presupposes determinate historical circumstances, existing legal practice, and lawyers trained in a
particular tradition and particular doctrinal materials ...." Id. at 74 n.1 (emphasis in original).
382. Id at 83.
383.

Id

384.

Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics supra note 5, at 500-10.
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of President Andrew Johnson, the all-white governments of the Southern
states rejected the Radical Republicans' proposed amendment. 38 5 Both
sides took the issue to the electorate in the 1866 congressional elections,
which resulted in "a decisive electoral victory for the party of constitutional reform. '38 6 Armed with this mandate, the Republicans responded
with the Reconstruction Acts of 1867 and 1868. They replaced the
existing Southern governments with military rule and required the army
to register Southern blacks to vote. Even so, the reconstructed Southern
governments were only allowed to rejoin the Union on the condition that
they ratify the fourteenth amendment.3 8 7
Johnson used his power as Commander-in-Chief to slow the process
of ratification so that he could take the issue back to the electorate in the
1868 presidential election. Congress responded by impeaching the
President, subjecting him to trial in the Senate. 388 Between March and
May of 1868, Johnson bowed to the requests of Republican senators and
called off his efforts to obstruct Reconstruction and ratification. Seven
Republican Senators voted to acquit; Johnson escaped conviction by one
vote. The ratification of the fourteenth amendment then proceeded
under the strictures of Reconstruction.38 9 It became part of the
Constitution in July, 1868.
As Ackerman suggests, "we should ask how well [this] system
serves the basic principles of dualist democracy." 3" I suspect that many
people will be troubled about the democratic legitimacy of this process as
it has been described. The essence of the dualist track is that the
"President, Congress, Court, and voters interact with one another over
time to test the constitutional credibility of the movement's mandate to
speak for the People on behalf of its transformative initiative. ' ' 39 1 But
one must question whether in 1868 the Republican Congress really
'3 92
allowed opponents "a fair opportunity to organize their own forces.
385. The proposed amendment was itself the product of a rump .Congress dominated by the
Radical Republicans after they had refused, in December 1865, to seat any of the Southern
representatives. Id. at 500-03.
386. Id at 505.
387. See id at 504-07.
388. Id As Ackerman notes, Congress exercised control over the Court as well. In 1863, the
Supreme Court had grown to ten Justices. P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. MELTZER & D. SHAPIRO,
HART AND WECHSLER's THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYsTEM 36 (3d ed. 1988)
[hereinafter HART AND WECHsLER'S FEDERAL CoURTS]. In 1866, however, Congress reduced the
size of the Supreme Court to seven in order to prevent President Johnson from filling existing
vacancies. Ackerman, Constitutional Politics, supra note 5, at 513 n.122. In 1869, after the
constitutional crisis was resolved in Congress' favor, it increased the size of the Court to nine. Id;
see also HART AND WECHSLER'S FEDERAL COURTS, supra, at 36.
389. Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics, supra note 5, at 505-07.
390. Id. at 515.
391. Id at 490 (emphasis added).
392. Id at 461.
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For the most part, the tactics of the Radical Republicans sound like
nothing more than brute power politics: destroying the existing white
governments of the South; threatening to unseat Andrew Johnson; and,
in each case, making their opponent's continued political existence contingent upon approval of the fourteenth amendment.
To sustain the dualist's case for the democratic legitimacy for these
actions, Ackerman must put extraordinary freight on the election of
1866. Even so, one must question whether a single off-year election quite
suffices for "higher" lawmaking. Under the strictures of article V,
amendment requires a supermajority both in Congress and among the
states. Ackerman's own proposed alternative contemplates at least two
transformative elections.39 3 Yet, the Republican Congress' strong-arm
tactics in advance of the 1868 presidential election pretermitted the possibility of any further test of their "mandate."
The weakness of the dualist's case for the legitimacy of the
Reconstruction amendments is accurately reflected in the swiftness and
ease with which the Supreme Court eviscerated the legal legacy of
Reconstruction.3 9 4 In 1873, the Court rejected the idea that the privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth amendment provided any
additional federal rights to be protected against state interference. 39 The
clause has remained moribund ever since. Between 1875 and 1883, the
Court repeatedly invoked the state action doctrine to undermine the
major work of Reconstruction. In 1875, the Court restricted the application of the criminal provisions of the 1870 Act.39 6 In 1882, it invalidated
a criminal provision of the 1875 Act.3 97 The next year, in the Civil
Rights Cases, the Court held the public accommodations provision of the
1875 Act unconstitutional.3 98 With the Court's approval of Jim Crow
laws at the close of the century,3 99 the undoing of Reconstruction was
complete. In a very real sense, the fourteenth amendment would remain
moribund until Brown.
d.

Coming Up Short II The New Deal and the Problem of Scope

Ackerman's account of the New Deal, at first glance, fares better as
a model of democratic jurisgenesis. The New Deal was consistently rati393. Ackerman, TransformativeAppointments, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1164, 1182 (1988).
394. Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute
Remain Alive orFade Away?, 60 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1, 9 (1985) ("[W]ith a few quick thrusts, the Court

cut the heart out of the Civil Rights Acts.").
395.

Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).

396. United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542 (1875) (conviction for lynching of black citizens
reversed for failure to allege violation of a particular federal right).

397. United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629 (1882) (invalidating provision prohibiting private
conspiracies to deprive persons of the equal protection of the laws).

398. Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883); see supra text accompanying notes 296-99.
399.

Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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fled at the polls through three elections, culminating in the 1936 presidential election. And so, it should not be surprising that, in contrast to
the Reconstruction, the major legacy of the New Deal-the activist welfare state-has remained intact.
Yet, even here, we may question whether all higher lawmaking of
the New Deal period passes muster as a matter of dualist democratic
legitimacy. As previously noted,'4 ° the 1937 paradigm shift manifested
itself in areas other than those affecting the constitutionality of the regulatory state. In a few short years, two pillars of modem federal courts
doctrine-constitutional standing law ° 1 and the Erie decision 4° 2 -both
made their appearance. In an important sense, these legal developments
were coherent with the conceptual underpinnings of the 1937 shift: Both
emanated from Justice Brandeis' progressive commitments, and both
were closely related to the Court's repudiation of the Lochner era. 4° 3
The development of standing law was a largely self-conscious effort to
impose procedural restraints on the Court so it could not interfere with
Erie freed state common law from the
progressive legislation.'
imposed national uniformity of the federal courts." 5 It reflected Justice
should have leeway to
Brandeis' strong commitment that the states
4' 6
experiment in social and economic matters.
Nevertheless, these two developments raise important questions
about the dualist theory. Standing law and Erie are substantial revisions
of article III and the concept of federalism, respectively. As constitutional changes, they rank with any of the explicit amendments. Yet, one
must wonder whether "their merits [we]re discussed, time and again, in
[any] deliberative fora";' 7 it is hard to imagine that they were the subject
of popular mobilization and debate in any election. Indeed, when considered along other dimensions, these two developments were in important
ways incongruent with the concerns that dominated the great national
debate attending the New Deal. Both in conception and effect, standing
law is nothing so much as the preservation of the background common
400. See supra note 96; sources cited supra notes 67 & 107.
401. Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460 (1939) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Exparte Levitt,
302 U.S. 633 (1937) (per curiam).
402. Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
403. See Tribe, supra note 96, at 25.
404. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing, supra note 12, at 1455-57.
405. It is also true that Erie can be viewed as "the principal case recognizing the constructed
rather than prepolitical character of the common law." Sunstein, supra note 9, at 882.
406. See New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) ("It
is one of the happy incidents of the federal system that a single courageous State may, if its citizens
choose, serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments without risk to the rest
of the country.").
407. Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics,supra note 5, at 461.
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law regime that the 1937 paradigm shift was supposed to reject." 8 In
shifting power from the" national courts to the states, Erie precisely
reversed the New Deal's afflrmance of a strong national government.
In sum, both of the primary exemplars of dualist constitutional
change fall short of the democratic mark. For Reconstruction, the problem is a matter of questionable procedure. For the New Deal, the extent
and nature of the substantive changes were not coextensive with the subject matter of the popular dialogue and vote.
"ea A TrimorphicExemplar
The trimorphic mode of constitutional change, in contrast, is democratically superior. In this mode, the relentless processes of social and
cultural construction produce new sedimentations that are first institutionalized in social practice and then concretized as constitutional
rules.4°9 In its highest form, trimorphic jurisgenesis is marked by a
moment of conscious, situated reflection in which the Court probes the
development of and experience with these social norms before transmuting them into constitutional commands.
My primary exemplar is a "liberal" criminal procedure decision of
the Burger Court, Tennessee v. Garner.4 10 Before Garner, the common
law fleeing-felon rule allowed police to use deadly force to prevent the
escape of fleeing felony suspects. The Court upset this rule in Garner. It
held that, absent probable cause to believe the suspect dangerous, the use
of deadly force to prevent escape constituted an unreasonable seizure of
the person in violation of the fourth amendment.4 1 1 The Court's ruling
invalidated the laws of about twenty-three states, "a seemingly striking
41 2
example of the countermajoritarian practice of judicial review.1
4 13
The conservative Burger Court's apparent about-face in Garner,
408. See Winter, The Metaphor of Standing supra note 12, at 1470-78 (demonstrating the
conceptual identity of Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, 426 U.S. 26 (1976),
and Palsgraf v. Long Island Railroad, 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928)); see also Sunstein, supra
note 9, at 893-94; Sunstein, Standing and the Privatizationof PublicLaw, 88 COLuM. L. REv. 1432

(1988).
409. Michelman disparages this conception "as a kind of behind-our-backs self-government."
Michelman, supra note 96, at 1508 n.53. Though partly right, this characterization does not fully
consider the reflective component of the process as described below.
410. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
411. Id.at 11.
412. Winter, Tennessee v. Garner and the Democratic Practiceof JudicialReview, 14 N.Y.U.
REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 679, 682 (1986). It is not possible to assess precisely how many states were
affected because, in several states, the law was quite unclear. See id at 680-82 nn.ll-16.
413. Previous holdings of the Burger Court had embraced a narrow reading of the fourth
amendment's application to searches. See The Supreme Court-Leading Cases, 99 HARV. L. REv.

120, 248 (1985).
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its willingness to break with the consensus of the lower courts,4 14 and its
invalidation of so many state statutes, nicely emphasize the trimorphic,
socially contingent nature of constitutional decisionmaking. By the time
Garner came to the Court in 1984, the deadly force policies of most of
the police departments in the country were substantially more restrictive
than the common law rule.4 15 This development was a reflection both of
repeated interactions with an angry public in the wake of inner-city
shootings and of the increasing professionalization of American policing.
Advocacy by civil rights groups, public hearings, and deliberations
within police departments, city council halls, and police professional
organizations all contributed to the promulgation of these restrictive regulations. Regardless of the source, however, the salient fact is that a new
standard evolved long before it was imposed from above by the courts.
What is instructive, moreover, is the self-conscious way in which the
Court addressed the intervening social changes. It carefully examined
state law and departmental policies both to evaluate "the reasonableness
of police procedures under the Fourth Amendment" 4 16 and the practicability of a more restrictive standard. 1 7 The Court noted that "the longterm movement has been away from the [common law] rule" and that
"[t]his trend is more evident and impressive when viewed in light of the
policies adopted by the police departments themselves." 4'18 Thus, what
the Court found-and what it founded Garner on-was precisely the
kind of political and social interactions over time, discussed repeatedly in
various deliberative fora, that might reasonably ground constitutional
change. The change, moreover, had already been tested in practice
before the Court articulated it as a standard that carried with it the force
of law and the force of the Constitution.
From a trimorphic perspective, the mid-century obsession with the
countermajoritarian difficulty seems a little quaint, if not peculiar.4 19
The ordinary course of constitutional jurisgenesis reflects the dynamic
nature of the social and cultural processes upon which it depends and, in
that very sense, is democratic. In contrast, most conventional theories of
judicial review need some knowable, authoritative, foundational moment
of democratic decisionmaking that validates subsequent judicial action.
414. Before Garner, state and federal courts had almost unanimously upheld the common law

deadly force rule. Id
415.

Garner, 471 U.S. at 18-19 (only 7.5% of police departments continued to follow common

law rule, whereas 86.8% explicitly did not).
416. Id at 15.
417. Id. at 19 ("We would hesitate to declare a police practice of long standing 'unreasonable' if
doing so would severely hamper effective law enforcement.").
418. Id at 18.

419. In a forthcoming work, I consider the impact of other, inherently majoritarian influences
on the Court and the degree to which they undermine conventional wisdom about the
countermajoritarian difficulty. Winter, Upside/Down View, supra note 20.
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Ackerman's dualist constitutionalism is an improvement over its competitors because it recognizes that there is more than one such moment. But
it falters because it fails to recognize that these very moments are always
in question. (What does it mean? Is that what we fought for? Did the
People really agree to that?) There is never a determinate, static thing
that the courts can abide by. Trimorphic constitutionalism, on the other
hand, recognizes that the courts too are socially situated actors necessarily engaged in the never-ending process of jurisgenerative synthesis. To
put the matter as crisply as I know how, Ackerman's railroad metaphor
is too quaint and European for a modem, mobile America. Judges are
not in the caboose looking backward at determinative moments of
constitutional politics. Rather, they are in the thick of it-always on the
freeway and always looking forward, backward, and side-to-side at all
the other drivers.
C. Reconstitutive Constitutionalism
As we have seen, the elaboration of constitutional meaning is
unavoidably affected by contemporary assumptions, beliefs, crises, and
events. In this sense, the idea of the situated Constitution is more conventional than controversial, less tendentious than trite. But the insight
that we are situated social beings has potentially more radical, transformative implications for the ways in which we understand, formulate, and
practice constitutional law. In the subsections that follow, I suggest
ways that an appreciation of situatedness can enhance our understanding
of constitutional autonomy. My strategy is to examine three familiar
4 2 ° Brown v. Board of Education,421
cases-West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,
and Griswold v. Connecticut 42 2 -and provide new readings that, upon
reflection, are how we understood these cases all along. Although each
of these cases has received revisionist readings by important scholars in
recent years, I hope to show you that there are yet more vital themes to
be extracted from these pivotal decisions.
In each case the themes that prior scholars have missed concern
some aspect of our inevitable and unavoidable situatedness-socially,
personally, and conceptually. In each case, the relevant autonomy
issue-whether that of contract between employer and employee, segregation in public education, or personal privacy--can only be understood
as an issue concerning the interaction between a situated individual and
some larger, interdependent set of social relations. Through this analysis
of the three cases, I hope to show that the implications of situatedness,
which I have presented as central to our social constitution, are already a
420.
421.
422.

300 U.S. 379 (1937).
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
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part of the broader legal canon that is the Constitution-redeeming my
preference for building upon the tradition without abandoning the need
for significant transformations. Indeed, as I illustrate in the conclusion,
the need for significant new directions is urgent.
L

A Matter of Interdependence-West Coast Hotel

In West Coast Hotel v. Parrish,42 3 the Court upheld a Washington
State statute that provided an administrative system for the determination of a minimum wage for women.4 2 4 Part of what placed this case at
the heart of the 1937 paradigm shift was the Court's explicit rejection4 25
of its Lochner-eraanalogue,Adkins v. Children'sHospital.4 26 The more
important and interesting question, however, concerns the meaning of
the case. There are several ways in which the case can be read, each
having substantially different implications.
Cass Sunstein ha suggested that the crux of Lochner and its progeny is their reliance on the common law as the baseline from which to
measure deviations from governmental neutrality.4 27 In this view, West
Coast Hotel
amount[s] to a rejection of the Lochner Court's conception of the appropriate baseline. The key lies in the notion that failure to act would
amount to "a subsidy for unconscionable employers.". . . The Court's
claim is that the failure to impose a minimum wage is not nonintervention at all but simply another form of action-a decision to rely on traditional market mechanisms,
within the common law framework, as the
42 8
basis for regulation.
In this reading of West Coast Hotel, the central focus is on the state and
the question is by what premises or against what standards will the constitutionality of state action be measured.
As Sunstein acknowledges, this understanding is an application of
the legal realists' critique of the private law system.4 29 The realists had
argued that there was nothing neutral or pre-political about the market
because the market was already shaped by state enforcement of the common law rules. And, as Duncan Kennedy has pointed out, the radical
critique of Lochner follows inevitably from this insight. If, as Kennedy
explained, the thrust of classical constitutional formalism was to equate
423. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
424. Id. at 400.

425. Id.
426. 261 U.S. 525 (1923).
427. Sunstein, supra note 9, at 873-83.
428. Id. at 880-81 (quoting West Coast Hotel 300 U.S. at 399).
429. Id. at 883 n.51; see alsb supra text accompanying notes 72-83. This point and its
implications for constitutional law were first developed by Duncan Kennedy. Kennedy, supra note

43, at 1741-56.
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the liberty of the due process clause with the free will protected by the
common law rules, then it follows that the best way to repudiate Lochner
would have been to acknowledge the inevitably political nature of both
private and public law."30
But the post-New Deal Court took a different route in its repudiation of Lochner. Instead of identifying both private and public law as
political, the Court divided public law into a political (which is to say
legislative) and a legal (which is to say judicial) sphere.4 3 1 Thus, while I
don't disagree with Sunstein's theoretical explanation of Lochner, I do
question his reading of West CoastHotel. I want to suggest, in contrast,
that it was neither the state nor the question of neutral baselines that
preoccupied Chief Justice Hughes in West Coast Hotel. Rather, it was
the issue of situatedness and interdependence that formed the framework
for Hughes' reasoning. We can see this most clearly if we take Hughes'
analysis and isolate each of its three more conventional components.
First, Hughes' majority opinion in West Coast Hotel articulated
many of the now familiar themes of modem constitutional restraint in
economic matters: deference to the legislative determinations of social
need, minimal scrutiny of means/ends rationality, and leeway in allowing
the legislature to regulate one step at a time and deal with less than the
432
entire evil.
Second, a significant aspect of Hughes' opinion in West Coast Hotel
was its attention to situation and context. Hughes rejected the Lochnerlike claim "that adult employees should be deemed competent to make
their own contracts," by "point[ing] out the inequality in the footing of
the parties. 4 3 3
The legislature of the State was clearly entitled to consider the situation
of women in employment, the fact that they are in the class receiving the
least pay, that their bargaining power is relatively weak, and that they are
the ready victims of those who would take advantage of their necessitous
43 4
circumstances.
Thus, Hughes linked the concept of deference to the legislature with
430. Kennedy, supra note 43, at 1753-56.
431. See supra text accompanying notes 90-108; see also Kennedy, supra note 43, at 1756.
432. West Coast Hotel 300 U.S. at 398-400; cf.Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483,
488 (1955) ('It is enough that there is an evil at hand for correction, and that it might be thought
that the particular legislative measure was a rational way to correct it."); Railway Express Agency v.
New York, 336 U.S. 106, 110 (1949) ('Itis no requirement of equal protection that all evils of the
same genus be eradicated or none at all.").
433. West Coast Hotel 300 U.S. at 393.
434. Id. at 398. The opinion continues: "The legislature was entitled to adopt measures to
reduce the evils of the 'sweating system,' the exploiting of workers at wages so low as to be
insufficient to meet the bare cost of living, thus making their very helplessness the occasion of a most
injurious competition." Id at 398-99.
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its ability to sustain a fact-specific attention to situation and
circumstance.4 3 5
Third, Hughes took the concept of situation a dramatic step further,
invoking a theme that would reappear in the most deferential and shameful individual rights cases of the 1940s and 1950s.436 In rejecting the
West Coast Hotel's freedom of contract claim, Hughes asked:
What is this freedom? The Constitution does not speak of freedom of
contract. It speaks of liberty and prohibits the deprivation of liberty
without due process of law. In prohibiting that deprivation the
Constitution does not recognize an absolute and uncontrollable liberty.
Liberty in each of its phases has its history and connotation. But the
liberty safeguarded is liberty in a social organization which requires the
protection of law against the evils which menace the health, safety,
morals and welfare of the people. Liberty under the Constitution is thus
necessarily subject to restraints of due process, and regulation which is
reasonable in relation to its437
subject and is adopted in the interests of the.
community is due process.
There is substantial danger implicit in this view of the situatedness
of the individual. Once we recognize that the individual is always
located "in a social organization," it is all too easy to conclude that he or
she is always "subject to the restraints... adopted in the interests of the
community. 413 Indeed, this reasoning also works well as an apology for
oppression. The lurking totalitarian danger is greatest when the subject's
interest is mistakenly identified with that of the state.4 39 State power is at
its zenith when its reach is as unbounded as the interests of any one of its
citizens: "The whole is no greater than the sum of all the parts, and
when the individual health, safety and welfare are sacrificed or neglected,
the State must suffer."'
This is the hidden problem with Sunstein's reading of West Coast
Hotel. Underlying his characterization is a two-dimensional picture of
435. In doing so, however, Hughes traded on (and, thus, confirmed) the formalist
presupposition that to act judicially is to act on the basis of grounds that are universal and
generalizable-that is, "neutral principles."
436. See, eg., Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 524-25 (1951) (affirming convictions under
the Smith Act and stating, "[p]rimary responsibility for adjusting the interests which compete in the
situation before us of necessity belongs to the Congress.") (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Minersville
School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-96 (1940) (compelling Jehovah's Witness schoolchildren
to recite pledge to U.S. flag against their established religious beliefs).
437. West Coast Hotel 300 U.S. at 391.
438. Id
439. By way of illustration, the late Romanian dictator, Nicolae Ceaucescu, declared in 1986
that "the fetus is the socialist property of the whole society. Giving birth is a patriotic duty,
determining the fate of our country. Those who refuse to have children are deserters, escaping the
law of natural continuity." ACLU Reproductive Rights Update, Vol. 11, No. 4, at 2 (February 16,
1990).
440. West Coast Hotel 300 U.S. at 394 (quoting Holden v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 397 (1898)).
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the social world: On the horizontal level, there are individuals with
opposing interests (the employer and the employee); on the vertical
plane, there are the state and its subjects. Viewed this way, with the
interest of the employer pitted against that of the employee, the crucial
issue for the state is which side to support. As interpreted by Sunstein,
the error of Lochner was to treat as neutral what was in fact the use of
the common law to back the employer with the power of the state.
According to this interpretation, West Coast Hotel merely inverted the
balance and allowed the state to come down on the other side of the
equation.
For Hughes, unlike Sunstein, the question was not which side of a
bipolar transaction could permissibly be aided by the state. Rather,
Hughes contextualized the transaction by focusing on its larger social
situation and the impact of the transaction in the community. In
Hughes' understanding of the matter, it was not legal realism but the
Depression that had undermined Lochner and its progeny. "There is an
additional and compelling consideration which recent economic experience has brought into a strong light."" 1 The unmistakable lesson of the
Depression-and what contributed to the paradigm shift in constitutional law-was that social and economic life is characterized by an unavoidable interdependence.
The exploitation of a class of workers who are in an unequal position
with respect to bargaining power and are thus relatively defenseless
against the denial of a living wage is not only detrimental to their health
and well being but. casts a direct burden for their support upon the community. What these workers lose in wages the taxpayers are called upon
to pay. The bare cost of living must be met. We may take judicial notice
of the unparalleled demands for relief which arose during the recent
period of depression and still continue to an alarming extent despite the
degree of economic recovery which has been achieved. ... inhere is no
reason to doubt that the State of Washington has encountered the same
socialproblem that is present elsewhere. The community is not bound to
provide what is in effect a subsidy for unconscionable employers. The
community may direct its law-making power to correct the abuse which
springs from their selfish disregard of the public interest. 442
Hughes' point was that no problem could be abstracted from its
situatedness in an unavoidably interdependent social system. Freedom of
contract is a subsidy for exploitation because the need for a "living wage"
won't go away. One way or another, the community is called upon to
pay. The cost may be exacted in many ways: welfare, crime, hunger,
homelessness, or disease. There is no state neutrality, not because the
state must choose one side or the other, but because it is already an inter441.
442.

Id. at 399.
Id. at 399-400 (emphasis added).
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ested party. It is merely the formal embodiment of the community upon
which unconscionable employers have externalized these costs. The
issue that frames West Coast Hotel is neither economic autonomy nor
state neutrality. It is, rather, communitarian responsibility.

2. The Social Construction of the Subject-Brown
In any account, Brown v. Board of Education 3 must figure as the
preeminent moment of twentieth-century constitutional law. The question, once again, is which of its many possible meanings we should preserve. I will suggest that its lesson of equality is inextricably bound to its
appreciation of situatedness. 44 Before elaborating this position, I will
consider an alternative reading recently offered by Bruce Ackerman.
In Ackerman's dualist account of constitutional change, there are
three primary moments of constitutional lawmaking: the founding in
1787, Reconstruction, and the New Deal. The challenge for the Court is
how to synthesize these three disparate visions of fundamental law. For
Ackerman, Brown represents the Court's interpretive synthesis of the
egalitarian vision of Reconstruction with the New Deal's affirmance of
the activist, regulatory state. He sees "the Court struggling... and trying to tell us that new principles of activist government have decisively
undercut the legal force of Plessy [v. Ferguson]."44 5
The key, according to Ackerman, is to understand that Plessy
depended upon two assumptions." 6 First, Plessy drew a sharp distinction between political equality, which was protected by the fourteenth
amendment, and social equality, which could not be enforced by the
law.' 7 Second, Plessy viewed the question of the meaning of segregation
as " 'solely' a product of private 'choices.' "44s On this account, both of
Plessy's underlying assumptions were undermined by the New Deal.
Certainly, the New Deal vindicated the power of government to address
social problems. With regard to the second assumption, Ackerman notes
that: "In repudiating Lochner, the modern Court recognized that the
government was an important actor in the process by which groups made
their 'choices' in American society."" 9 Thus, when Plessy suggested
that blacks had "chosen" to interpret Jim Crow as a statement of inferi443. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
444. I do not claim to be the first to note this. Cf Michelman, supra note 7, at 31 n.146 (Brown
is "a supreme example of deciding with an eye to context."). But to my knowledge, no one has
characterized Brown as a case about the social construction of the subject.
445. Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics; supra note 5, at 530 (citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S.
537 (1896)).
446. Id. at 531-34.
447. Plessy, 163 U.s. at 544. For Ackerman's discussion of this assumption, see Ackerman,
ConstitutionalPolitics,supra note 5, at 530.
448. Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics,supra note 5, at 532 (discussing Plessy, 163 U.S. at 551).
449. Id.
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ority, it was ignoring the role of the state itself in establishing this
meaning.
The obvious problem with this interpretation is that Brown had
nothing to say about the activist state, and only a little to say about the
role of the government in establishing meaning. 4 0 Ackerman is aware of
this difficulty, and he engages it with 61an. "What is a public school," he
asks, "but a place where government employees are paid to educate
children into the 'truth' about social reality... ?45, For Ackerman,
"[p]ublic schools exemplified the newly legitimated claims of the activist
state to shape the conditions under which individual citizens ultimately
come to make their mature choices. ' 45 2 Masterfully, he finds the same
equation between school and activist state in Brown itself: "Just as one
might use the history of the White House as a trope to express the rise of
the Presidency, Warren used the history of public education to express
the rise of the activist welfare state in modern constitutional interpretation."4 5 3 In this view, it was the New Deal insight about the role of the
state in creating meaning and shaping private choices that undermined
the premises of Plessy.
Ackerman is correct to see Brown as affected by the New Deal shift
in constitutional law. But his reading is premised on a statist principle
that is far too strong for the historical record to bear. The public school
was hardly the centerpiece of the New Deal, and it is difficult to believe
that it "exemplified... the activist state' 45 4 in the Depression era deliberations of "We the People." But even more to the point, there is the
awkward problem of squaring his reading with the actual case law that
followed the New Deal. For Ackerman, the public school is prototypical
of the activist state because it is the institution authorized to induct children into its version of social reality.4 55 This strong statist characterization echoes Justice Frankfurter's majority opinion in Minersville School
District v. Gobitis,45 6 the first of the compulsory flag-salute cases. In
Gobitis, the question was "whether school children... must be excused
from conduct required of all the other children in the promotion of
450. In fact, the only direct reference to the role of the state in the construction of meaning
comes when Chief Justice Warren quotes the lower court finding that: "The impact [of segregation]
is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of separating the races is usually
interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
494 (1954) (quoting lower court finding not published in opinion below, Brown v. Board of Educ., 98
F. Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951)). Even this passage suggests only that the state contributes by

magnifying an already existing psychological meaning.
451.

Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics, supra note 5, at 533.

452. Id
453. Id at 540.
454. Id at 533.
455. Id
456. 310 U.S. 586 (1940).

1990)

INDETERMINACY AND INCOMMENSURABILITY

1529

national cohesion." 4 7 Frankfurter held that no exemption was required;
to the contrary, he found it enough that the state had chosen this means
of promoting good citizenship, inculcating patriotism, and maintaining

national unity.458
But this strong statist view was quickly repudiated in West Virginia
State Board of Education v. Barnette." Justice Jackson's opinion recognized that local boards of education have "important, delicate, and
highly discretionary functions" to fulfill in educating the young.' 0 Nevertheless, he emphasized that these powers must be exercised within constitutional constraints, lest they "strangle the free mind at its source." 41
And there was good reason for the Court's repudiation: The social and
political aftermath of Gobitis was marked by both state and private
repression. 467
Far from legitimating the power of the state to use the public school

"to educate children into the 'truth' about social reality,""

3

the lesson

internalized by the Court following the New Deal was exactly the oppo-

site: "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is
that no official, high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in

politics, nationalism, religion, or other matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." 4 As Justices
Douglas and Black made explicit in their concurring opinion, the Court
had come to see that the power of the state could not be as unrestrained
457. Id. at 595. "Such a sentiment [of national unity] is fostered by all those agencies of the
mind and spirit which may serve to gather up the traditions of a people, transmit them from
generation to generation, and thereby create that continuity of a treasured common life which
constitutes a civilization." Id at 596.
458. Id at 595-96.
459. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
460. Id at 637.
461. Id
462. In the wake of the Court's stamp of approval of compulsory flag salute, religious
bigotry and fanatical, unthinking patriotism became rampant.... Vigilante committees
took it upon themselves to enforce respect for the flag. Between June 12 and June 20, 1940,
hundreds of attacks on the [Jehovah's] Witnesses were reported to the Justice
Department... . With the blessings of an authoritative Supreme Court judgment, the
country's local school officials tightened up on the flag salute requirement. In several states
the lower courts treated recalcitrant Witnesses' children as delinquents and confined them
to state reform schools.
A. MASON, HARLAN FisKE STONE: PILLAR OF THE LAW 533 (1956) (footnotes omitted).
463. Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics, supra note 5, at 533.
464. Barnette 319 U.S. at 642. The Court objected to the communicative as well as the coercive
aspects of the practice.
Symbolism is a primitive but effective way of communicating ideas. The use of an emblem
or flag to symbolize some system, idea, institution, or personality, is a short cut from mind
to mind.
...Here it is the State that employs a flag as a symbol of adherence to government as
presently organized. It requires the individual to communicate by word and sign his
acceptance of the political ideas it thus bespeaks.
Id. at 632-33.
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in matters of politics and belief as in economics.4 6 The suggestion that
Brown somehow broke with this aspect of the post-New Deal paradigm is
further belied by the Court's decisions since Brown. As Robert Cover
pointedly observes, the Court subsequently resuscitated and reinvigorated its earlier substantive due process decisions that protected the right
to private schooling and curricular choice.4 66 Thus, whatever the New
Deal contributed to Brown, it was not the strong sense of legitimate stat-

ist hegemony that Ackerman's reading seems to require.
To understand what the New Deal did contribute to Brown, it is

necessary to return to and reconsider what was wrong with the reasoning
in Plessy. Plessy was an artifact of constitutional formalism. Thus, the
only equality commanded by the fourteenth amendment was formal
equality-that is, "the absolute equality of the two races before the

law."" 7 The Plessy Court's central premise was its confidence in the
relative autonomy of the subject. Thus, relations between autonomous
subjects could not be achieved "by an enforced commingling of the two

races.... If the two races are to meet on terms of social equality, it must
be the result of... a voluntary consent of individuals.""'

In this naive

view of subject/object relations, the meaning of the segregation acts was
either a matter of the objective text or something for each and every

subject to determine freely for itself: If "the enforced separation of the
two races stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority... it is not
by reason of anythingfound in the act, but solely because the colored race
465.

Accounting for the change in their vote since Gobitis, they explained:
Reluctance to make the Federal Constitution a rigid bar against state regulation of
conduct thought inimical to the public welfare was the controlling influence which moved
us to consent to the Gobitis decision. Long reflection convinced us that although the
principle is sound, its application in the particular case was wrong.
Id at 643 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring).
466. Certain decisions have acknowledged the dangerous tendencies of a statist paidela and
marked its boundaries through formal specification of the limits of public meaning. West
Virginia v. Barnette, Epperson v. Arkansas, and the School Prayer Cases are the landmarks,
though all proceed, in one sense, from Meyer v. Nebraska.... [Tihe confessional or
sacramental character of the utterances in Barnette and the School PrayerCases distinguish
them only in degree from the confessional character of all claims of truth and meaning.
Cover, supra note 178, at 61 (citing Barnette, supra; Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968);
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923)) (footnotes omitted); see also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 232
(1972). Cover stresses the danger of a too activist state as educator. Instead, he highlights the
constitutional value of ensuring educational pluralism.
Were there a single, statist corpus, a state school, a state understanding ... we might
imagine a rather simple participation-protecting rule to guarantee universal access to the
process. In our own complex nomos, however, it is the manifold equally dignified communal bases of legal meaning that constitute the array of commitments, realities, and visions
extant at any given time.
Cover, supra note 178, at 66.
467. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 544 (1896).
468. Id at 551 (emphasis added).

1990]

INDETERMINACY AND INCOMMENSURABILITY

1531

chooses to put that construction upon it."" 9 If the roles were reversed,
the Plessy Court was confident, "the white race, at least, would not
acquiesce in this assumption."4 7 0
Equipped with the blindness to context that afflicts all formalisms,
the Plessy Court could shamelessly maintain that the meaning of segregation could only be a matter of voluntary choice on the part of its victims
and, at the very same time, assert that the legislature "is at liberty to act
with reference to the established usages, customs and traditions of the
people."4 7 1 It could do so because-as with Justice Peckham in
Lochner4 7 2 or Justice O'Connor in Croson4 7 3-- it could neither perceive
nor consider the relevance of social context and situation to the question
of statutory meaning (as opposed to legislative purpose).
With this introduction, it is easy to see where Ackerman's account
goes wrong. According to Ackerman, the Plessy Court's error was to
treat as neutral that which was, in fact, the use of the power of the state
to back the whites. This is "formalism-plus-one"-that is, the same twodimensional picture of the social world held by Sunstein: There are individuals with opposing interests (here, whites and blacks), and then there
is the state. For those who view the world in this way, the crucial issue
will always be the question of which side the state should support. What
they miss, however, is the larger social context in which the state and
every other social actor is always already embedded.47 4
The social meaning of segregation was neither a matter of voluntary
choice on the part of blacks (as Plessy would have it) nor the construction of the state through its statutes (as Ackerman seems to suggest). If
the segregation statutes had any meaning whatsoever (whether for black
or white), it was because they reflected the already existing and "established usages, customs and traditions of the people."47 5 If blacks understood the Jim Crow laws to stigmatize them, it was because the social
meaning of those laws was already established in the social experiences
and beliefs of the late nineteenth-century Southerners.4 76 What was
wrong with Plessy was not that it neglected the role of the state in estab469. Id. (emphasis added).
470. Id.
471. Id. at 550.
472. Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); see supra text accompanying notes 73-81.
473. City of Richmond v. l.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989); see supra text accompanying
notes 221-22.
474. Tribe's "post-Newtonian" view is no less afflicted by this shortcoming. He is correct to
recognize the role of the state and its law in affecting meaning, that people are "in part shaped by
political and legal interactions." Tribe, supra note 96, at 25. But despite all the physics analogies to
Newtonian mechanics and relativity theory, his basic position remains two-dimensional. See supra
note 223.
475. Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, 550 (1896).
476. Cf Black, The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions, 69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960).
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lishing meaning, but rather that it failed to recognize that the state could
not speak except in terms that were already meaningful to its citizens.4 77
Plessy was undermined by the New Deal because Plessy was premised on
a denial of the contextuality and situatedness of legal meaning. After
West CoastHotel v. Parrish,78 the Court could no longer accept that the
state was somehow separate from the community that it embodies.4 79 By
the same token, it could no longer accept that subjects were "autonomous" and "competent" to choose their own interpretations "free" of all
prior social significance.48 0
By the time of Brown, moreover, a carefully' planned litigation strategy had brought to the Court a series of cases that made the essentially
situated nature of the educational experience all but inescapable. In
4 8' the Court had considered whether the newly
Sweatt v. Painter,
opened, segregated black law school was "equal" to the existing, exclusively white University of Texas Law School. What Warren found most
relevant to Brown was that, in making that comparison, the Sweatt Court
"relied in large part on 'those qualities which are incapable of objective
measurement but which make for greatness in a law school.' 482
Although it had considered the number of faculty and the size of the
libraries, the Sweatt Court had stressed the quality and reputation of the
faculty, the position and influence of the alumni, and the students' opportunity to interact with various segments of society.4 83 Similarly, what
Warren found most important about McLaurin v. Oklahoma,48 4 the
companion case to Sweatt, was its stress on the importance of the black
student's "ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views
with other students. 48
477. Cf Winter, TranscendentalNonsense, supra note 12, at 1180 (law can speak only in the
normative language of the culture). Instead, Plessy presumed that legislative meaning was only a

matter of formal linguistic structures-and whatever other meaning the autonomous subject might
project into it. See 163 U.S. at 551.
478. 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
479. As Pat Williams observes:
The rules may be color-blind but people are not. The question remains, therefore, whether

the law can truly shed, or exist apart from the color-conscious society in which it exists, as
a skeleton is devoid of flesh; or whether law is the embodiment of society, either the
creation or reflection of a particular citizenry's arranged complexity of relations.
Williams, supra note 225, at 2142.
480. In the account I am providing, Ackerman's basic point-that Brown is a synthesis of the
constitutional meaning of Reconstruction and the New Deal-remains true. What changes is the
meaning of the New Deal and, thus, of the synthesis.
481. 339 U.S. 629 (1950).

482. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (quoting Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 634).
483. Sweatt, 339 U.S. at 633-34.
484. 339 U.S. 637 (1950). In McLaurin, the Court invalidated the policy of the University of
Oklahoma graduate school of education that allowed the admission (under court order) of a black
student but required him to sit at separate tables in separate areas of the library, classrooms, and
cafeteria. Id. at 642.
485. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 (quoting McLaurin, 339 U.S. at 641).
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In short, what Warren culled from these precedents was the pertinence to educational quality of situation, acculturation, and social interaction. Warren invoked precisely this point in rejecting Plessy. "Such
considerations apply with added force to children in grade and high
schools. To separate them.., solely because of their race generates a
feeling of inferiority as to their status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone."48' 6 Warren's
breakthrough, however, was to see the deeper, more profound implications of situatedness:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the
great expenditures for education both demonstrate our recognition of the
importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the
armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a
principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may
reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of
48 7
an education.

This passage is a frank and total recognition of the role of education in
the social construction of the subject.4 8 8 Education is "a principal instrument" for inculcating cultural values in children; it is a necessary precondition for "the performance of our most basic public responsibilities,"
without which the child cannot "adjust normally to his environment" or
"succeed in life."' 4 9 "Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal," 4" not because the state shapes that meaning.4 9 1 Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal because, without access to an
education that reflects the full range of the social situation for which the
486. Id at 494.
487. Id at 493.
488. This passage does begin with an invocation of the state's role in education. Cf Ackerman,
ConstitutionalPolitiz; supra note 5, at 534 (claiming that Warren presents the public school as a
"paradigmatic expression of the modern republic's activist commitment to the general welfare of its
citizens"). However, Warren's focus is not on the activist regulatory state; indeed, the state is not
Warren's subject at all. Education is the subject of the passage's first few sentences. State and local
governments are important because they provide that education. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493 ("the most
important function of state and local governments"). Indeed, Warren ends the paragraph with just
such an equivocation: "Such an opportunity, where the state has undertaken to provide it,
is a right
which must be made available to all on equal terms." Id. (emphasis added).
489. Brown, 347 U.S. at 493.
490. Id at 495.
491. The strongest support for this reading of Brown appears in the lower court finding quoted
by Warren just before his disapproval of Plessy: "Segregation with the sanction of law.., has a
tendency to [retard] the educational ... development of negro children .
I..."
M at 494 (bracketed
material in original). Oddly enough, Ackerman never discusses this passage.

1534

CALIFORNIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 78:1441

student is being acculturated, the socially constructed subject cannot participate fully in the social and political world.
On this reading, the conceptual significance of Brown is its emphasis
on the importance of situatedness to an understanding of constitutional
autonomy: Because we are situated social beings, equality cannot be
equal except in context. Because the individual is formed in the interaction with the physical and social world, meaningful constitutional autonomy requires affirmative access to the processes by which both the
individual and the community are constituted. As Cover notes:
Precisely because the school is the point of entry to the paideic and
the locus of its creation, the school must be the target of any redemptive
constitutional ideology. Through education, the social bonds form that
give rise to autonomy, to the jurisgenerative process. In education
are
492
meaning.
given
is
"law"
which
in
processes
the
of
origins
the
It is this appreciation of what is truly at stake in the practices of segregation that provides the logic of Warren's conclusion "that in the field of
'49 3
public education the doctrine of 'separate but equal' has no place.
3. Everything's Connected to Everything Else-Griswold
Justice Douglas' opinion in Griswold v. Connecticut 494 is much
maligned for its talk of "penumbras" and "emanations" as well as for the
lack of any explicit textual support for the right to privacy that it
invokes. Ackerman's dualist defense of Griswold sees the case as a selfconscious effort by the Court to wrestle with the implications of the New
Deal's repudiation of Lochner's property-based conception of individual
liberty.495 This interpretation is obviously right, as even a cursory reading of the opinion confirms. 96 Moreover, Ackerman is correct to see
Griswold's move to privacy as rooted in Brandeis' early work on the subject. 9 7 In fact, Griswold is only one installment in the post-New Deal
Court's shift to a privacy-based conception of individual liberty in a
number of different doctrinal areas. The process in fact began in the first
amendment context with NAACP v. Alabama 498 and continued in
the fourth amendment context with Warden v. Hayden4 9 9 and Katz v.
492.
493.
494.
495.

Cover, supra note 178, at 66.
Brown, 347 U.S. at 495.
381 U.S. 479 (1965).
Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics, supra note 5, at 536-45.

496. See Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-83.
497.

Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics, supra note 5, at 544-45 n.193 (discussing Warren &

Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HAIv. L. REv. 193 (1890)); see also Olmstead v. United States,
277 U.S. 438, 478-79 (1928) (Brandeis, L, dissenting) (invoking "the right to be let alone" and "the
privacy of the individual").
498. 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958) (protecting the right of "privacy in one's associations").
499. 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) ("We have recognized that the principal object of the Fourth
Amendment is the protection of privacy rather than property ....").
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United States.50°
Although Ackerman's analysis of Griswold is right on target, it
misses the case's trimorphic, socially contingent dimension. Griswold
must also be situated in its time and in its social milieu. The line from
Griswold through Eisenstadt v. Baird5 0 1 to Roe v. Wade 5 02 can only be
understood when placed in historical context-the development of the
birth control pill in the late 1950s and the revolution in sexual mores that
took place in the 1960s. But even if one stays within the confines of the
text of Griswold itself, Ackerman's reading fails to mine all the riches of
Douglas' opinion.
Everyone is familiar with the eloquent (and somewhat ironic) passage with which Douglas closes the opinion: "Marriage is a coming
together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate to the
degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life,
not causes; a harmony in living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty,
not commercial or social projects."5 03 Ackerman stresses the phrase
about "bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects," 5° which he
sees as the linchpin of Griswold's "discriminating view of the Lochner
era.) 50 5 And surely he is correct to say that the Court was rejecting any
role in economic affairs. But why emphasize only what the case is not
about? What is Douglas endorsing? What is his,,affirmative claim? And
how does that relate to the New Deal?
We can answer these questions with a closer reading of the Griswold
opinion. One of the striking things is the manner in which the opinion is
framed by a focus on relationships. Following the recitation of the facts,
the first legal issue to be discussed is the standing of the professionals to
raise the personal rights of their married patients.50 6 The Court concludes that there is third-party standing because of the "professional relationship": "The rights of husband and wife... [will likely be] diluted or
adversely affected unless ... considered in a suit involving those who
have this kind of confidential relation to them."5 0 7 When Douglas
rejects the Lochner-like overtones of some of the appellants' argu500. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (wiretapping "violated the privacy upon which [Katz] justifiably
relied").
501. 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (state law prohibiting distribution of contraceptives to unmarried
persons but not to married persons violates equal protection clause).
502. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
503. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 486.
504. Id., quoted in Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics, supra note 5, at 541.
505. Ackerman, ConstitutionalPolitics, supra note 5, at 541.
506. The appellants in Griswold were, respectively, the Executive Director of the Planned
Parenthood League of Connecticut and a physician who worked at its center. Griswold, 381 U.S. at
480. They were represented by Professor Thomas I. Emerson of Yale Law School. Id at 479.
507. Id. at 481. For a discussion of the concept of "relational standing," see Winter, The
Metaphor of Standing, supra note 12, at 1485-86, 1501-02.
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ments,50 8 he nevertheless goes forward because: "This law... operates
directly on an intimate relation of husband and wife and their physician's
role in one aspect of that relation."" ° So too, when Douglas expresses
the Court's ultimate conclusion, he makes this relational focus explicit:
The Connecticut statute must be struck down because, "in forbidding the
use of contraceptives rather than regulating their manufacture or sale,
[it] seeks to achieve its goals by means having a maximum destructive
impact upon that relationship."' 10 Indeed, what else could Griswold be
about if not relationships? One doesn't use a contraceptive when one is
alone.
To understand Griswold, then, one must see that the heart of the
case is the recognition that privacy is relational or associational. In the
conventional understanding, priyacy is understood as an individual,
5 11
atomistic right-in Justice Brandeis' words, "the right to be let alone.
In constrast, Justice Douglas already sees what many feminists have
since come to emphasize: that privacy is not a matter of separation and
intrusion, but rather of association and choice. Privacy means more than
the right to exclude others; it necessarily-that is, necessary to us as
social beings-includes the right to share intimacy with others of our
choice. As Douglas later explained:
Those who wrote the Bill of Rights believed that every individual needs
both to communicate with others and to keep his affairs to himself. That
dual aspect of privacy means that the individual should have the freedom
to select for himself the time and circumstances when he will share his
secrets with others and decide the extent of that sharing....
It was in that tradition that we held in Griswold that lawmakers
husband and wife at least, make the use of contracould not, as respects
5 12
ceptives a crime.
Thus, it is this other-directed, situated "dual aspect of privacy" that
Douglas invokes in Griswold, just as West Coast Hotel5" 3 invoked the
situated, interdependent consequences of all economic and social actions.
This is why the unenumerated right that Douglas considers to be the
common thread in Meyer v. Nebraska,51 4 Pierce v. Society of Sisters,5 15
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
footnote
513.
514.

Griswold, 381 U.S. at 481-82.
Id.at 482.
Id. at 485 (emphasis changed from original).
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (Brandeis, ., dissenting).
Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 323-24 (1967) (Douglas, J.,dissenting) (citation and
omitted).
300 U.S 379 (1937).
262 U.S. 390 (1923) (striking down state statute that forbade the teaching of foreign

languages).
515. 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (striking down state statute that forbade parents from sending their
children to private schools).
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NAACP v. Alabama, 51 6 and NAACP v. Button, 17 is not individual privacy, but rather "the 'freedom to associate and privacy in one's
associations.' ,"518
Of course, privacy retains its connotation of freedom from intrusion
by the state; we would not "allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives."5' 9 But much more is at stake. Douglas views marriage as an
"association that promotes a way of life."520 It is obvious that privacy is
destroyed when the state intrudes on the space of the marital bedroom.
Yet it is also problematic, even if less so, to coerce the abandonment of
actions that arise from common life in a dedicated space within the normative world. The effect of this latter form of coercion is to destroy the
experience and interpersonal faith that, as much as "reason," are constitutive of our understanding of normative worlds. 52 '
Privacy is only meaningful as an associational right. If meaning is
grounded in a form of life, then forms of life must be both fostered and
516. 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (holding compelled disclosure of membership in an organization
violates right of free association).
517. 371 U.S. 415 (1963) (holding that state statute prohibiting proper solicitation of legal
business violated first and fourteenth amendments).
518. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 483 (quoting NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958)). For a
sophisticated argument that the common law "privacy" tort is, in essence, a social construct
constitutive of the individual's social personality, see Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REv. 957 (1989). "The tort rests not
upon a perceived opposition between persons and social life, but rather upon their interdependence."
Id. at 959.
519. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485.
520. Id. at 486.
521. Cover, supra note 178, at 49; see also Michelman, supra note 96, at 1533. Cover's point
demonstrates what is wrong about Jennifer Nedelsky's argument that we must do without the
boundary metaphor if we are better to reconceptualize our idea of "self." Nedelsky, supra note 323,
at 176-77. Although I agree with her that it is necessary to reformulate our concept of constitutional
autonomy in a more relational way, it remains useful and important to maintain some conception of
boundary against state power. Otherwise, we too easily fall prey to the conception of the collective
that swallows everything-the lurking totalitarian danger in Hughes' reasoning in West Coast Hotel.
See discussion supratext accompanying notes 436-40. Nedesky seems to recognize this point in her
interpretation of Starhawk's use of the boundary metaphor as "a way of organizing patterns of
respect and expressing the capacity for commitment." Nedelsky, supra note 323, at 175. Even so,
she insists that the boundary metaphor is necessarily distorting. Id. at 176-78.
Nedelsky fails to recognize that it is she, not Lakoff and Johnson, who essentializes the meaning
of the BODY-AS-CONTAINER metaphor. Id. at 178-79 (discussing G. LAKOFF & M. JOHNSON, supra
note 137, at 29). What she does not understand is that, no matter how putatively "natural" a
particular metaphor might be, its meaning is nondeterminate and socially contingent. See Winter,
The Cognitive Dimension, supra note 12, at 2245-55. Thus, even if we unavoidably experience the
body as a container, it does not follow that we do not also experience the body as a connection to
others. Nor does it follow that, if we understand the "self" via the BoDY-As-CoNTAiNER metaphor,
we cannot also understand that what the self "contains" is, necessarily, our relations with others.
See discussion supra text accompanying notes 232-39; see also Winter, supra note 284.
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supported with some measure of legal protection. 522 Because we are situated social beings, real autonomy can have no other meaning.
And, in its own way, Griswold makes the point by the very
unorthodoxy of its methodology. It declines to locate this associationalprivacy right in a discrete constitutional command. Rather, it locates the
right of privacy of relationships in an entire, constitutional way of life.
[S]pecific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by
emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.
Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen.
The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering of
soldiers "in any house" ... is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the "right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches
and seizures." The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause
enables the citizen to create a zone of privacy which government may not
force him to surrender to his detriment.
We have had many controversies over these penumbral rights of
"privacy and repose."... The present case, then, concerns a relationship
lying within the zone ofprivacy created by severalfundamental constitutional guarantees.2 3
Thus, Ackerman is correct that synthesis occurs at the heart of Griswold.
This synthesis, however, is more breathtaking than normally realized.
Douglas synthesizes an entire nomos, an entire constitutional ethos.524 It
is a situated nomos marked by a social, relational ethic. And what he
finds at the center of this normative world is not a self alone, but situated
humans in an intimate relationship.

522. And, so, I agree with Michelman on Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 18 (1986). See
discussion at supra note 179.
523. Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
524. In a passage omitted from the block quote above, Douglas invokes the Court's earlier
synthetic effort in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 613 (1886). Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85. Boyd
was a pre-Lochner case, still operating with a property-based conception of liberty. Nevertheless,
Boyd was a pivotal case for the Brandeisian view of personal liberty that the post-New Deal Court
inherited. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (Boyd is
"a case that will be remembered as long as civil liberty lives in the United States."). Moreover,
Boyd's synthesis employs much the same sense of conceptual interrelatedness as Douglas', although
it invokes a somewhat less felicitous metaphor.
It is not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that constitutes the
essence of the offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible right of personal security,
personal liberty and private property .... Breaking into a house and opening boxes and
drawers are circumstances of aggravation; but any forcible and compulsory extortion of a
man's own testimony or of his private papers . . . is within the condemnation of th[e]
judgment [in Entick v. Carrington]. In this regard the Fourth and Fifth Amendments run
almost into each other.
Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630 (emphasis added), quoted in Griswold, 381 U.S. at 484-85 n.*.
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Robert Cover reminds us that "[a] legal tradition is... part and
parcel of a complex normative world." ' Every normative world has its
own essential, conceptual ecology: It is "a system with an overall structure, where effects cannot be localized-that is, where something in one
part of the system affects things elsewhere in the system." '2 6 Our normative world, no less than any other, is already built up with the sedimented
value of the past. At the same time, it is always an invitation to a sequel,
each new decision "taking its place in relation to what went before and
further cutting a channel for what is to come." '2 7
If I have done my job well, my exploration of these three cases has
only revealed what you, as a situated member of the tradition, already
know to be true. At the same time, however, I have invited you to see
these cases in a way that presents a different path to a different future. Of
course, one consequence of the fact that we are situated in a tradition is
that these cases are already weighted down with other, more restrictive
meanings. But there is no objective truth that stands behind the more
conventional versions of these cases.
Like our language, our tools, our customs, our clothes, they are instruments, invented for a definite purpose, which f[i]nd themselves little by
little burdened with an entirely different function. A complete analysis of
this change in meaning has to 5be
made, . . .and a program of action
28
established consequent upon it.
Thus, if we do share the situated versions of West Coast Hotel, Brown,
and Griswold, they can be the vehicles of an alternative constitutional
paradigm that reflects the inexorability of our situatedness: "Shared
examples can serve cognitive functions commonly attributed to shared
rules."5'29 These cases can be taught and elaborated as the constitutional
exemplars that reveal the ways in which we constitute each other and the
ways in which we constitute an ecologically related social system.
The challenge that remains is to formulate the politics that will realize the potential of these cases. The challenge that remains is the hard
work of a reconstitutive constitutionalism.
VI
WEARING OUT THE SHEATH

In the epigraph at the start of this essay, I quote Merleau-Ponty's
stark, disquieting metaphor: "The blade wears out the sheath, and in the
end no one is satisfied, neither the philosopher nor the powers that
525.
526.
527.
528.
529.

Cover, supra note 178, at 9.
G. LAKo1F, supra note 28, at 113.
Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 147 (1954) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting).
M. MERLEAU-PoNTY, DiALECTnc, supra note 1, at 227 (discussing capitalist institutions).
Kuhn, supra note 336, at 482.
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be." 3 ° It is a powerful image, one that simultaneously evokes the concepts of situatedness and incommensurability. By way of summary, I
want to offer three different readings of this image.
Each of the positions that dominate the current debate in constitutional scholarship prescribes a different antidote for the specter of constitutional law in a conservative age. One position would constrain the
Court with a governing theory, either Grand or otherwise. A second
would render it harmless, demystifying and delegitimating it by means of
the "law is politics" and indeterminacy critiques. A third would wrap it
in normative dialogue in the hope that, if the blade is sufficiently
swathed, we will somehow fail to feel its sting. In this first reading, constitutional authority is the blade and our flagging theoretical efforts the
hapless sheath.
I have argued that these strategies are wrongheaded. The alternative is the more difficult route of making constitutional meaning-from
the ground up, so to speak. More difficult, but more promising. This
alternative engages us in the arduous task of a truly constitutional politics. In this second, more hopeful reading, the relentless capacity for
jurisgenesis is the blade and the stylized strictures of legal convention the
inevitably less sturdy sheath. This reading, however, will please neither
those who long for a stable, logical order nor those who constitute hierarchical legal authority-that is, neither the philosopher nor the powers
that be.
In this reading, the relative indeterminacies and inevitable instabilities of the law are a positive good. In the absence of objective foundations, would we have it any other way?
We do not gain from the working operations of history that comprehensive understanding which would reveal the true solution. At best we rectify errors which occur along the way, but the new scheme is not immune
to errors which will have to be rectified anew. History eliminates the
irrational; but the rational remains to be created and to be imagined, and
5 31
it does not have the power of replacing the false with the true.
The periodic cycle of normalization, crisis, and paradigm shift is, thus, a
necessary homeostatic phenomenon. A multiplicity of diverse and conflicting meanings is an adaptive mechanism, part of a continuing process
by which the social group revises its public meanings. 532 Jurisgenesis is
530. M. MERi.EAu-PoNTY, DIALECrxC, supra note 1, at 72.
531. Id at 22.
532. Cf Kuhn, Reflections on My Crtics, in CRITICISM AND THE GROWTH OF KNOWLEDGE,
supra note 186, at 241:
[M]y other critics inevitably fail to note a special feature which follows from taking the

normal group rather than the normal mind as unit.... Given a group all the members of
which are committed to choosing between alternative theories and also to considering
[shared] values... while making their choice, the concrete decisions of individual members
in individual cases will nevertheless vary. Group behaviour will be affected decisively by
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both relentless and endless, and that is how it should be.
There is a third reading, and it is the one I find most frightening. In
this reading, our individualist self-conception is the blade; and the social,
cultural, and physical environment, the sheath in which we are situated.
As long as we fail to recognize the import of our situatedness, we run the
all too serious risks of fragmentation and self-destruction. The best way
to express this is to recount the results of a Gallup poll published on New
Year's Day, 1990. When asked about their jobs, finances, families, and
the overall quality of their lives in the year 2000, overwhelming majorities (between 75 and 82 percent of those polled) thought that things
would be better for them and their families.53 3 When asked about a
series of social and economic problems, however, the same respondents
were not so sanguine.
Large majorities expected by 2000 to see increases in the rate of inflation
(74 percent), the crime rate (71 percent), poverty (67 percent), homelessness (62 percent), and environmental pollution (62 percent).
Slightly smaller majorities anticipated a worsening of the unemployment rate (59 percent), alcohol and drug abuse problems (58 percent),
and the divorce rate (58 percent).5 4
What I want to know is: Where do these people think they will be living
ten years from now? And, for that matter, where will we?

the shared commitments, but individual choice will be a function also of personality, [and]
education .... To many ... this variability seems a weakness .... When considering the
problems of crisis... I shall want, however, to argue that it is instead a strength. If a
decision must be made under circumstances in which even the most deliberate and
considered judgement may be wrong, it may be vitally important that different individuals
decide in different ways. How else could the group as a whole hedge its bets?
See also Cover, The Uses ofJurisdictionalRedundancy: Interest,Ideology, andInnovation, 22 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 639 (1981); Cover & Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:Habeas Corpus and the
Court, 86 YALE L.J. 1035 (1977); Miechelman, supra note 96, at 1528-29.
533. Kagay, 90', in Pol" A Good Life Amid Old Ills, N.Y. Times, Jan. 1, 1990, at 8, col. 3.
534. Id. at 8, col. 4.

